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All health care technologies covered through the basic benefits basket of 
the Dutch collective health insurance should be effective, provide value for 
money, and be necessary. This last criterion determines the extent of the 
collective solidarity. But how to establish whether a health care technology 
is necessary? 
Through examining qualitative cases from the Netherlands and further afield, 
Tineke Kleinhout-Vliek describes how necessity is established in health care 
coverage decision-making practice. Manifold argumentations pertaining to 
necessity exist and are used by the Dutch National Health Care Institute 
and its appraisal committee (and their equivalents in several Western 
European countries) when deliberating on and formulating advised health 
care coverage decisions. Kleinhout-Vliek details the varied but patterned use 
of these necessity argumentations in cases ranging from highly expensive 
medicines to paracetamol tablets and maternity care.
Such varied use of necessity argumentations may seem problematic, as 
variation would indicate inconsistency and potential inequity between 
decisions. Instead, Kleinhout-Vliek shows that these variable necessity 
argumentations are used for setting health care coverage decisions in 
context, that is, for contextualising them. As the relevant contexts differ 
per health care technology appraised, the relevant necessity argumentations 
vary likewise. Well-contextualised health care coverage decisions contain 
necessity argumentations that are carefully woven together. Weaving 
necessity makes these decisions robust: able to withstand pressure outside 
the decision-making setting.
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17th-century English statesman Oliver Cromwell held that it knows no law. As far as Greek tragedy 
poets Euripides and Sophocles were concerned, nothing had more strength. Even Ares, the god of 
war, could not battle it: necessity. These days, dictionaries speak of something required, unavoid-
able, indispensable, enforcing even. The philosophical definition runs along the same lines: “the 
principle according to which something must be so, by virtue either of logic or of natural law”. As 
more contemporary idiom would have it, however, necessity is the mother of invention – you can 
even make a virtue out of it.
On this scale from enforcing to inspiring, many things have been considered a necessity: educa-
tion, faith, fiction, happiness, music, and even private jets. As in the case of music, the person who 
deemed it so (in this instance, soul music legend Ray Charles) may add the nuance that it concerns 
a personal, rather than a general, necessity: “this is necessary for me”. In the realm of health care, 
this dynamic rears its head too. Is a certain form of health care a necessity for one person – or 
does this also hold for more than one? Historically, medical doctors were responsible for making 
the decision for the individual patient, but in many countries, this has since been supplemented 
by general decisions made for more than one patient. These decisions on what is, and what is not, 
necessary health care taken on a more collective, often (sub) national level deal with the necessity 
of the health care technology generally. Examples of widely acknowledged unnecessary health care 
may seem relatively easy to come by. For forms of health care such as cosmetic surgery (Russell 
et al., 2014) and Viagra (Stolk et al., 2002), many people intuit that provision for all prospective 
recipients may not be a necessity. Then again, both erectile dysfunction and port-wine stains, the 
removal of which is often considered cosmetic and thus unnecessary, may cause impeded social 
functioning and severe psychosocial problems, which does indicate it may be a necessity for some 
patients. So what, if we think about it, should be the arguments pertaining to necessity to back up a 
collective health care coverage decision?
One of the few settings where this question is and has been tackled head-on is the Dutch Na-
tional Health Care Institute (in Dutch: Zorginstituut Nederland, ZIN, in this text: the Institute). 
The Institute is responsible for delivering advice to the Minister of Health concerning which health 
care technologies should, and should not, be part of the Dutch basic benefits basket. This benefits 
basket specifies what Dutch citizens are entitled to through their collective health insurance, which 
is mandatory for all citizens. After receiving advice on the in- or exclusion of the health care 
technology from the benefits basket, the Minister of Health takes the final decision. The process 
for arriving at the advised decision at the Institute has on average, over the years, employed four 
criteria (effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, feasibility, and necessity), with these criteria representing 
questions that are to be answered in the final advice. For effectiveness, the question is: is this health 
care technology effective (enough)? Similarly, for cost-effectiveness: is this cost-effective enough? 
The necessity criterion likewise asks: is it necessary? This last question has also been phrased as: is 
a claim on the collective solidarity justified?
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ThIS DISSERTaTION
This dissertation describes the outcomes of a study commissioned to operationalise the necessity 
criterion. The provenance of this project lies with the Institute. The project was part of a larger move 
towards more research substantiation and support for the Institute’s work. This coincided with the 
set-up of the research network Health Technology Assessment Netherlands (in Dutch: Academische 
Werkplaats Verzekerde Zorg) to act as a “bridge between research and policy”. This centre represents 
a collaboration between Erasmus University Rotterdam, Utrecht University, and the Institute and 
aims to support research designed together with policy advisors (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2020).
In 2014, a working group of Institute employees considered the necessity criterion likely to 
benefit from further operationalisation. This group had concerns about the extent to which the 
then-current version of the formalised necessity criterion reflected political and societal values 
pertinent to the case at hand. They noted that necessity was not a clear-cut criterion for making 
coverage decisions, despite multiple operationalisation and re-operationalisation steps that had 
been taken over the years. At the turn of the century, just over ten years after the term was first 
coined by the Dunning committee (Commissie-Dunning, 1991), scholars had already considered 
necessity a “difficult to measure, non-uniform unit” (Poley, 2002, p. 2313). Since then, multiple 
policy reports had dealt with the necessity question. Despite these efforts, and even though the 
formulation as a criterion did ensure that most, if not all, coverage advice documents contain a 
section ‘necessity’, further operationalisation was still deemed beneficial. This dissertation reports 
on the study that was done to fulfil this need.
a BRIEf hISTORy Of OPERaTIONaLISING NECESSITy
This section will provide a brief history of how necessity as a criterion has been operationalised 
thus far. This overview ranges from 1991 to 2013, which saw the publication of the last relevant 
policy report before the start of this project in March 2015. I distinguish two general strands of 
thought in these documents: first is the substance of the criterion, as several steps have been taken 
to ‘operationalise’ the necessity criterion, that is, to specify the exact question(s) this criterion 
should answer. Second, there is a recurring acknowledgement that necessity should be established 
in deliberation, concurrently with the other criteria and, possibly, other argumentations in the 
appraisal phase of coverage decisions. In health care coverage policy vernacular, the appraisal is 
treated as distinct from the establishment of the knowledge base through assessment of (a subset 
of) the knowledge types available, referred to as ‘the assessment’. Such knowledge bases may range 
from randomised controlled trials to patient-reported outcome measures, which may include data 
harvested from social media as well as ‘real-world data’, but also live patient input (Kalf et al., 2018; 
Makady et al., 2017; Moes et al., 2016; Wiering et al., 2017). The appraisal provides a valuation of 
these knowledge bases, an exploration of additional pertinent factors, and a formulation of the 
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advice, and may or may not be set up as a distinct moment in time and space (Jansen et al., 2017; 
Oliver et al., 2004; Patera & Wild, 2014; Walley, 2007). With their focus on the appraisal as where 
necessity and its arguments should be brought together, these policy documents also highlight the 
importance of procedures to embed the necessity criterion in, in addition to the substance of the 
criterion.
In 1991, the term ‘necessity criterion’ was coined in the report ‘Kiezen en delen; rapport van de 
commissie Keuzen in de zorg’, authored by the ‘Dunning committee’ (Commissie-Dunning, 1991). 
This report was written at the time of a reorganisation of health care more generally in the Neth-
erlands (Helderman et al., 2014). The Dunning committee was the first to introduce a necessity 
criterion for making choices in health care. The report advocated the community approach (as 
opposed to the individual or medical-professional approach) to establishing necessity. This meant 
that necessary care was defined as all care that enabled, sustained, and where possible improved 
opportunities for individuals to share existence with other members of society. The core question of 
necessity was defined as what care would be considered necessary from a communal point of view, 
resulting in a potential ‘ranking’ of care according to level of necessity.
The Dunning committee specifically advocated the use of what they termed a funnel, which 
was to go down in history as ‘Dunning’s funnel’ (in Dutch: de trechter van Dunning). This funnel 
contained four sieves (necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and ‘for own account’ – the last of which 
will also become significant in due course). The idea was that forms of health care would either 
pass through all four sieves and end up in the basic benefits basket that was positioned underneath 
the funnel or get ‘caught’ in one of the sieves and therefore not be provided. Notably, this contrasts 
with the actual use of the four criteria in several examples that are given in the report. Helpful 
here is the case of in vitro fertilisation (IVF), where the Dunning committee was divided on the 
necessity, struggling, for example, with the question whether societal functioning was hampered 
by being childless. There were questions on financing as well in terms of own responsibility: IVF is 
expensive, but as expensive as adoption, which was (and is) not part of the benefits basket. All in 
all, the committee concluded, IVF is not highly necessary and should be low on the ranking. This 
showcases how criteria already in 1991 served less as a sieve and more like arguments to be weighed 
concertedly. In fact, as the committee poses later in the report, the goal of the whole exercise is to 
provide “arguments to base choices in health care on” (Commissie-Dunning, 1991, p. 109).
After its inception in the Dunning committee’s report, the life of necessity as a formalised criterion 
was to last for nearly three decades. In this time, it went through several changes. Several reports 
by other government bodies followed Dunning’s efforts, such as the Contours of the Basic Health 
Benefit Package report by the Health Council of the Netherlands (in Dutch: Gezondheidsraad), 
which stated that package management should be based on both scientific and societal grounds 
and underlined the significance of following good procedures (Gezondheidsraad, 2003). This was 
resonated by the first of a duo of reports by the Council for Public Health and Care (in Dutch: Raad 
voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, RVZ, now Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Samenleving, RVS). 
The first was the Sensible and Durable Care report (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006), 
Introduction
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published June 2006. This report was primarily concerned with the criteria for coverage decisions 
(whereas the next report, Just and Durable Care (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2007), 
dealt with the formalised procedures). The Sensible and Durable Care report noted the difficulties 
with operationalising necessity “not only in the Netherlands but elsewhere” (Raad voor de Volks-
gezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 6). It also names ‘necessity/need for care’ as a criterion, specifying 
that: “the higher this is, the sooner care would qualify to be paid for from collective means” (Raad 
voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 6). This is operationalised as individual severity of 
illness only, specifying this as “the severity of illness for the ‘average’ individual as underwritten 
by society” (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 15). The report also mentions the 
criterion ‘justice/solidarity’ – which is considered even more difficult to operationalise. Four po-
tential concepts are given (egalitarianism, utilitarianism, rule of rescue, and the Maximin principle) 
but these are all “theoretical, without practical consequences.” Usually, the report continues, the 
consequences come down to “justice based on need for care or based on equal access” (Raad voor 
de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 20). This is considered to hang together with the ‘solidar-
ity’ criterion, which is in turn related to the Dunning committee’s ‘for own account’. Here, it is 
important to note that collective funding is not necessary for those technologies patients can pay 
for themselves but that “necessary care must be given independent of financial carrying capacity” 
(Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 20). All in all, these considerations are related but 
it does not become clear how this should be worked out in practice. As to the working of criteria 
in general, the report notes that “filters or sieves do not work, because the world is not black-and-
white” (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 22). Accordingly, the report argues, these 
criteria must be weighed concomitantly. Notably, it names the appraisal phase as the place where 
non-quantifiable criteria feature, where a “societal correction on the technically achieved decision 
becomes possible” (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2006, p. 6, emphasis added). Moreover, 
the report states, if the two differ, the final choice needs to be justified explicitly.
Later that year, in December 2006, The Institute’s predecessor, the College of Health Care Insur-
ances (in Dutch: College voor Zorgverzekeringen, CVZ), was the first to mention package principles 
in their first Package management in Practice report (in Dutch: Pakketbeheer in de Praktijk, abbrevi-
ated PiP). Necessity was one such principle, which was defined as whether “the disease or required 
health care justify a claim on solidarity given the cultural context” (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 
2006). Notably, CVZ was also clear that these package principles and the specific criteria that un-
derlay them should be weighed at the same time and without hierarchy – again in the strictest sense 
deviating from Dunning’s sequential funnel (though not from how it was likely used in practice).
Necessity was operationalised in PiP1 as a combination of first, severity of illness and second, 
‘need for care’, which were then to be combined with third, ‘for own account’: the costs of the 
intervention on the individual level (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2006, p. 36), previously 
visible in the Dunning report. These three are worked out further in the rest of the text (and the 
appendix also adds “public health argumentations, such as dangers to third parties” (College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen, 2006, p. appendix I)). The first element, severity of illness, was defined prefer-
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ably quantitatively, in comparable units. The authors admit that this may not always be practical, or 
the data may not always be available, and this may therefore also be done qualitatively. The second 
element, need for care, was to “get a picture” of the “appeal to care” that this group of patients may 
do (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2006, p. 36). The third element, for own account, was part of 
the necessity criterion but to be used to value and nuance the necessity ‘data’ from the assessment 
phase during the appraisal phase.
There is a severity of illness or need for care, and there is an adequate intervention, and despite 
this positive score, the judgement may still be that the costs do not justify a call on the social 
health care insurance. Because necessity will rarely be expressed as a resolute ‘yes’ or ‘no’, we 
weigh the question whether something can be for [the patient’s] own account in the appraisal 
phase. (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2006, p. 42)
Regarding health care aids, the for own account question had been worked out further, to contain 
‘common use’ and ‘financial accessibility’.
There are questions of ‘common use aid’, or ‘substitution for a commonly used aid’. If it concerns 
a one-off purchase, with a long use, low costs, that does also not vary much from the provisions 
a regular citizen would have in their house, then the conclusion may be that the aid can be for 
own account [the patient can pay for it his or herself]. (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2006, 
p. 42)
In addition, ‘financial accessibility’, containing both contributions and/or accumulation of costs, 
were to be considered as part of necessity of insurance (see appendix 1 of the report). Overall, many 
elements of necessity were again specified, but the appraisal phase was given as the primary place 
where such elements would be brought together and weighed.
At the end of 2006, then, the necessity criterion was operationalised differently in different 
places. Most notable were the introduction of individual severity of illness, preferably quantified, 
and the specification of the Dunning committee’s for own account as individual cost and/or com-
mon use. In addition, the reports suggest a host of different argumentations pertaining to solidarity, 
the cultural context, and public health. However, the difficulty of operationalising these is also 
commented on in several places. Moreover, we see an acknowledgement that criteria acting as 
filters or sieves does not work: criteria should be weighed concertedly and without hierarchy. In 
particular, the necessity question (the answer to which was considered to be rarely a terse yes or no) 
should be dealt with in an appraisal.
The following report of note was the second RVZ report, Just and Durable Care (Raad voor de 
Volksgezondheid en Zorg, 2007). It was, as far as I am aware, the first to propose the installation of 
a specific committee at CVZ: an appraisal committee. This report was followed by Package manage-
ment in Practice 2 (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2009). Necessity was defined the same as in 
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the first PiP report, but the criterion here comprised first, severity of illness, and second, necessity 
of insurance. The first element remained largely the same, but this second element deserves a closer 
look. It was defined as “whether it is necessary or due from a societal perspective to insure a health 
care intervention.” The report continues,
Experience teaches that it is difficult to judge during the assessment whether a health care 
intervention is necessary to insure. These considerations fit, after all, in the societal debate 
(appraisal). (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2009, p. 18)
Further on, the report states that the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness calculations will be weighed 
against the outcome on the rating on feasibility, the individual severity of illness, expressed as a 
percentage of individual loss of health for a patient due to this disease, and ‘necessity of insurance’.
This rating yields arguments in favour of or against incorporation into the [basic benefits] pack-
age. Arguments against incorporation will lower the chance of a positive advice; arguments in 
favour of incorporation into the package will heighten the chance of a positive advice. Examples 
of arguments in favour include: rarity of the disease (orphan indications) combined with a 
lack of alternative treatment options, informal care (a high level of informal care is given to 
the patient, which puts a high pressure on the environment of the patient), and risks for public 
health outside of the patient. Examples of arguments against incorporation into the package 
are: little overlap with the domain of health care, a high total budget impact, unsuitability of 
insurance due to high prevalence, and unsuitability of insurance due to high autonomy of the 
patient. The entirety of these argumentations determines the outcome of the advice. (College 
voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2009, p. 22)
In this report, the role of the appraisal committee (in Dutch: Adviescommissie Pakket, ACP) is 
also worked out for the first time by CVZ. This committee is specifically tasked with weighing the 
comments on the concept advice, making an inventory of the considerations, and determining the 
direction of the advice and priorities. Moreover, the report states, there should not be a sharp line 
between the assessment and appraisal phases.
By 2009, then, two significant steps had been taken. First, on the operationalisation of the neces-
sity criterion side, we see the specification of Dunning’s for own account in terms of insurance 
logic, where a combination of high individual cost and low risk indicates that insuring a health care 
technology makes sense. Second, on the procedural side, RVZ’s suggestion to install an appraisal 
committee had been followed by CVZ.
Package management in Practice 3 was published another four years later (Zorginstituut Neder-
land, 2013). The funnel of Dunning is now named explicitly, with ‘own risk and responsibility’ as 
part of the necessity of insurance element of the necessity criterion (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2013, 
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p. 32). For the severity of illness element, the proportional shortfall method1 was introduced, and 
the reasons why this was chosen: because the societal opinions on the distribution of health were 
now also considered of importance. Examples of such opinions may be that there may be no age 
discrimination, that people with an immediate need should be helped first, or that those with the 
worst health condition should receive most care (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2013, p. 33).
The Institute for Medical Technology & Assessment (iMTA) and the Institute for Health Policy 
& Management (in Dutch: instituut Beleid en Management van de Gezondheidszorg, iBMG) worked 
together with CVZ to develop the ‘necessity of insurance’ element, as in PiP2 it was noted to be in 
need of further operationalisation. Niëns and colleagues developed a ‘2x4 checklist’, based on the 
Institute’s assessment framework for medical care (in Dutch: beoordelingskader hulpmiddelenzorg):
Health insurance as an instrument
 1.  Is the intervention customary care?
 2.  Is the intervention foreseeable?
 3.  Might there be under-usage of an intervention if it is not insured?
 4.  Might there be over-usage of an intervention if it is insured (moral hazard)?
Financial accessibility
 5.  Does the intervention substitute for something that the majority of the population also 
uses?
 6.  Can the (additional) treatment costs be borne by the individual patient?
 7.  Can the patient expect relevant savings (offsetting the costs) due to the intervention?
 8.  Are treatment costs incurred only once or are they structural in character? (Niëns, 2014)
These questions, according to PiP3, were to be asked from an “insurance perspective” (Zorginsti-
tuut Nederland, 2013, p. 37). The first set of questions concerns the chance that something happens 
and the risk of moral hazard (over-usage), the second set considers the financial impact this may 
have for the individual. Questions 1 and 6 were expanded on in the report. For question 1, the 
report states: “This question is meant to delineate the insured care from the usual course of events 
in society.” It specifies that if it is first, a generally customary provision, it will not be insured (such 
as a braille watch). Second, when it is customary care, it concerns the usual care that partners, 
inhabiting parents, or other house mates usually give one another. For question 6, the report notes 
1 Proportional shortfall is a method currently in use in Dutch coverage decision-making practice to quantify the ‘necessity 
of care’ for a certain health care technology. Its objective is to create more equity in terms of severity of illness and (pro-
spective or past) health than counting all Quality-adjusted Life Years (QALYs) as equal, as the latter does not reflect wider 
(societal) notions in terms of treating those in greatest need first. It seeks to do so through quantifying the proportion of 
QALYs patients lost due to the disease without the technology compared to the remaining QALYs these patients would 
have had without this disease (Reckers-Droog et al., 2018; Stolk et al., 2004). It is currently used in practice in setting 
reference values for cost-effectiveness thresholds (Reckers-Droog et al., 2019; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2018).
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that it has been difficult in practice to state a maximum amount, and that this is perhaps even 
undesirable. It also holds that “whether certain package proposals exceed the capacity of citizens is, 
ultimately, a political consideration. From insurance theory, it is a legitimate question whether the 
costs of provision outweigh the costs of insurance.” The report argues that for low costs, insurance is 
not indicated, because if it is not provided through the benefits package “the market will do its job, 
in the good sense of the word” (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2013, p. 38). This, the report continues, 
should be regarded in cohesion with other considerations.
PiP3 thus further operationalised the necessity criterion’s first element, severity of illness, as 
calculated by means of the proportional shortfall method, and the second element, necessity of 
insurance, as a 2x4 checklist. Notably, these highly specified considerations should still be consid-
ered in cohesion with other argumentations but not much attention is given in PiP3 as to how this 
should take place.
Summarising, the two strands of thought that have dominated these policy reports have both 
evolved over the years. The substantive operationalisation of necessity has moved from relatively 
broadly defined to a high degree of specification in the shape of a complex calculation and a check-
list. Over the years, the specified criterion has contained several elements, the most transient of 
which seems to have been solidarity and public health argumentations, though an acknowledge-
ment of the context, be it cultural or otherwise, appears regularly. Second, there has been an almost 
continual appreciation of deliberative settings for the establishment of necessity so as to be able 
to weigh it concurrently with other criteria (and other argumentations), with necessity relatively 
quickly losing its primacy as the first ‘sieve’ in Dunning’s funnel. Establishment of necessity or 
answering the necessity question, in particular, has over the years been specified as best taking 
place in the appraisal phase of decisions by a separate appraisal committee.
DuTCh COVERaGE DECISION-MakING PRaCTICE
Current Dutch coverage decision practice, follows the generic assessment-appraisal pattern out-
lined above, with a few additional steps. After a form of health care has been set on the agenda as a 
topic requiring consideration from the Institute, a scoping session is initiated, in which stakehold-
ers are invited to contribute relevant considerations. Next, a wide variety of knowledge types is 
gathered by Institute employees, which are subsequently assessed by the assessment committee (in 
Dutch: Wetenschappelijke Adviesraad, WAR). This is written up into a ‘discussion document’ which 
features headings per criterion and other relevant considerations to benefit the appraisal committee 
(in Dutch: Adviescommissie Pakket, ACP). The appraisal aims for an explicit “societal weighing” of 
the knowledge established in the assessment (art. 14, Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016, 2017), result-
ing in an advised decision. This advised decision is discussed and approved by the Institute’s board 
of directors and sent to the Minister.
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To arrive at this advice, a combination of both Health Technology Assessment (HTA) and 
Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) is reportedly used (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017). 
HTA and A4R are both institutionalised frameworks aiming to benefit coverage decision-making 
practice and both have been extensively refined and their workings in practice studied by scientists. 
They are relevant as the two strands of thought I distinguished in the policy documents above have 
each been resonated by, and probably influenced by, these two scientific fields. On the one hand, the 
idea of providing well-established, consistently-applied substantive criteria for making decisions 
has been advocated by scholars in the field of Health Technology Assessment. Scholars working 
on Accountability for Reasonableness, on the other hand, would consider good procedures the 
primary guarantee for good decisions. Below, I give a brief introduction to both2.
HTA aims to provide a “systematic evaluation of the properties and effects of a health technol-
ogy” (INAHTA, 2020). It does so assuming that the total budget a country has available to spend 
on health care technologies is limited and it seeks to identify which technologies provide value 
for money as a consequence (Lehoux, 2014). HTA was at its inception defined as the evaluation 
of both the technical side of a health care technology as well as the societal impact, that is, both 
assessment and appraisal. In practice, HTA has largely been narrowed down to effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness calculations to benefit the assessment phase (Giacomini, 1999; Lehoux & Blume, 
2000), despite historic and recent calls to (re)integrate ‘ethical issues’ into HTA (Daniels et al., 2016; 
Jansen et al., 2017). HTA remains a hugely impactful enterprise and these technical assessments are 
now more and more achieved internationally (Guegan et al., 2014; Stolk et al., 2009). A large part 
of the work of the Institute currently entails achieving an HTA per health care technology, which 
feeds into decision making through the assessment phase in particular and serves to ‘ground’ the 
advice scientifically (Niezen, 2012). This grounding is directly based on notions of evidence-based 
medicine (Abrishami, 2017; Lehoux & Blume, 2000).
On the procedural side, Daniels and Sabin developed the Accountability for Reasonableness 
(A4R) framework in the 1990s based on Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. A4R responded to 
questions around the legitimacy and fairness of limit-setting decisions made by USA-based 
Managed Care Organizations and other insurers at the time. A4R sets procedural boundaries 
for coverage decisions: relevance, publicity, appeals, and enforcement (Daniels, 2000; Daniels & 
Sabin, 1997, 1998, 2008). These respectively aim to ensure that 1) the rationale for the decision 
is supported by reasons judged reasonable by “fair-minded people”; 2) this rationale is provided 
2 Recent efforts have attempted to bring the two together into a comprehensive framework for ‘evidence-informed delibera-
tive processes’ (EDPs) (Bærøe & Baltussen, 2014; Baltussen et al., 2016; Baltussen et al., 2017; Oortwijn et al., 2020). Such 
EDPs should, these authors argue, “learn about the relevant social values” through early stakeholder involvement and 
evaluate these values in a manner that is informed by evidence. They denote five important implications for the ideal 
organisation of the processes at HTA agencies. First, these agencies should organise stakeholder involvement well. Second, 
they should integrate the assessment and appraisal phases. Third, it is suggested that the criteria for making decisions 
are subjected to public scrutiny. Fourth, HTA agencies are advised to formulate and use a checklist of criteria that are 
considered potentially relevant and, in the justification or rationale for decisions, outline how each criterion affected this 
decision. Fifth, the authors suggest making these justifications or rationales public and enabling appeals.
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publicly; 3) this decision can be appealed; and 4) the first three criteria are enforced in some way. 
A4R thus prescribes criteria for coverage decision processes and holds that through satisfaction of 
these criteria, the process can be considered legitimate. A4R has been considered both acceptable 
and applicable in a wide variety of decision settings (Daniels & Sabin, 2008; Kapiriri et al., 2009; 
Kapiriri & Razavi, 2017; Martin et al., 2002). In essence, A4R holds that a decision outcome should 
be accepted as fair when it has been reached by a fair procedure (Daniels et al., 2016). As opposed to 
HTA, A4R thus sets procedures over content in terms of achieving health care coverage decisions. 
A recent policy report specifies how A4R’s procedural boundaries are adhered to in practice at the 
Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017).
Of the whole coverage decision-making process, this dissertation will focus on the appraisal 
phase as this is where necessity is located according to the policy documents studied. Specifically, 
this dissertation will build on descriptive, inductive understandings of what appraisal entails. This 
will mean not situating it in either the HTA or A4R scientific tradition, as these are in essence both 
more prescriptive than descriptive, deriving as they do from larger principles for good decision 
making, namely justice as consistently-applied criteria and justice as fairness respectively. This 
means that these schools of thought are not primarily concerned with describing what happens in 
practice but with to what extent practice may adhere to the principles set out. Instead, I will take 
my cues from inductive studies which understand appraisal to be a deliberative process to come 
to a decision through interpretation of the knowledge input. These studies describe appraisals as 
featuring a plethora of different argumentations (Dakin et al., 2015; Franken et al., 2015; Gordon, 
2006; Guindo et al., 2012; Jansen et al., 2017; Morrell et al., 2017; Shah, 2009), which may contradict 
(Martin et al., 2001; Singer et al., 2000), and the applicability of which may be under discussion 
(Kapiriri et al., 2009; Vuorenkoski et al., 2008). Two schools of thought have considered inductively 
how these types of decisions are arrived at: Health Services Research and Science and Technology 
Studies. I will discuss both in turn.
hEaLTh SERVICES RESEaRCh: ELEGaNCE, RaTIONaLITy, ExPERTISE
This overview on the inductive work on coverage decision making in the Health Services Research 
(HSR) field starts in the middle of the 1990s. ‘Muddling through’, a key phrase in this field at this 
time, denoted decisions made ‘not according to general rules’, that is, decision criteria. Instead, 
decisions relied on the discretion of the decision makers (Hunter, 1995; Mechanic, 1997). The term 
muddling through is borrowed from the political scientist Lindblom (1959) who observed in his 
landmark study that even when you agree on both the (knowledge) input and the intended goals 
of a policy, you may still disagree on which policy is most appropriate. Preferences of decision 
makers vary, and they, therefore, value certain policies or policy instruments differently. This, 
however, Lindblom considered not so much a problem as a fact of policy life. Since its inception, 
muddling through has been criticised for resulting in inconsistency between decisions and even in 
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arbitrariness. Scholars in the coverage decision-making field, however, preferred it over the rigid 
application of universal decision criteria, which they considered to lead to too little attention for 
the case at hand (Entwistle et al., 1996; Ham, 1999). They described ‘implicit’ or individual-level 
decisions that relied on “discretion, flexibility, and ability to take account of emotions, aspirations, 
and preferences” (Mechanic, 1997, p. 90). Their answer to the arbitrariness charge was to muddle 
through elegantly with greater transparency concerning the grounds for a decision (Hunter, 1995; 
Mechanic, 1997). Much of the inductive work that followed this positioning described decision 
makers’ subjectivities, that is, personal preferences and ways of deciding, showcasing “the practical 
circumstances of real-world decision making” (Hughes & Light, 2002, p. 1).
Since then, the field has moved towards describing the rationality of decisions, specifically 
favouring a both-and conceptualisation of rational decisions (Calnan et al., 2017; Gkeredakis et al., 
2011; Hughes & Doheny, 2011). For rational decisions, decision makers not only take into account 
“contexts and occasions” but are accountable to criteria, such as those provided by evidence-based 
medicine, at the same time (Jenkings & Barber, 2004, p. 1765). The application of criteria and the 
incorporation of scientific knowledge has thus become part and parcel of making rational deci-
sions, rather than being opposed to it. This has required decision makers to negotiate between 
and ultimately incorporate both those more formal rationalities and more ‘local’ ones in the 
decision-making process (Hughes & Doheny, 2011). This has resulted in an overall focus on the 
work that goes into combining; some scholars describe decision makers as being both ‘rational’ and 
‘human’ (Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014); others how they display a “combining of strategies” (Calnan 
et al., 2017; Moreira, 2005). Such combining work has specifically been characterised as being 
pragmatic (Calnan et al., 2017; Hunter, 1995; Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014); resulting in decisions 
with a ‘pragmatic rationality’ (Russell, 2017, following a.o. Aristotle). Such rationality is juxtaposed 
with both instrumental rationality, where a complete set of decision rules guarantees the quality of 
the decision (embodied by HTA efforts), and institutional rationality, with transparency and good 
procedure acting as guarantors (as visible in the A4R framework) (Gkeredakis et al., 2011; Ham 
& Glenn, 2003; Russell, 2017). Pragmatic rationality carries a distinctly positive valuation as “a 
characteristic of expert judgement” (Russell, 2017, p. 60). Pragmatic rationality is found in the way 
experts combine not only experiential knowledge and emotional engagement but also scientific 
evidence and ethical principles for fair processes (Russell, 2017). Expertise or specifically experts 
who display pragmatic rationality in the rhetorical deliberative setting thus may potentially be held 
as an alternative guarantor of decision quality.
Concluding, although some authors (Hughes & Doheny, 2011; Jenkings & Barber, 2004) do ref-
erence the world outside in the decision-making process, the HSR field primarily focuses its efforts 
on the dynamics of the deliberative processes and describing the role and embodiment of expertise 
therein. For this dissertation, these processual dynamics of pragmatic decision making will be of 
great interest. Based on the overview above, I note three elements: 1) decision-making experts 
display an understanding of, and are able to work with, different types of knowledges; 2) experts 
know how to respond in a human way; and 3) experts adhere to formalised procedures. I will, 
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however, release the emphasis on combining work and instead, focus on the expertise displayed in 
appraisal specifically and what may distinguish it from earlier studies on coverage decision-making 
expertise. Moreover, as the use of the necessity criterion is evident not only in deliberation but also 
in documents containing the justification or rationale for decisions, this study requires more focus 
in terms of the substance and the outcome of the decision than much current HSR is giving it. To 
fill this gap, I am turning to Science and Technology Studies.
SCIENCE aND TEChNOLOGy STuDIES: ExPERTISE aND ThE WORLD 
OuTSIDE
Science and Technology Studies (STS) has a long history studying the role of expert advice in ‘the 
greater picture’, often a political decision-making process (Collins & Evans, 2008; Fischer, 2011; 
Frey & Fontana, 1991; King et al., 2018; Rip, 1985). According to Rip (1986, 1992), expert advice 
should aim to orientate the recipients of the advice in favour of some option for action, involving 
the world outside with its complexity and uncertainty in this advice (Rip, 1985, p. 95). Rip notes 
(following Ezrahi, 1980) that when there is no scientific consensus and no agreement on social and 
political goals, public controversy is likely. The aim should therefore be pragmatic rationalism (see 
also Rip, 1992), which he defines as:
Each solution must take account of the circumstances relevant to that unique situation. 
[Pragmatic rationalism] redefines the goals of expert advice towards stressing its ability to help 
decision-makers to produce robust outcomes in particular contexts, rather than just in terms of 
the quality of its scientific and technical content. (Rip, 1985, p. 108)
This definition of pragmatic rationalism differs notably from Russell’s. Russell defines pragmatic 
rationalism as a specific process, a moment in time in which the decision is made, and highlights 
the skills of experts therein. In contrast, through his definition, Rip underlines the substantive 
input, the decision outcome, and what happens to the decision afterwards. He defines pragmatic 
rationalism as a process that is not only localised but in an active relationship with ‘contexts’. These 
contexts affect the decision both through input into the decision as the circumstances to be consid-
ered and through testing the ‘robustness’ of the decision output.
Concerning input into policy decisions, much recent STS work has considered the production 
of (socially) robust knowledge (Nowotny, 2003; Nowotny et al., 2013; Rip, 2010). Such knowledge, 
Nowotny et al. hold, is produced by “democratising expertise”, which involves opening the door 
to experts of other kinds, most notably experts-by-experience rather than academic training (cf. 
Moes, 2019). Context is thus given a voice, “society [is] speaking back to science” (Strathern, 2003), 
in line with a broader societal trend in many Western countries towards more public participation 
in policy making (e.g., Jasanoff, 2003). Some scholars have expressed a fear of this resulting in a 
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collapse of the concept of expertise. Starting with their landmark paper ‘The Third Wave of Science 
Studies’, Collins and Evans (2002) have sought to re-draw boundaries around technical-scientific 
expertise, aiming to explicate its status and role in decision making and sparking subsequent debate 
within STS (Collins et al., 2010, 2011; Epstein, 2011; Fischer, 2011; Jasanoff, 2003; Rip, 2003).
I would agree with Fischer as he argues that technical expertise inputs in but cannot give the final 
judgement on decisions affecting the public realm (in line with Lindblom) (Fischer, 2011). Nowotny 
also gives the many complexities of the social and political world as a major reason for involving 
experts-by-experience (Nowotny, 2003), thus likewise linking the input to the performance of the 
output ‘out there’. In this, the justification or rationale for a decision likely plays a major role (Bal, 
1999). This has also been acknowledged by Collins et al., who noted that political choices based 
on expert advice ought to be made explicit and public (Collins et al., 2010). As Moreira recom-
mends on coverage decisions, “experts and stakeholders should be able to pre-emptively account 
for their reasoning to a non-expert audience” (Moreira, 2011, p. 1340). As stated above, the decision 
justification or rationale should be robust given the places and situations where the decision is to 
have an effect (Rip, 1985), and knowledge concerning this context is to be crucial in achieving this.
RESEaRCh quESTIONS
This research answers the following main research question: how is the necessity criterion used in 
practice? The first important observation I made during the early days of my field work, underlined 
by the policy documents described above, was that the necessity criterion as used in practice took 
the form of argumentations. I will define argumentations as explicated reasons, generally given on 
paper or in discussion by anyone reasoning about the potential coverage status of a health care 
technology. Consequently, I set up the following sub-questions:
 1.  Which primary types of necessity argumentations can be distinguished from the published 
literature and how does the user and place of use of necessity argumentations affect their 
use and outcome?
This question, answered in Chapter 1, aims to provide an overview, not comprehensive but to be 
used as a first insight, of necessity argumentations, to see if a classification can be made that might 
distinguish several specific argumentation types and if patterns of use may be elucidated based on 
user and place of use.
 2.  How are necessity argumentations used in (advised) decision documents in the Nether-
lands, Belgium, England, and Germany to construct this decision through contextualising 
the knowledge on a certain health care technology?
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Chapter 2 gives the answer to this question, which compares the use of necessity argumentations in 
(advised) decision documents in Belgium, England, Germany, and the Netherlands to gain insight 
into how necessity argumentation types are used, for what purpose, and especially how their use 
compares across four specific case studies.
 3.  How are necessity argumentations used, both in deliberation and in the advised decision, 
to ‘construct necessity’ in the Dutch appraisal committee meetings and what does this say 
about societal weighing expertise?
For this question, we delved into the setting of the appraisal committee as that is where the use of 
necessity argumentations such as the ones identified through research question 1 were audible in 
practice. This question is answered in Chapter 3.
 4.  How are necessity argumentations used to contribute to a robust advised decision and what 
may be done to make such a decision more robust?
In Chapter 4, a subset of data from Chapter 3 was re-analysed to formulate a conceptual model for 
arriving at robust decisions.
Together, these four questions aim to clarify how the necessity criterion is used by examining 
usage-in-practice as described in scholarly literature, in different countries, in the Dutch appraisal 
specifically, and from a theoretical stance.
SET-uP aND METhODOLOGy
Chapter 1 comprises a realist review, that answers research question 1. The realist review is an es-
tablished methodology used to review literatures and to gain insight into technologies-in-context. 
My team has extended the applicability of this method by applying it to text rather than technology 
– we are, as far as we know, the first to do so. The realist review method asks: what works, for whom, 
under what circumstances? This is in fact not difficult to apply to argumentations, as they, like 
technologies, are used in a particular place to achieve a particular outcome (Pawson et al., 2005). 
The realist review method was thus chosen to enlarge our understanding of not only the variety 
of potential argumentations but of their usage, as we hypothesised that not all argumentations 
would be used in the same way. We chose to review scholarly literature rather than policy docu-
ments as much of the previous scholarly work on necessity had in fact built on the latter. Moreover, 
we were hoping to provide insight into more than the argumentation types used in formalised 
decisions only. In terms of the review, particularly the identification of the argumentation types 
was an extended process methodologically. There are iterations of the Excel file that have three 
argumentation types (Burden of Disease, Necessity of Insurance, and Solidarity, dated 23 March 
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2016), and there are iterations that have more than the twenty we arrived at (e.g., Vulnerability/
Compassion is a combined argumentation type in the final list, as these turned out to be difficult to 
distinguish in some texts). Chapter 1, then, provides an overview of the list of necessity argumenta-
tion types retrieved from scholarly literature, and second, zones in on the patterns of use of these 
argumentations.
Chapter 2 answers research question 2 by offering a comparative analysis of the use of necessity 
in decision-making processes generally and in four (advised) decisions specifically across four 
countries in Western Europe: Belgium, England, Germany, and the Netherlands. These countries 
were chosen as they share certain ‘health care system objectives’; equity, affordability, and trans-
parent decision-making among them (Franken et al., 2012). The reason for examining not just 
Dutch decision-making practices but comparing them to those in three other countries was that 
comparative analyses are considered helpful for comparing arguments and statements specifically, 
resulting in clear definitions and succinct follow-up research questions (Deville et al., 2016). To 
gain understanding of the general decision-making practices, we started with semi-structured, ac-
tive group interviews (Holstein & Gubrium, 2016), which were augmented by document and web 
site analysis, with the results member-checked. This member check also resulted in the decision to 
additionally examine several decisions that were made in all four countries. Employing the case 
approach promises insight into patterns of social behaviour specifically (Creswell & Poth, 2017; 
Ragin, 2004) and is as such a good match for this type of research. The selection of cases adhered 
to specific criteria formulated by all the collaborators on that chapter (for more details, please 
see Chapter 2). Importantly, the cases could include any decision as long as a decision document 
(containing a justification or rationale for the decision) was available, as only this paper was to be 
examined. The cases that were ultimately selected represented a relatively wide variety of health 
care technologies, as we hypothesised that would also contribute to the validity of our findings, in 
addition to the decision outcomes per case varying across the countries. Throughout the analysis 
of the documentation pertaining to the four selected cases in the four countries, I have used the 
list of necessity argumentation types as ‘sensitising concepts’ (Bulmer, 1979) to gain insight into 
how necessity argumentations are used in coverage decision practice. A sensitising concept is used 
to make the researcher (more) aware of certain dynamics, and in my case, it guides the analysis 
through acting as a code. I coded the documents with these twenty necessity argumentation types 
as codes, transferring them to Microsoft Excel so as to see when, where, and by whom the different 
argumentation types were used in the documents studied. This has enabled insight not so much 
in the contents of the argumentations but in the patterns of use to be compared across the four 
countries.
Chapter 3 will answer research question 3 by homing in on the Dutch appraisal phase and 
analysing how this appraisal committee interprets its role in terms of societal weighing. Ques-
tion 3 asks how necessity is constructed, what societal weighing looks like. Chapters 3 and 4, both 
examine the Dutch appraisal practices specifically, as this is where both the policy documents and 
Chapter 2 expressly located the use of necessity argumentations. These chapters build in part on 
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the same cases (namely eculizumab and paracetamol-vitamin D tablets), and case selection was 
more time-constrained than for Chapter 2. The reason is that I had to have been present at the 
appraisal committee meeting or at least be able to listen to the audio file, with the former having 
a strong preference (in the end, only the maternity case happened before my presence at appraisal 
committee meetings; this case was selected as interviewees stated it would be a particularly fruitful 
case in terms of studying the necessity criterion). Moreover, the cases were purposely chosen to 
represent a wide variety of health care technologies. Like in Chapter 2, I coded the transcribed 
audio files and the documents (in this case, the discussion documents provided as input for the 
appraisal meeting as well as the decision documents containing the final decision and the letter to 
the Minister) using the necessity argumentation types formulated in Chapter 1. These data were 
triangulated by interviews with Institute employees and appraisal committee members.
Sensitisation to the robustness of decisions through appreciation of what public controversy 
might engender is the way into Chapter 4. This chapter seeks to answer research question 4 to focus 
more on theorising on how these decisions are brought together in terms of content, asking the 
question: how are robust coverage decisions made? In this chapter, instead of choosing a primar-
ily data-driven approach, I chose to profit from theoretical work within STS on controversy and 
robustness to come to a model for making robust decisions in appraisal. This model is illustrated 
by data from Chapter 3.
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INTRODuCTION
Public outrage often ensues when decision makers exclude forms of care, such as orphan drugs or 
expensive cancer medicines, based on an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) that is below 
par. This outrage not infrequently precedes a reversal of the decision (Burls et al., 2005; Clarke et 
al., 2001). At the same time, however, not all forms of care with a sufficiently low ICER are covered. 
Viagra, for example, is highly effective and not that expensive but almost never provided by the 
state; decision makers deem it unnecessary to do so (Bernfort, 2003; Stolk et al., 2002). Hence, 
(cost-) effectiveness is not the decisive factor in all funding decisions. In these situations, another 
factor trumps it: the perceived necessity of coverage. To aid operationalisation, this chapter will 
survey the content, use, and context of the necessity criterion, an umbrella term for need- and 
solidarity-related argumentations used – not just decisively, and not just in coverage decisions 
made by policy makers and insurance companies.
In this chapter we will review argumentations underpinning the necessity, or lack thereof, of 
coverage of a certain treatment or therapy, as explicated in academic literature. To cast our net 
wide, we have chosen to include not only ‘actual’ decisions, that is, coverage decisions made by 
policy makers and insurance companies but also what we term ‘hypothetical’ coverage decisions. 
The latter type generally comes in the form of surveys (of, e.g., decision makers or the public) or 
ethical or economic analyses exploring possible reasons for (denial of) coverage. By examining 
both actual and hypothetical decisions we hope to provide insight into all potential considerations 
that may be invoked when deciding whether the coverage of a therapy or treatment is thought to be 
necessary. This is relevant as surveys and public opinion are considered of note (and of use) within 
coverage decision making practice (Ham, 1997; Mitton et al., 2009), as are scholarly reflections, 
as exemplified by the international take-up of the Accountability for Reasonableness framework 
(Kapiriri et al., 2009; D. Martin et al., 2002).
Objectives and focus of review
We followed the realist review method as described in the RAMESES publication standard (G. 
Wong et al., 2013). This method is used to review sundry literatures on a specific policy interven-
tion, in order to describe why and how these interventions do what they do in their context. Using 
this method, researchers aim to uncover what works, for whom, and in what circumstances by 
conceptualising meta-level theories that detail patterns of how mechanisms-in-contexts lead to 
certain outcomes (Greenhalgh et al., 2011; Otte-Trojel et al., 2014; Pawson et al., 2005). In such 
an iterative research process, we refined how argumentations bearing upon necessity of coverage 
(mechanism) are used in justifying both actual and hypothetical coverage decisions (outcome), as 
found in academic literature. These decisions are made in context: by different decision makers from 
different countries, and, in case of actual decisions, placed on the decision agenda by different actors. 
Thus, the argumentations may be seen as interventions that have a proposed or actual outworking, 
also depending on contexts they are situated in. This review will address the following questions:
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1. Which, if any, argumentations (mechanisms) are currently used in hypothetical and actual 
coverage decisions to justify whether coverage of a treatment is, or is not, necessary?
2. How do these argumentations justify the hypothetical and actual coverage decisions (outcomes) 
for different treatments, in different countries, put on the agenda by different agents (contexts)?
METhODS
Rationale for using realist synthesis
Little attention has been given to “the problem of operationalizing for decision makers essentially 
qualitative and normative criteria such as whether the technology serves an “ethical” or “medically 
necessary” purpose” (Giacomini, 2005). Furthermore, “social and ethical parameters of value (…) 
are anticipated to become as critical for reimbursement decisions (…) as economic and clinical 
criteria” (Akhmetov & Bubnov, 2015). In light of the lack of operationalisation and its (potentially) 
crucial role in coverage decisions, we conducted a literature review of the argumentation types that 
fall under the necessity criterion.
A realist review describes an intervention from different types of literatures, in our case actual 
coverage decisions (qualitative analyses of coverage decisions or policies), as well as hypothetical 
ones (economic analyses, ethical analyses, surveys, interviews, and opinion pieces). It searches these 
articles not just for information on the intervention (that is, the argumentation) but also for how 
the context (country, agenda setter) may have influenced the use of the intervention and its out-
come (the decision including decision type: hypothetical or actual decision). This is subsequently 
summarised in context-mechanism-outcome patterns. From these patterns, meta-level theories 
are formulated that explain the working of these interventions-in-context. The primary reason for 
choosing the realist review method is practical; this method provided a focused lens to zoom in on 
particular aspects of actual and hypothetical coverage decisions, which in turn aided comparison 
of a broad variety of articles. Using this method for a non-classical intervention proved, moreover, 
an interesting methodological issue to grapple with. The second reason for utilising this method 
lies in its philosophical underpinnings. A realist philosophy holds that actors can and do effectuate 
change in context but are themselves shaped by the contexts they are part of. In this sense, it is likely 
to be acceptable to (social) scientists and policy makers alike.
Scoping the literature and searching processes
As an exploratory foray into grey literature and policy documents yielded too few explicated argumenta-
tions, we focused on peer-reviewed literature. For our primary background search thereof (Pawson et 
al., 2005), we used the conceptualisation of the necessity criterion in the Netherlands (Couwenbergh 
et al., 2013), as a request for operationalisation of this criterion from the Dutch National Health Care 
Institute catalysed this study. We subsequently discovered similar and/or underlying conceptualisations 
and related terminology in other countries, like ‘need’ and ‘solidarity’, which helped inform our search 
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strategy. The primary search was conducted in Embase (see Table 1 for search terms) and translated to 
Medline and Web of Science (Bramer et al., 2014), which is recognised to be an effective combination for 
reviews (Wichor M. Bramer). We used three general elements separated by the Boolean operator ‘AND’ 
as this kept the total number of articles workable (under 6,000). These general elements are a) the type 
of provision, b) the process of decision making, and c) the content in terms of criteria. Utilising a), we 
aimed for a representative sample, therefore a wide variety of provision were included (benefit package, 
health insurance, and/or health catalogue or service). For elements b) and c) specificity was the goal; we 
zoomed in specifically on coverage decisions (also often termed ‘rationing’ or ‘priority setting’ decisions) 
and precisely on those decisions that employ the necessity criterion. In selecting the exact search terms, 
we aimed for results that included the articles retrieved and selected from the primary background 
search, for example (Bernfort, 2003; Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn, 2003; Stolk et al., 2002). For each of the 
three elements we included relevant thesaurus terms (Emtree terms for Embase and MeSH terms for 
Medline). We excluded conference papers, letters, notes, and editorials, as well as articles written in any 
language other than English but did not employ any date restrictions (WM Bramer).
(‘insurance’/de OR ‘health insurance’/de OR ‘child health insurance’/de OR ‘national health insurance’/de OR ‘private health 
insurance’/de OR ‘public health insurance’/de OR ‘national health service’/de OR ‘reimbursement’/de OR (insurance* OR 
reimburse* OR (national NEAR/3 (service OR coverage)) OR (cover* NEAR/6 deci*) OR ((partial* OR polic* OR universal 
OR unlimited OR limited OR temporar* OR permanent* OR recommend* OR plan OR plans) NEAR/3 coverage) OR 
(basic NEAR/3 package*) OR (health NEAR/3 catalogue*)):ab,ti)
AND
(‘decision making’/de OR ‘ethical decision making’/de OR ‘medical decision making’/de OR (decision* OR decide OR 
rationing OR priorit* OR (analys* NEAR/3 (inclusion OR exclusion)) OR (coverage NEAR/3 (negativ* OR positiv* OR 
determin* OR deny OR denial*))):ab,ti) AND (‘resource allocation’/de OR (coverage OR inclusion* OR funding OR 
(resource* NEAR/3 allocat*) OR ‘should be provided’ OR ‘what to provide’):ab,ti)
AND
(‘health care cost’/de OR ‘cost of illness’/de OR ‘economic evaluation’/exp OR ethics/de OR bioethics/de OR ‘medical 
ethics’/de OR ‘ethical decision making’/de OR ‘health care policy’/de OR ‘needs assessment’/de OR (necess* OR cost* OR 
(disease* NEAR/3 burden*) OR expenditure* OR solidarit* OR (therapeutic NEAR/3 (value* OR need*)) OR (budget* 
NEAR/3 impact*) OR ethic* OR ‘health benefit*’ OR (benefit NEAR/3 (risk OR analysis)) OR ‘health technology 
assessment*’ OR ‘health care poli*’ OR (need* NEAR/3 (assess* OR healthcare OR health-care))):ab,ti)
NOT
([Conference Abstract]/lim OR [Letter]/lim OR [Note]/lim OR [Editorial]/lim)
AND
[english]/lim
Table 1 - Search terms used in Embase
Selection and appraisal of documents
The first author (TKV) scanned titles, abstracts, and keywords in Endnote to include decisions 
that were made on the macro (government) or meso (local health authorities, sickness funds, and 
insurance companies) level (Polikowski & Santos-Eggimann, 2002). BB, the last author, scanned 
a random subset of 537 studies. Together, an agreement rate of 96% was reached and further 
disagreement was resolved through discussion. This first round of inclusions amounted to a total 
of 666 studies. Next, TKV read all candidate papers in full and excluded 594 of the 666, ending 
up with 72 studies. Through snowballing, a further 26 such studies were added, bringing the total 
number to 98 (see Figure 1).
Chapter 1
40
figure 1 - Document flow diagram
The inclusion criteria were:
 a)  the article describes a hypothetical or actual coverage decision made concerning a specific 
form of care, treatment, therapy or medical technology,
 b)  on the meso or macro level, and
 c)  employing necessity-related considerations.
We correspondingly excluded articles that:
 a)  describe generalised criteria not applied to a specific form of care,
 b)  concern individual decisions (that is, for one patient) as they may concern the exception 
rather than the rule, and
 c)  employ only effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness or other quantitative argumentations.
In doing so, we aimed to find studies containing concrete, qualitative, in-use argumentations that 
influence different types of coverage decisions as formulated by different actors on different levels 
regarding different forms of care.
Data extraction
TKV extracted data from these 98 articles using Microsoft Excel and ATLAS.ti. During this process, 
‘mode of agenda setting’ emerged as a potential context of influence. Conversely, ‘type of disease’ 
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was removed as it proved unfruitful. To score the context, we noted country, year, macro- or meso 
level, and decision maker per identified argumentation, which was in turn scored as mechanism. 
The coverage decision was scored as the outcome, with eight outcome categories, of which three 
were used in case of an actual coverage decision:
 -  Yes – the treatment is unconditionally covered/conditions unspecified,
 -  Conditional – the treatment is covered for specific patient groups/indications,
 -  No – the treatment is never covered.
Three categories were scored as hypothetical decisions (generally based on theory, interviews, or 
surveys):
 -  Should – the treatment should be unconditionally covered/conditions unspecified,
 -  Should conditional – the treatment should be covered for specific patient groups or indica-
tions,
 -  Should not – the treatment should never be covered.
Furthermore, two categories were added later on to signify when an author or actor noted whether 
an argumentation should, or should not, have a bearing upon the decision.
 -  Valid – the consideration should be taken into account,
 -  Not valid – the consideration should not be taken into account.
BB extracted data from a random subset of 11 studies, reaching an agreement rate of 73%, and full 
agreement was reached in deliberation.
analysis and synthesis process
Data analysis was undertaken by TKV, and candidate context-mechanism-outcome combinations 
were formulated according to the following pattern:
Based on these argumentation types,  (mechanism)
used in country C, put on the agenda by A, (contexts)
lead to actual or hypothetical in- or exclusion of treatment T. (outcome)
Discussion with BB and AdB enabled the formulation of four meta-level theories.
RESuLTS
Document characteristics
The 98 reviewed studies contain studies that are (in part) based on qualitative analyses of coverage 
decisions or policies (34 studies), interviews/surveys (26 studies), and case studies (twenty studies), 
but also ethical analyses (fourteen studies), opinion pieces (fourteen studies), economic analyses 
(eight studies), and reviews (seven studies), from over twenty (primarily Western) countries.
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Main findings
General overview
In this chapter twenty argumentation types are described that are in use in hypothetical and actual 
coverage decisions. These twenty argumentation types are derived from over 400 argumentations 
found in 98 articles, for an overview of the argumentation types in alphabetical order, see Table 2.
Argumentation type Description
1) Definition of Illness Whether the ailment is considered an illness for which treatment is necessary
2) Dignity Whether (lack of) coverage is considered to affect the dignity of the patient to 
such an extent that it needs to be amended
3) Equity/Fairness/Justice Whether coverage would be necessary to counter injustice/inequity/lack of 
fairness in (access to) treatment
4) Human Right Whether (lack of) coverage is considered to affect the human rights of the patient 
to such an extent that it needs to be amended
5) Individual Cost Whether lack of coverage would stop patients from buying necessary care 
themselves due to prohibitive cost
6) Individual Responsibility Whether the individual is considered responsible for paying for this treatment
7) Medical Necessity Whether or not a treatment is considered to be “medically necessary” or a 
“medical necessity”
8) Morbidity/Severity Whether the physical and/or psychosocial morbidity associated with a certain 
ailment constitutes such a need that coverage is considered necessary
9) Moral Hazard Whether there is considered to be a possibility of over-usage (i.e., unnecessary 
increase in demand, when people use more than they need as a result of 
coverage)
10) Need The extent to which the patient is considered to be in need for which treatment 
is necessary
11) (No) Alternative Whether or not viable alternatives are considered to be present which would 
make coverage more or less necessary
12) Patient-Diagnosis Whether an illness is self-reported rather than diagnosed by a doctor
13) Range of Normality Whether the experience of the patient is considered normal or abnormal to such 
an extent that coverage is deemed necessary
14) Rule of Rescue Whether the identifiability of individuals close to death is considered to heighten 
the necessity of coverage
15) Similar Treatments Whether similar treatments are covered or not (meaning that this type of 
treatment is considered necessary)
16) Small Number of Patients Whether the small size of the patient population is considered to heighten the 
necessity of coverage (due to, amongst others, the inequality in terms of research 
expenditure or difficulties in obtaining high-quality data)
17) Societal Impact Whether coverage is considered necessary to allay the impact this disease has on 
people beyond the patient
18) Societal Functioning Whether coverage would aid a person’s necessary functioning in society
19) Societal Responsibility Whether society is considered responsible for this necessary treatment
20) Vulnerability/Compassion Whether a compassionate response to vulnerable groups, e.g. children, in the 
form of coverage is considered to be a necessity
Table 2 - Overview of the twenty argumentation types that fall under the necessity criterion and their respective 
descriptions
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The 98 reviewed articles are divided up into seven treatment sets (cancer therapies, orphan drugs, 
infertility treatments, Viagra, cosmetic surgery, obesity treatment, and smoking cessation therapy). 
What follows is a detailed description of the use of these twenty argumentation types per treatment 
set in justifying positive, negative, and/or conditional coverage decisions, both actual and hypo-
thetical. A handful of included articles is not described because there was too little information on 
that type of treatment: Alzheimer’s disease (Bernardi & Pegoraro, 2003), genetic tests (Fischer & 
Rogowski, 2014; Trosman et al., 2015), and medical devices (Kisser et al., 2016). Notably, no new 
argumentation types are described in these articles.
1. Cancer therapies
For cancer therapies, we observed solely positive coverage decisions. For these, higher incremental 
cost-effectiveness ratios than usual are acceptable (Chabot & Rocchi, 2010), as evidenced by posi-
tive decisions made despite the fact that coverage would be inadvisable based on high cost (Drum-
mond & Mason, 2007), or “lack of clear clinical consensus about [a therapy’s] benefits” (Daniels & 
Sabin, 1998). Moreover, a few articles pose that “patients should be treated equally” regardless of 
the number of patients suffering from the specific type of cancer.
The main argumentation visible in this data subset poses that the need of the patient and the 
severity of the disease should be taken into account (Cookson et al., 2008; Linley & Hughes, 2013; 
Rocchi et al., 2008; Stafinski et al., 2014; Trowman et al., 2011). As cancer patients have urgent 
needs and a serious health condition, therefore therapy is, or should be, covered (Aggarwal et al., 
2014; Brock, 2010; Cookson et al., 2008; Daniels & Sabin, 1998; Drummond et al., 2009; Drum-
mond & Mason, 2007; D. Martin et al., 2001; Rocchi et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2000), heightened 
by concerns over dignity and impact on daily activities and family (Stafinski et al., 2014). The Rule 
of Rescue is the second main argumentation, where the necessity of covering a certain treatment 
is high specifically for identifiable patients who are in a life-threatening situation and are without 
alternative (Brock, 2010; MacKenzie et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2000). The unavailability of alterna-
tive treatments or therapies should thus be considered (Cookson et al., 2008; Daniels & Sabin, 1998; 
Drummond et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2014; Linley & Hughes, 2013), as visible in several coverage 
decisions (Chabot & Rocchi, 2010; Cookson et al., 2008; Daniels & Sabin, 1998; Drummond et al., 
2009; Drummond & Mason, 2007; Lim et al., 2014; Linley & Hughes, 2013; D. Martin et al., 2001; 
Singer et al., 2000), but this argumentation is also sometimes questioned (Brock, 2010; Cookson 
et al., 2008). The ‘identifiable individuals’ element is also present in the ‘Small Number of Patients’ 
argumentation, which several authors pose is important (Cookson et al., 2008; Stafinski et al., 2014; 
Trowman et al., 2011) and as heightening justifiability (Chabot & Rocchi, 2010; Drummond et 
al., 2009), although others deny this (Cookson et al., 2008; Linley & Hughes, 2013; Singer et al., 
2000). The third main argumentation holds that for some, like children, exceptions are (Lim et 
al., 2014; Rocchi et al., 2008), may (Cookson et al., 2008; Stafinski et al., 2014), may not (Linley & 
Hughes, 2013), or should be made (Brock, 2010). This is expanded by Brock, who argues that those 
who have had fewest QALYs in their lifetime are the worst off, which is most obviously the case 
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for paediatric patients (Brock, 2010). The final argumentation concerns the distribution of health 
care resources (Aggarwal et al., 2014; Drummond & Mason, 2007). E.g., Foy et al. emphasise that 
patients in different districts should be treated equally, thus arguing for more distributive justice 
(Foy et al., 1999).
2. Orphan drugs
For orphan drugs, we identified argumentations for both positive and negative coverage decisions. 
The structure and types of argumentations of positive decisions in this data subset greatly resemble 
those for cancer therapies and the use of a number of argumentations is questioned here as well.
Higher incremental cost-effectiveness ratios are generally found acceptable for orphan drugs 
so decisions reek of making exceptions to this rule. The fact that the severity of the illness does 
or should count as an argumentation is stressed by many (Bae et al., 2015; Clarke et al., 2001; 
Cohen & Felix, 2014; Denis et al., 2011; Dyfrig Hughes, 2006; Mentzakis et al., 2011; Nicod, 2016; 
Rosenberg-Yunger et al., 2011; Schlander & Beck, 2009; Winquist et al., 2012; Zelei et al., 2016), and 
so is need (Cohen & Felix, 2014; Nicod, 2016). Consequently, argumentations in favour of coverage 
include that orphan diseases are severe (Drummond & Towse, 2014; Dyfrig Hughes, 2006; Largent 
& Pearson, 2012; Paulden et al., 2015), that coverage only happens when they are (Clarke et al., 
2001) and/or when patients are in need (Henschke, 2012). Patients are said to be vulnerable, which 
should be (Largent & Pearson, 2012; Winquist et al., 2012), and is (Bañón Hernández Antonio, 2015; 
Henschke, 2012), considered, and to score low on societal functioning, and orphan drugs should be 
covered because they maintain or restore these capacities (Largent & Pearson, 2012). As for cancer 
therapies, a common argumentation supportive of provision is that patients have “no alternative” 
(Drummond & Towse, 2014; Iskrov et al., 2013; Paulden et al., 2015), often generally considered 
important (Cohen & Felix, 2014; Denis et al., 2011; Rosenberg-Yunger et al., 2011; Zelei et al., 
2016). The Rule of Rescue argues in favour of coverage in two cases (Bañón Hernández Antonio, 
2015; Clarke et al., 2001), its relevance as a consideration is underlined by some (Bae et al., 2015; 
Rosenberg-Yunger et al., 2011; Zelei et al., 2016) but also regularly questioned (Burls et al., 2005; 
Arna S Desser et al., 2010; Gross, 2002; David Hughes et al., 2005; Juth, 2014; Largent & Pearson, 
2012; Schlander & Beck, 2009). The small patient population is mentioned as an argumentation 
separately as well but primarily to say it should not be of effect on the coverage decision (Burls et al., 
2005; Arna S. Desser, 2013; Arna S Desser et al., 2010; Drummond & Towse, 2014; David Hughes 
et al., 2005; Juth, 2014; McCabe et al., 2005; Mentzakis et al., 2011; Paulden et al., 2015), though not 
always (Dyfrig Hughes, 2006; Nicod, 2016; Zelei et al., 2016). Finally, the societal impact of treat-
ment should be considered (Zelei et al., 2016). A new main argumentation in favour of coverage 
holds that the budget impact remains “sufficiently insignificant” given the low numbers of patients 
(David Hughes et al., 2005), as is the concurrent fact that the price is prohibitive to the individual 
(Denis et al., 2011). “Equity” and distributive justice are once again mentioned but the exact line of 
reasoning is not always explicated (Burls et al., 2005; David Hughes et al., 2005; Rosenberg-Yunger 
et al., 2011; Zelei et al., 2016), as is the case for the right to health care (David Hughes et al., 2005).
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Arguing for denial of coverage, the most common assertion is that some orphan diseases may 
not be as severe as assumed, e.g. Gaucher’s disease is said to be “minimally symptomatic” (Clarke 
et al., 2001; Gross, 2002). Hughes et al. state that orphan diseases may not “pose sufficient imminent 
threat to the life of patients to constitute a right to treatment” (italics mine) (David Hughes et al., 
2005), see also (Juth, 2014). One coverage decision cites “equity” as a reason (Rosenberg-Yunger et 
al., 2011). Finally, denial of coverage for similar treatments may support another negative coverage 
decision (Burls et al., 2005; Winquist et al., 2012).
3. Infertility treatments
The infertility treatment data subset was the largest and the most diverse, containing positive cover-
age decisions, including those that set indication criteria, as well as negative coverage decisions.
The first main argumentation favouring coverage is that those seeking infertility treatment are in 
need (Blank, 1997; McMillan, 2001; McWhirter & McQueen, 2000; Rauprich et al., 2010; Redmayne 
& Klein, 1993; Shaw et al., 2002), resulting in a positive coverage decision once (Redmayne & Klein, 
1993). Further, they are suffering morbidity (Brown, 2000; Chambers et al., 2013; E. G. Hughes 
& Giacomini, 2001; Lord et al., 2001; Redmayne & Klein, 1993; Shaw et al., 2002), explicated as 
mental distress and psychological harm in decisions by UK health authorities (Redmayne & Klein, 
1993). Treatment may be medically necessary (Nachtigall et al., 2012) and patients therefore 
deserve compassion (Giacomini et al., 2000; Nachtigall et al., 2012). The second argumentation 
holds that the “cost of [coverage of] assisted conception would be surprisingly small to the NHS as 
a whole, although to an individual it is often prohibitive” (Lord et al., 2001) and (Chambers et al., 
2013; Chambers et al., 2006; E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 2001). Third, equity is mentioned again, 
but the underlying line of reasoning is more clearly explicated here, though not used in actual deci-
sions. Lack of geographical equity as well as equity over the rich-poor divide is cause for concern 
(Brown, 2000; Chambers et al., 2006; Giacomini et al., 2000; E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 2001; Lord 
et al., 2001; McWhirter & McQueen, 2000; Nachtigall et al., 2012; Redmayne & Klein, 1993; Shaw 
et al., 2002). Postcode and financial status should not affect coverage, and it would therefore be 
preferable to cover infertility treatment everywhere. Moreover, it is deemed inequitable to withhold 
treatment based on the environmental impact of having a child (Wilkinson & Williams, 2015). The 
fourth and fifth argumentations are not visible in the first two datasets, and both are only in use in 
hypothetical decisions, made by authors, patients, and the public. The fourth holds that infertility, 
or subfertility (E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 2001), is an illness and its cure should therefore be 
covered (Brown, 2000; Chambers et al., 2013; Giacomini et al., 2000; E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 
2001; Lord et al., 2001; McMillan, 2001; McWhirter & McQueen, 2000; Mladovsky & Sorenson, 
2010; Nachtigall et al., 2012; Neumann, 1997; Plomer et al., 1999; Rauprich et al., 2010; Redmayne 
& Klein, 1993; Wilkinson & Williams, 2015), especially because similar services are covered (E. G. 
Hughes & Giacomini, 2001; Lord et al., 2001; Wilkinson & Williams, 2015). Fifth, parenthood is 
part of the “right to reproduce” (Giacomini et al., 2000) or right to health (Mladovsky & Sorenson, 
2010), required for societal functioning (Chambers et al., 2013; Lord et al., 2001; McMillan, 2001; 
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Mladovsky & Sorenson, 2010; Neumann, 1997; Redmayne & Klein, 1993) and part of “the basic 
opportunities every human should have” (Rauprich et al., 2010), also (Blank, 1997) and that those 
without children suffer stigmatisation (Chambers et al., 2013; Lord et al., 2001) and their dignity is 
impacted (E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 2001). Lastly, the societal impact of children, in economic 
terms, should be considered (Connolly et al., 2010).
For the negative coverage decisions, we observe several argumentations, of which some are 
new. First, infertility is not an illness and therefore not covered (Neumann, 1997; Redmayne & 
Klein, 1993) or should not be (Wilkinson & Williams, 2015), also because it is not life-threatening 
(Neumann, 1997). In some cases, it is only covered in case of a diagnosed cause (Brown, 2000; 
McWhirter & McQueen, 2000). Other needs are thought “more pressing” (Giacomini, 2005; E. 
G. Hughes & Giacomini, 2001), the treatment risky and not medically necessary (E. G. Hughes & 
Giacomini, 2001), also the reason for exclusion from coverage in Ontario (Giacomini et al., 2000). 
Infertility has little emotional appeal (E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 2001) and its treatment should 
therefore fall to personal, and not societal, responsibility (Blank, 1997; E. G. Hughes & Giacomini, 
2001; Plomer et al., 1999). Other argumentations that support a hypothetical negative coverage 
decision include potential moral hazard (Blank, 1997; Mladovsky & Sorenson, 2010; Neumann, 
1997) and that alternatives are available (Nachtigall et al., 2012; Wilkinson & Williams, 2015), of 
which the latter also used in an actual decision (Giacomini, 2005).
For the decisions that set indication criteria; Mladovsky and Sorenson describe how the necessity 
of coverage is lowered when doctors rely “on patients to ascribe infertility” (Mladovsky & Sorenson, 
2010). Argumentations with concrete, micro-level indication criteria include, for example, “the 
number of children living in the home/from previous relationships” (Brown, 2000; McWhirter & 
McQueen, 2000; Plomer et al., 1999; Shaw et al., 2002).
4. Viagra
Viagra is almost never covered (Klein & Sturm, 2002; Stolk et al., 2002), and moreover, about half 
of the argumentations oppose coverage. The other half contains both positive decisions and those 
that set indication criteria.
Viagra is, in actual coverage decisions, considered not medically necessary (Klein & Sturm, 2002; 
Stolk et al., 2002), patients not in need (Klein & Sturm, 2002), and erectile dysfunction not serious 
enough to prevent societal functioning (Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn, 2003) or to be a normal part 
of ageing (Stolk et al., 2002). Moreover, the apparent subjectivity of this determination of need by 
the patient (rather than the doctor) may have further loosened the concept of ‘medical necessity’ 
for Viagra. This may well effectuate over-usage, as policy makers feel patients cannot be fully relied 
upon to make this kind of decisions (Klein & Sturm, 2002). Moreover, because Viagra is available 
“over-the-web,” the doctor is thus conclusively unneeded for diagnosis and prescription, which 
decreases the necessity of coverage, further strengthened by fear of moral hazard (Klein & Sturm, 
2002).
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Others, primarily authors, do support coverage of Viagra, based on the severity of psychosocial 
problems (Hornbrook & Holup, 2011; Klein & Sturm, 2002; Manson, 2005), impeded societal 
functioning as sexual function is considered essential to quality of life (Hornbrook & Holup, 2011) 
and positive coverage of similar treatments (Hornbrook & Holup, 2011).
Indication criteria are set in several countries, generally holding that Viagra as a treatment for 
erectile dysfunction is covered in cases of a spinal cord injury only, an argumentation related to the 
definition of illness and morbidity (Klein & Sturm, 2002; Manson, 2005; Stolk et al., 2002). This use 
of the definition of illness argumentation is also questioned once (Manson, 2005).
5. Cosmetic surgery
Both the public and policy makers often regard cosmetic surgical procedures like tattoo removal 
or ‘boob jobs’ a prime example of a form of care that should not be funded (Polikowski & Santos-
Eggimann, 2002; Russell et al., 2014); in several countries it is indeed excluded from coverage 
(Schreyögg et al., 2005). The decisions examined all set limits on eligibility through indication 
criteria or, in cases like circumcision, exclude the form of care altogether.
The main argumentation is offered in support of a decision setting indication criteria, that is, 
cosmetic surgery is generally reimbursed for certain indications only. All decisions, which included 
primarily actual and a few hypothetical decisions, use certain physical characteristics, evidence of 
physical or psychosocial morbidity, reduced social capacity, or a combination thereof, to argue for 
necessity of coverage in certain cases. Decision makers thus set physical or psychological patient 
eligibility criteria on the morbidity experienced that need to be applied by a physician (Adler, 2011; 
Benditte-Klepetko et al., 2007; Breuning et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2003; Goodson et al., 2011; Hen-
derson, 2009; Horner, 2002; Kerrigan et al., 2002; Krieger & Lesavoy, 2001; McClean & Hanke, 1997; 
Mukherjee et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2015; A. M. Wong, 
1995; Wraight et al., 2007). Individual assessment providing evidence of morbidity here leads to a 
higher justifiability of surgery. In this way, surgery is performed only on those patients that fall on 
the ‘right’ side of the line between cosmetic and non-cosmetic care (Goodson et al., 2011; Krieger & 
Lesavoy, 2001) or outside a “range of normality” (Breuning et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2003; Goodson 
et al., 2011; Henderson, 2009; Kerrigan et al., 2002; McClean & Hanke, 1997; Mukherjee et al., 2014; 
Nguyen et al., 2008; Nicoletti et al., 2009; Russell et al., 2014; Schnur et al., 1991; Stevens et al., 2015) 
so that care is only provided if medically necessary (Benditte-Klepetko et al., 2007; True, 2012). 
Some argue that cosmetic surgery should be covered only in case of societal functioning problems 
(Breuning et al., 2010; Henderson, 2009; Mukherjee et al., 2014), which McClean and Hanke argue 
to be affected only in some cases (McClean & Hanke, 1997). Directly related is the illness definition 
(Adler, 2011; Stevens et al., 2015): what counts as illness needs treatment and what falls inside the 
‘range of normality’ does not need treatment.
This is also reflected in the argumentation supporting a negative coverage decision, stating that 
because “newborns do not have a medical condition,” circumcision should not be covered (Adler, 
2011), see also (Darby, 2016; Krieger & Lesavoy, 2001). Other argumentations against coverage 
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include, for actual decisions, the availability of alternative treatments (True, 2012) and the lack of 
medical necessity (McClean & Hanke, 1997), the latter also in hypothetical decisions (Adler, 2011; 
Darby, 2016; Jacobs, 1980).
Argumentations for a hypothetical positive decision were offered primarily for treatment of 
port-wine stains, with medical complications and psychosocial morbidity explicated (McClean & 
Hanke, 1997), also (Henderson, 2009). The (potential of a) ‘postcode lottery’ was brought up a 
number of times, to apparently argue in favour of coverage (Goodson et al., 2011; Henderson, 2009; 
Mukherjee et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2015; Wraight et al., 2007).
6. Obesity treatments
Obesity treatments are often excluded from coverage (Polikowski & Santos-Eggimann, 2002). 
However, various argumentations in support of coverage are visible in the literature and a few in 
combination with indication criteria. In some cases, argumentations against coverage are given, but 
there is no evidence of public outrage over these negative decisions (Greer et al., 2012; L. F. Martin 
et al., 1998; Persson et al., 2010; Simpson & Cooper, 2009).
Articles mention the psychosocial burden of obesity (L. F. Martin et al., 1998; Persson et al., 
2010) as supporting hypothetical coverage decisions, as well as the fact patients should be enabled 
to “conform to societal standards,” which is linked to the range of normality mentioned for cos-
metic surgery. For actual decisions, potential co-morbidities (Persson et al., 2010), as well as the 
lack of alternatives and simply “need and solidarity principles” (Persson et al., 2010) are brought up. 
Further hypothetical argumentations favouring coverage include societal responsibility for these 
patients (Greer et al., 2012), “fair treatment” (L. F. Martin et al., 1998), consideration of “human 
dignity” (Persson et al., 2010), and “social justice” (Greer et al., 2012).
Clear argumentations in support of decisions that set indication criteria are visible in decisions 
by American insurance companies, with positive decisions based on an expert opinion (L. F. Martin 
et al., 1998), the medical necessity as judged by a doctor (Simpson & Cooper, 2009) or a health risk 
assessment (Greer et al., 2012).
Conversely, the argumentations opposing coverage used by insurance companies in the USA 
hold that the individual patient is “to blame,” and that obesity treatment should therefore not be 
included (Greer et al., 2012; L. F. Martin et al., 1998) but also that obesity is not an illness (L. F. 
Martin et al., 1998) or not severe enough (Simpson & Cooper, 2009).
7. Smoking cessation therapies
Smoking cessation therapy is covered in countries such as Australia, Canada, England, and the 
USA, though not in Argentina (Specogna, 2010), and it has been included and excluded several 
times in the Netherlands (Kroneman & de Jong, 2015). The subset contains negative and positive 
coverage decisions and focuses on the question of societal versus individual responsibility, only 
observed once before (in the obesity treatment subset).
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For negative coverage decisions, two argumentations were elucidated. First, smoking or the ces-
sation of it is considered in actual decisions to be a “personal” issue (Au-Yeung et al., 2010; Heath 
et al., 2002). Second, “tobacco consumption [is] not understood as an addiction or illness,” which 
reduces the necessity of coverage.
For positive coverage decisions, the four argumentations include first, for actual decisions, the 
obligation to attempt “safe-guarding the wellbeing of fund participants” (Au-Yeung et al., 2010). 
Second, for hypothetical decisions, it is argued that distributive rather than retributive justice 
ought to prevail (Heath et al., 2002). Third, addiction is an illness (Heath et al., 2002; Woolf et al., 
2006), also in use in actual decisions (Kroneman & de Jong, 2015). The fourth, though only used 
in hypothetical decisions, simply underlines the “need” for or “necessity” of smoking cessation 
services (Au-Yeung et al., 2010; Heath et al., 2002; Khalid, 1993; Specogna, 2010). The Dutch policy 
for coverage of smoking cessation therapy deserves special attention (Kroneman & de Jong, 2015). 
Smoking cessation therapy was excluded supported by the argumentation that the costs “could 
easily be paid from the savings that quitting smoking produced for individuals.”
analysis
In order to identify context-mechanism-outcome patterns (Pawson et al., 2005), we classified the 
twenty argumentation types per decision outcome: positive, negative, and conditional coverage 
(Table 3). First, seven argumentation types are generally used in the justification of positive cover-
age decisions (both hypothetical and actual), namely: Equity/Fairness/Justice, Societal Functioning, 
Individual Cost, the coverage of Similar Treatments, Human Rights, Dignity, and Societal Impact. 
Second, five argumentation types are solely in use in the justification of negative coverage decisions 
(both hypothetical and actual): Medical Necessity, Individual Responsibility, Moral Hazard, Small 
Number of Patients, and Patient-Diagnosis. Finally, eight argumentation types are employed for all 
types of coverage decision outcomes. This set comprises Morbidity/Severity, Range of Normality, 
Definition of Illness, Vulnerability/Compassion, Need, (No) Alternatives, Societal Responsibility, 
and the Rule of Rescue. Conditional coverage is, moreover, generally based on Morbidity/Severity, 
Definition of Illness, Range of Normality, Societal Functioning, and Medical Necessity – doctors 
are in these cases may make the final individual coverage decision. From Table 3, we thus observe 
that nearly two-thirds of the argumentation types is in use for either positive or negative decisions, 
from which we conclude the first meta-level theory: different argumentation types are generally 
used for different decision outcomes.
Table 4 gives a précis of those decisions where policy makers made a coverage decision respond-
ing to a patient (representative), the media, or the public, and it was explicitly analysed in the article 
as such. These actors were thus reported to be involved in setting the decision on the agenda, often 
reacting to a negative decision. We quickly detected that all coverage decisions in this table have a 
positive outcome. We first identified two decisions (Aggarwal et al., 2014; Burls et al., 2005) that use 
an argumentation type, in both cases Equity/Fairness/Justice, which is generally used in positive 
decisions (as visible in Table 3), meaning that the positive outcome was to be expected from the 
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Mechanism Outcome
Argumentation type POSITIVE COVERAGE NEGATIVE COVERAGE CONDITIONAL COVERAGE
Actual Hypothetical Actual Hypothetical Actual Hypothetical
Equity/Fairness/
Justice
Cancer; Cosmetic;
Infertility; Obesity;
Orphan; Smoking
Orphan
Societal Functioning Infertility Cancer; Cosmetic;
Infertility; Obesity;
Orphan; Viagra
Viagra Cosmetic
Individual Cost Infertility; Orphan Smoking
Similar Treatments Infertility; Viagra Orphan
Human Right Infertility
Dignity Cancer; Obesity
Societal Impact Cancer; Infertility
Medical Necessity Smoking Cosmetic;
Infertility;
Viagra
Cosmetic;
Infertility
Obesity Cosmetic
Individual Responsibility Infertility;
Smoking
Obesity
Moral Hazard Infertility;
Viagra
Small Number of Patients Cancer Cancer;
Orphan
Patient-Diagnosis Viagra
Morbidity/Severity Cancer;
Infertility;
Viagra
Cancer; Cosmetic;
Infertility; Obesity;
Orphan; Viagra
Cosmetic;
Obesity;
Viagra
Cosmetic;
Infertility;
Orphan
Cosmetic;
Infertility;
Orphan;
Viagra
Range of Normality Cosmetic;
Infertility
Viagra Cosmetic Cosmetic;
Infertility
Cosmetic
Definition of Illness Obesity;
Smoking
Infertility;
Smoking;
Viagra
Infertility;
Obesity;
Smoking
Infertility Cosmetic;
Infertility;
Obesity;
Viagra
Cosmetic
Vulnerability/
Compassion
Cancer;
Orphan
Cancer; Cosmetic;
Infertility; Orphan
Cosmetic Infertility
Need Cancer;
Infertility;
Obesity
Cancer; Cosmetic;
Infertility; 
Smoking
Viagra Infertility;
Orphan
[No] Alternative Cancer;
Obesity
Cancer; Infertility;
Orphan
Cosmetic;
Infertility
Infertility
Societal Responsibility Smoking Obesity Infertility Infertility Smoking
Rule of Rescue Cancer; Orphan Cancer; Orphan Orphan
Table 3 - Articles containing argumentations used to justify coverage decisions per treatments or therapies. 
‘Cancer’ stands for cancer therapies, ‘orphan’ for orphan drugs, ‘infertility’ for infertility treatments, ‘cosmetic’ 
for cosmetic surgery, ‘obesity’ for obesity treatment and ‘smoking’ for smoking cessation therapy. NB: When 
a particular argumentation-outcome combination occurred only in one article, the cell is coloured light grey.
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argumentation type used. However, we also found five cases that employ argumentation types also 
sometimes used to justify negative decisions, but that had, in fact, also a positive outcome (Burls et 
al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2001; Kroneman & de Jong, 2015; MacKenzie et al., 2008; McClean & Hanke, 
1997). From this, we conclude that who set the decision on the agenda may have played a role in 
these cases. The second meta-level theory is therefore: when the public or a patient (representative) 
is recorded to have been involved in setting the decision agenda, regardless of the argumentation 
type used, the decision outcome is positive in this dataset. Indubitably, we would need a more 
extensive analysis of grey literature and media coverage to ‘prove’ this conclusively or to draw 
conclusions for unexamined coverage decision processes. It seems conceivable, however, that the 
working of the argumentation types depends upon the context. We conclude that an important 
context is who set the agenda; when a patient (representative), lobbyist, journalist, or politician was 
recorded to be involved, the resulting decision was always positive.
For the latter two meta-level theories, we utilise the distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘hypothetical’ 
coverage decisions. Actual decisions are those made by policy makers and insurance companies, 
that is, they concern coverage policies and therefore directly affect patients’ access to medicine 
or therapy. Hypothetical decisions are those made by all other parties, which includes patients, 
authors (generalising, primarily ethicists and economists), the general public, and the media. We 
grouped the twenty necessity argumentation types into two broad categories, which are based on 
the type of decision (actual vs. hypothetical) they are used in. The categorisation is then made as 
follows: the first category is argumentations used in both actual and hypothetical decisions, the 
second category contains argumentations only used in hypothetical decisions.
The first category (as visible in the upper half of Table 5) contains ten argumentation types: 
Definition of Illness, Individual Responsibility, Medical Necessity, Morbidity/Severity, Need, (No) 
Alternative, Range of Normality, Societal Functioning, Societal Responsibility, and Vulnerability/
Compassion. The lower half of Table 5 holds the second category of necessity argumentations, 
Context Mechanism Outcome
Country Actor Argumentation type(s) Decision
UK Politician Equity/Fairness/Justice Positive
Canada Patient representative Equity/Fairness/Justice Positive
Canada Patient representative Rule of Rescue Positive
Australia Journalist Rule of Rescue
Small Number of Patients
No Alternative
Positive
USA Patient Morbidity/Severity
Medical Necessity
Societal Functioning
Positive
UK Patient (not explicated, possibly Morbidity/Severity or Need) Positive
Netherlands Lobbyist (not explicated, possibly Societal Responsibility or Societal Impact) Positive
Table 4 - Overview of decisions where it was recorded that the public, a patient or a patient representative was 
involved in setting the coverage decision on the policy agenda, with the argumentation type and final decision
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which are only used in hypothetical decisions. It consists of the following ten argumentation types: 
Dignity, Equity/Fairness/Justice, Human Rights, Individual Cost, Moral Hazard, Patient-Diagnosis, 
Rule of Rescue, Similar Treatments, Small Number of Patients, and Societal Impact. Furthermore, 
we observe that the first category contains the three most strongly acknowledged argumentation 
types, namely Morbidity/Severity (acknowledged thirteen times), (No) Alternative (eight times), 
and Need (seven times). In contrast, the second category holds the two most strongly questioned 
argumentations (that is, more than once), namely Small Number of Patients (six times) and Rule 
of Rescue (four times), though these were also as often acknowledged as valid (seven times and 
five times, respectively). Based on this analysis, we formulate the third meta-level theory: half of 
Mechanism Outcome
Argumentation type
Decision type
Actual decision
[Policy makers and insurance companies]
Hypothetical decision
[Patients, authors, the public, and the media]
U
se
d 
in
 b
ot
h 
ac
tu
al
 a
nd
 h
yp
ot
he
tic
al
 d
ec
isi
on
s
Definition of Illness Cosmetic; Infertility; Obesity;
Smoking; Viagra
Cosmetic; Infertility;
Smoking; Viagra
Individual Responsibility Infertility; Smoking Obesity
Medical Necessity Cosmetic; Infertility; Obesity; Viagra Cosmetic; Infertility; Smoking
Morbidity/Severity Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility;
Obesity; Orphan; Viagra
Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility;
Obesity; Orphan; Viagra
Need Cancer; Infertility; Obesity; Viagra Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility;
Orphan; Smoking
[No] Alternative Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility; Obesity Cancer; Infertility; Orphan
Range of Normality Cosmetic; Infertility; Viagra Cosmetic; Infertility
Societal Functioning Cosmetic; Infertility; Viagra Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility; Obesity; 
Orphan; Viagra
Societal Responsibility Smoking; Infertility Infertility; Obesity; Smoking
Vulnerability/Compassion Cancer; Cosmetic; Orphan Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility; Orphan
U
se
d 
in
 h
yp
ot
he
tic
al
 d
ec
isi
on
s o
nl
y
Dignity Cancer; Obesity
Equity/Fairness/Justice Orphan Cancer; Cosmetic; Infertility;
Obesity; Orphan; Smoking
Human Rights Infertility
Individual Cost Smoking Infertility; Orphan
Moral Hazard Infertility; Viagra
Patient-Diagnosis Viagra
Rule of Rescue Orphan Cancer; Orphan
Similar Treatments Orphan Infertility; Viagra
Small Number of Patients Cancer Cancer; Orphan
Societal Impact Cancer; Infertility
Table 5 - Twenty argumentation sets organised per category, and the articles containing argumentations per 
treatment set per decision type of outcome (actual vs. hypothetical). ‘Cancer’ stands for cancer therapies, ‘or-
phan’ for orphan drugs, ‘infertility’ for infertility treatments, ‘cosmetic’ for cosmetic surgery, ‘obesity’ for obesity 
treatment and ‘smoking’ for smoking cessation therapy. NB: When a particular argumentation-outcome com-
bination occurred only in one article, the cell is coloured light grey.
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the argumentation types are used by policy makers and insurance companies as well as patients, 
authors, the public, and the media, whereas the other half are only used by the latter group. The 
argumentation types that are used by policy makers and insurance companies are, moreover, more 
frequently acknowledged as valid, whereas some that are only used by patients, authors, the public, 
and the media are strongly questioned.
In an effort to understand whether and how the geographical location (the second context that 
we observed the impact of) affected the use of argumentation types, we plotted the usage frequency 
per country in Table 6. We identified the following parallels between the countries. From the first 
necessity category (the upper half of Table 6, categorised by use as described above), most countries 
employ most argumentation types at some point, and all countries employ the argumentation types 
Morbidity/Severity, No Alternatives, and Vulnerability/Compassion. In contrast, Medical Neces-
sity is constricted to the USA, and Need is most frequently visible for ‘mainland Europe’ (France, 
Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands). For the second necessity category (the lower half of Table 
6), the pattern is much less congruent. Canada and Australia have the highest percentage of use 
Mechanism Context
Argumentation type Australia Canada USA UK
France,
Germany,
Sweden,
the Netherlands
U
se
d 
in
 b
ot
h 
ac
tu
al
 a
nd
 h
yp
ot
he
tic
al
 d
ec
isi
on
s Definition of Illness - 4.9 19.2 5.6 13.5
Individual Responsibility - - 5.8 1.1 -
Medical Necessity - 4.9 19.2 - 2.7
Morbidity/Severity 25.0 19.5 19.2 28.1 16.2
Need - 7.3 5.8 7.9 18.9
(No) Alternatives 25.0 12.2 5.8 7.9 16.2
Range of Normality - - 7.7 16.9 5.4
Societal Functioning - 2.4 3.8 5.6 2.7
Societal Responsibility - - 1.9 - 2.7
Vulnerability/Compassion 16.7 12.2 3.8 4.5 10.8
U
se
d 
in
 h
yp
ot
he
tic
al
 d
ec
isi
on
s o
nl
y Dignity - 2.4 - - 2.7
Equity/Fairness/Justice - 7.3 5.8 13.5 -
Individual Cost - - - - 2.7
Moral Hazard - - 1.9 - -
Rule of Rescue 25.0 12.2 - 1.1 -
Similar Treatments - 2.4 - 2.2 -
Small Number of Patients 8.3 9.8 - 5.6 5.4
Societal Impact - 2.4 - - -
Total number of argumentations 12 41 52 89 37
Table 6 - Percentages of use of argumentations per country (for which a minimum of five argumentations was 
found). The argumentations are shown in alphabetical order per category. Human Rights and Patient-Diagnosis 
are absent as they were not used in country-specific argumentations.
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of argumentations grouped into this category. Moreover, only these countries utilise the more 
controversial argumentation types, namely Rule of Rescue and Small Number of Patients, whereas 
this is not the case for the other countries. This is to be expected, as the Rule of Rescue is part of 
the official criteria of the PBAC (cf. Cookson et al., 2008). In addition, the UK has a high percent-
age of the Equity/Fairness/Justice argumentation type, which is primarily due to the concern and 
outrage about ‘postcode rationing’ (Breuning et al., 2010; Goodson et al., 2011; Henderson, 2009; 
Mukherjee et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2015; Wraight et al., 2007).
Accordingly, we formulated the fourth and final meta-level theory, which holds that the 
argumentations that fall under the first necessity category appear to be applied in most of the 
(predominantly Western) countries the dataset reports on, though the countries do appear to have 
their own argumentation type preferences. For the second category the patterns are much more 
varied: many argumentation types have a specific pattern (that is, used in two or three countries), 
which we conclude as depending on the local context.
DISCuSSION
In this chapter we unpack the question of necessity of coverage by reviewing the argumentations 
used and proposed to be used in coverage decision making. In seven treatment sets (cancer thera-
pies, orphan drugs, infertility treatments, Viagra, cosmetic surgery, obesity treatment, and smoking 
cessation therapy) from 98 reviewed articles, we identified twenty different argumentation types 
employed to argue for or against the necessity of coverage of a certain therapy or treatment.
The argumentation types may be typified by primary decision outcome. The following eight 
argumentation types are used primarily in favour of coverage: equity, fairness and justice, a patient’s 
societal functioning being impeded, the cost being too high to bear for an individual, the coverage 
status of similar treatments, considerations concerning human rights and dignity of the patient, 
and wider societal impact. Reversely, limited medical necessity, the individual being held respon-
sible, potential moral hazard or over-usage, a small patient population, and a doctor needing to rely 
on the patient to set the diagnosis are argumentations solely employed to decrease the necessity of 
coverage. Finally, the morbidity experienced or the severity of the disease, whether the ailment falls 
within a defined ‘range of normality’ or is considered an illness, compassion for vulnerable patients, 
the need of the patient, the (un)availability of alternatives, society having to take responsibility 
for coverage, and the rule of rescue are used both in favour of and opposing coverage. The most 
important context affecting the argumentations in use in coverage decisions is the way the decision 
has come onto the agenda: when this is recorded in the article to be by a patient, a patient organisa-
tion, or the public, this always facilitates a positive decision, even when the argumentation type 
employed is also in use in negative coverage decisions. Others have stressed much the same point 
(Booth et al., 2007); in a cross-country comparison of hepatitis C coverage, Kieslich et al. describe 
experiences that are “as much a tale of challenges that arise when making difficult prioritization 
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decisions as they are a tale of agenda-setting” (Kieslich et al., 2016). Overall, it is important to note 
that no wide consensus is needed to let a consideration function as an argumentation in coverage 
decisions. This makes it doubly interesting to investigate what exactly happens during the processes 
of coverage decision making.
Necessity is also broadly categorised by two different types of usage. Under the first necessity 
category, indicating use in both actual and hypothetical decisions, fall the definition of illness and 
range of normality, the individual’s own responsibility, the medical necessity, the morbidity (or the 
severity of the disease) and need experienced, the presence or absence of alternatives, the societal 
functioning of the patient, the societal responsibility for coverage, and compassion towards vulner-
able patients. The second necessity category is not used in actual coverage decisions, that is, by 
policy makers and insurance companies but rather only by patients, authors, the public, and the 
media. For this second necessity category, we observed dignity, equity, fairness and justice con-
siderations, human rights, the individual cost of the treatment, moral hazard, whether the patient 
sets the diagnosis him- or herself, the rule of rescue, coverage of similar treatments, the size of the 
patient population, and the societal impact of coverage. Interestingly, the use of the argumentation 
types that fall under this category is more localised, that is, country-specific, and more frequently 
debated. The argumentation types belonging to the first necessity category, however, are much 
more universally applied.
Comparison with existing literature
Our search string yielded seven studies containing literature reviews that were included in our 
review (Aggarwal et al., 2014; Drummond et al., 2014; Mladovsky & Sorenson, 2010; Nguyen et 
al., 2008; Paulden et al., 2015; Rocchi et al., 2008; Zelei et al., 2016), as well as a number of reviews 
that specified general qualitative criteria for coverage decisions. Cromwell, Peacock, and Mitton 
have conducted a literature review of ‘real-world’ decision criteria as found in 33 articles in peer-
reviewed and grey literature (Cromwell et al., 2015). They searched for articles with an explicit 
acknowledgement of a “finite resource pool.” Therefore, their review focuses on resource allocation, 
i.e., choosing one thing over another, in different settings such as hospitals and health authorities. 
They found that disease impact (burden) was an influential criterion in resource allocation deci-
sions but did not observe other necessity-based argumentations.
Several other studies, e.g., Cerri et al., examined technology appraisals as conducted by macro-
level institutions and commonly find it to be a “complex process involving numerous clinical, 
disease, and affordability considerations” (Cerri et al., 2014). Shah examined popular preferences in 
using severity of illness in economic evaluation as part of priority setting, showing that “people are, 
on the whole, willing to sacrifice aggregate health in order to give priority to the severely ill,” which 
may further legitimise the use of individual burden of disease as a coverage criterion (Shah et al., 
2014). Fischer conducted a broad review of decisions where quantitative methods were employed 
and identified several clinical criteria that strengthen our conclusions: availability of treatment 
alternative; condition is life threatening; condition caused by patients own behaviour; and end 
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of life considerations (Fischer, 2012). Hasman, McIntosh, and Hope, finally, interviewed decision 
makers on what they considered relevant in a coverage decision on a hypothetical drug (Hasman 
et al., 2008). The interviews highlighted agreement over cost effectiveness, clinical effectiveness, 
equality, and gross cost as important reasons for coverage. Interestingly, a lack of agreement was 
elicited over using ‘absence of alternative treatments’ as a criterion. Our study, rather than aiming to 
outline general criteria in use in coverage decisions, specifically gives an analysis of the tonal variety 
in the use of necessity in actual and hypothetical coverage decisions, and the effect contexts may 
have on the final coverage decision.
Strengths, limitations, and future research directions
To study, like we have, the way contexts influence coverage decision outcomes through the use 
of necessity as a criterion will aid our understanding of both coverage decision making as well as 
necessity as a concept as used in practice. In addition, the wide variety of argumentations described 
will aid further ethical reflection on the content and processes of actual and hypothetical coverage 
decisions.
Our search strategy in particular provided a challenge, as when one searches for “need” in the 
title/abstract, the articles that will be found are likely to discuss coverage decisions that use “need” 
as a criterion. As such, certain necessity-based argumentations were in that sense already to be 
expected from the wording of the search strategy. We have engaged two expert librarians to aid us 
in order to widen and strengthen our search terms and have thus acquired a relatively ‘broad but 
clean’ dataset.
The use of the realist review method has sharpened our review by forcing us to both broaden 
our choice in articles (opinion pieces, ethical and economic analyses, and reviews were analysed on 
top of document analyses and interviews/surveys) and take the defined contexts, rather than the 
practical set-up of the research, as primary quality attribute for inclusion and scoring. Although 
not always easy to accomplish, this study shows that the realist review method may successfully be 
applied to a wider variety of interventions than classical policy interventions such as patient portals 
(Otte-Trojel et al., 2014) or internet-based medical education (Wong et al., 2010). Necessity as a 
criterion is a policy ‘product’ that interacts with a variety of contexts to produce certain outcomes, 
and to frame our question thus has elicited exciting data on the varied use of necessity as a criterion 
in coverage decisions from peer-reviewed literature. It must, however, also be stressed that we 
have not effectuated a different ‘weighing’ of actual versus hypothetical decisions and that ethical 
discussions and public attitude surveys are of a wholly different substance than coverage decisions 
made by policy makers as they directly affect patients’ lives. The inclusion of hypothetical decisions 
has not been self-evident, but it has been crucial to giving an overview of as wide a selection of 
criteria-in-action as possible.
It is, however, debatable to what extent we have grasped the full context of these criteria-in-action 
due to the way ‘context’ has been defined in this study. For example, on the micro level in Sweden, 
despite the national-level guidance not to treat smokers differently, “physicians are more inclined to 
57
Realist review of necessity argumentations
1
treat a non-smoking patient” (Björk et al., 2015). The element of weighing personal responsibility in 
coverage decisions is visible here but rarely expressed as such in health policy (Tinghög et al., 2010). 
This shows that criteria may be exhibited in other argumentations at the bedside (e.g., (Breuning 
et al., 2010; Rooshenas et al., 2015) or in court (e.g., (Giacomini, 2005; McIver & Ham, 2000). 
We have also omitted the characteristics of the exact form of care under consideration as being 
potentially influential, insofar as they were not described as part of the argumentations (cf. Lowi 
in (Kieslich et al., 2016). Additionally, one could argue that the way contexts have been defined in 
this study obscures the role of the decision maker or the structure of the decision-making process, 
as these also have not been considered as ‘contexts’. Furthermore, the ‘agenda setting’ context is 
a short consideration of decisions that may have been made for political, rather than explicitly 
patient-focused, reasons (Gordon, 2006; Kroneman & de Jong, 2015; Specogna, 2010). Lastly, the 
data contained few articles on non-Western countries, which, upon becoming available, may well 
nuance the homogeneity in use of necessity considerations between countries. This, as well as ad-
ditional research on the contexts mentioned earlier, may prove fruitful lines of further inquiry.
Finally, it would appear that using the realist review method predisposes one to think in terms 
of causality: a certain mechanism in a certain context leads to a certain outcome; argumentation 
type M, when used in country C leads to (hypothetical or actual) inclusion of treatment T. This, in 
itself, is problematic: the fact that a combination occurred ‘out there’ does not necessarily mean it 
needed to happen that way; it underplays the agency of the decision makers in this important sense. 
It also assumes that the outcome ‘comes last’; it leaves no space for (additional) justifications that 
may have been brought in after the decision was made. Further investigation, for example through 
an ethnography, of the coverage decision making process and the role and use of necessity as a 
criterion in coverage decisions would be a useful exercise to shed more light hereon.
CONCLuSION
Necessity as a criterion in coverage decisions has lacked operationalisation: this chapter provides a 
handle on the wide variety of argumentation types that fall under this umbrella term by reviewing 
over 400 argumentations described in 98 peer-reviewed articles. These argumentations are grouped 
into twenty different necessity-based argumentation types that are used in coverage decisions, both 
‘actual’ decisions (made by policy makers and insurance companies) as well as ‘hypothetical’ deci-
sions (made by actors such as patients, authors, the public, and the media).
Eight of these twenty necessity-based argumentations are used to support both positive and 
negative coverage decisions; twelve are, however, only employed for either positive or negative 
decisions. When patients or the public were recorded to have aided in setting the decision on the 
agenda this always resulted in a positive decision, even when an argumentation type was used that 
could have resulted in a negative decision.
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The argumentation types heightening or lowering necessity of coverage of a certain form of care 
may also be distinguished by their users. Half of the argumentation types is used in both actual 
and hypothetical coverage decisions, that is, by policy makers and insurance companies as well 
as patients, authors, the public, and the media. The second half is, in contrast, only used by the 
latter group. Argumentation types used in actual as well as hypothetical decisions are more strongly 
acknowledged and used in a greater number of countries. Conversely, argumentation types used 
in hypothetical decisions only are much more strongly questioned, and their use is much more 
country specific.
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2
INTRODuCTION
Challenging coverage decision dossiers on a specific health care technology may show up on desks 
placed in different countries around the same time (Rosenberg-Yunger et al., 2011). Within their 
varying health care systems, decision makers are struggling with the exact same question: should 
our society pay for this? (Cerri et al., 2015). The processes to arrive at an answer to this ques-
tion have not been aligned across Western Europe, though there are strong similarities. Western 
European systems do generally utilise some form of Health Technology Assessment for health care 
technologies (Franken et al., 2012; Kleijnen et al., 2012; Makady et al., 2017; Salas-Vega et al., 2016), 
which include technologies as wide-ranging as (orphan) drugs and medical devices, and “have clear 
objectives reflected in reimbursement criteria” (Franken et al., 2012). A formalised set of reim-
bursement criteria may, however, not necessarily wholly capture all reasons for or against coverage 
provided in a (publicly available) coverage decision document (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017), which 
may result in differences between countries that might not be expected based on their respective 
formalised criteria sets (Maynou & Cairns, 2019; Nicod & Kanavos, 2012; Vuorenkoski et al., 2008). 
When surveyed, decision makers indeed frequently acknowledge the presence of additional ele-
ments that impact coverage decisions. Scholars group such additional elements under umbrellas 
like ‘contextual factors’ (Cerri et al., 2014; Cromwell et al., 2015; Csanádi et al., 2019; Hasman et 
al., 2008; Salas-Vega et al., 2016; Vuorenkoski et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2018; Wirtz et al., 2005).
What this umbrella of contextual factors holds exactly has recently attracted scholarly interest 
for ‘decisions of value’ in the health care field (Bærøe, 2018; Calnan, 2018; Peacock & Bentley, 2018; 
Williams et al., 2019). Williams et al. initiated the discussion with a literature review focused on 
meso-level decision making, exploring both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ contexts and how these may affect 
these decisions of value (Williams et al., 2018). Many of the papers reviewed by Williams et al. 
give ‘context’ as a relatively abstract explanation, and as something that is not necessarily visible 
in the final decision document. Examples from this review include organisational/institutional 
forces (Eddama & Coast, 2008; Williams et al., 2008), political constraints (Miller et al., 2013), and 
economic climate or market forces (Bazzoli et al., 2007; Castro et al., 2014). The field of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS), and Asdal specifically, challenges us to not use contexts as what she 
terms non-specific ‘explanatory resources’ (Asdal, 2012; Asdal & Moser, 2012). Not content with 
doing away with context altogether either, Asdal encourages us to:
[Grasp] the events of your study as, literally, unique events. (…) [Consequently,] the situation 
as the context that needs to be “recovered” is that which conditions or enables a specific utter-
ance to happen. (Asdal, 2012, pp. 387-388)
In essence, she sees context as present in a specific decision situation, traceable to a specific moment 
in time: as situation-specific. This characteristic of situation-specificity, we argue, gives a handle on 
the contents of what Williams et al. term “greater levels of judgement and intuitions” on the part of 
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decision makers (Williams et al., 2018, p. 691). This chapter follows suit in conceptualising contexts 
expressly not as external explanations for a situation and not as enduring backdrops of whatever 
kind but rather as situation-specific entities that may be actively brought in by decision makers. 
Moreover, we will term contexts that are present in the final decision documentation, which pro-
vides a justification or rationale for the decision, ‘contextual factors’. In this, we narrow down and 
specify Williams et al.’s original description of contextual factors (Bærøe, 2018). Of the contexts 
retrieved from literature by Williams et al., only two may be considered situation-specific, namely 
first, the information accessed by the decision makers, or its absence, and especially high levels of 
uncertainty regarding this information; and second, the presence of specific interests impacting the 
decision. That the technology and its information would vary per decision may be considered logi-
cal; the latter finding resonates with situation-specific contexts identified elsewhere for macro-level 
coverage decisions (Booth et al., 2007; Hasman et al., 2008; D. K. Martin et al., 2001b; Moes et al., 
2017; Moreira, 2011).
Although some of the papers reviewed by Williams et al. describe minutely how the decision 
process unfolded, especially those included in the review by Vuorenkoski et al. (2008), little is 
known about how these contexts are integrated in the justification of, the rationale for, the deci-
sion specifically, as this often remains implicit in line with the surveys of policy makers described 
above. To be precise, no studies have, to our knowledge, compared such use of contextual factors 
across countries (comparative papers primarily focus on the use of Health Technology Assessment 
or related criteria such as cost-effectiveness and conclude that if decisions “vary”, they do so due 
to “additional factors” (Clement et al., 2009; Nguyen-Kim et al., 2005; Nicod & Kanavos, 2012)). 
This chapter compares how situation-specific contextual factors are integrated in coverage decision 
documents in four Western European countries. Contextual factors will be operationalised here by 
means of a list of previously-described necessity argumentations (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017). Ne-
cessity argumentations have been shown to be used in coverage decisions around the world but are 
not considered valid for every health care technology by everyone: their perceived validity varies 
per situation. These argumentations comprise a varied list and include e.g. the presence or absence 
of alternative treatments, the rule of rescue, the societal impact of (lack of) coverage, whether 
similar treatments are covered, medical necessity, and moral hazard considerations. Specifically, 
this research adds to existing literature by comparison of such contextual factor use in four widely 
varying health care technologies across four relatively similar countries in Western Europe, namely 
Belgium, England, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Research aim
This chapter will explore situation-specific contextual factors in health care coverage decisions. 
We will answer the following main research question: how do Belgium, England, Germany, and 
the Netherlands use contextual factors in health care coverage decisions generally, and how does 
contextual factors use compare across four specific decisions? This study is divided into two parts. 
Part 1 examines how contextual factors are used in decision documentations generally through 
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interviews and a workshop, enriched by document and web site analysis. Part 2 compares the con-
textual factors present in four specific decisions, Nivolumab (Opdivo®), benzodiazepines, smoking 
cessation therapy, and walking aids with wheels, taken in each of the four countries by examining 
the relevant decision documents.
METhODS
approach
This study describes the outcomes of an international research collaboration of decision makers 
or policy advisors employed at four national health care institutes: National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) in England; the German Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer 
Bundesausschuss, G-BA); the Health Care Knowledge Centre/National Institute for Health and 
Disability Insurance (HCKC/NIHDI) in Belgium; and the Dutch National Health Care Institute 
(Zorginstituut Nederland, ZIN) in the Netherlands with researchers from the Erasmus School of 
Health Policy & Management and the Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Science, Rot-
terdam, the Netherlands on health care coverage decisions. For further information on the national 
health care institutes, please see section ‘working procedures’ in Appendix II. We provide an analy-
sis of contextual factors in coverage decision documents generally (part 1 of the study) and in four 
specific cases (part 2) in these four countries.
We have chosen to compare countries in the understanding that comparative research need not 
be a linear-causal exercise, meaning here that a specific attribute of the country need not be offered 
as the explanation for an observed phenomenon (Deville et al., 2016; Krause, 2016). Rather, this 
method was chosen because careful comparison of arguments and statements is thought to result 
in clearer definitions of these and more succinct questions for future research to address (Deville 
et al., 2016). Specifically, we started with semi-structured, active interviews (Holstein & Gubrium, 
2016) in groups. We enriched the interview data by document and web site analysis as well as an 
extensive member check (during the workshop, see below).
We have opted to further extend the data gathered in part 1 with case studies from the four 
countries (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Ragin, 2004). The reason for doing so is that comparison between 
cases that are similar (decisions on the same health care technology) taken in varying situations 
(the different countries) aids generating insight especially where valuation processes (cf. decisions 
of value (Williams et al., 2018)) are concerned (Lamont, 2012). In addition, the cases represent 
maximum variability (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000). In this way, by comparing the countries’ general 
decision-making processes with four decisions specifically, we have chosen a small ‘string of com-
parisons’, which has the potential to bring strong clarification (Krause, 2016).
To operationalise these contextual factors, we will employ necessity argumentations as our 
sensitising concepts (Blumer, 1954). Necessity is an umbrella term that encapsulates disease sever-
ity and need-related argumentations, which are situation-specific because they vary strongly per 
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technology examined, and explicated and integrated by virtue of being used in decision outcomes. 
Necessity argumentations comprise patient-specific considerations, such as above-mentioned 
disease severity, medical necessity and need, but also dignity, human rights and impact on societal 
functioning, and whether the condition the patient suffers from may be construed as ‘normal 
experience’. Related are the argumentations related to the patient population, such as whether 
the technology will be relevant for a small number of patients. Other considerations have to do 
with the technology and its availability, such as the presence or absence of alternative treatment 
and coverage of similar treatments, but also moral hazard (over-usage) considerations. Another 
type of argumentation is society-related and concerns argumentations like societal (or individual) 
responsibility and impact of (lack of) coverage on wider society.
Necessity argumentations are used to provide a justification of, a rationale for, coverage decisions 
in several European countries, including France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017). These argumentations are largely considered valid not 
only by decision makers but also by the public. In the overall study, the Netherlands was taken as 
the entry point in terms of country selection and overall study focus, because necessity has been 
described and used as a criterion for Dutch coverage decisions (Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn, 2003; 
Stolk et al., 2001). England, Germany and Belgium were selected as comparator countries because 
of their similarities in terms of ‘health care system objectives’ such as equity and affordability but 
also transparency in decision making (Franken et al., 2012). This was expected to result in a pub-
licly available decision, enabling our data analysis (Krause, 2016). The countries’ specific working 
procedures for decision making may be found in Appendix II.
Data collection
The data collection consisted of two parts corresponding to the two parts of the study: first, a round 
of semi-structured group interviews with experts, general policy document and web site analysis 
and a workshop with all the authors (for an overview, see Table 1); and second, document analysis 
of the four decisions taken across the four countries (for an overview, see Table 2).
Part 1 of the data collection aimed to answer the first research question, was designed by authors 
AdB, BB, and TKV, and consisted of four semi-structured interviews, which were conducted in 2.5-
3-hour conversations at each of the four health care institutes. These semi-structured interviews 
were conducted by BB, TKV, and JZ and held with one national expert, who acted as the primary 
point of contact per institute and subsequently agreed to co-author this chapter (MB, MP, and 
RvdV/JZ) and two colleagues, i.e. three interviewees per country, with the exception of Belgium, 
who opted out of authorship. These national experts hold the following roles: former Head of 
HCKC, Director of the Centre for Health Technology Evaluation at NICE, Head of the Department 
of Medical Advice at G-BA, and the Chair and Secretary of the Appraisal Committee at ZIN.
An exception was the Dutch group interview, where two experts agreed to co-author this chapter 
and only one additional colleague was present, and RvdV was interviewed one additional time by 
TKV (see Table 1).
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During the interviews, the interviewees all offered a deep understanding of their own country’s 
health care decision processes and the use of contextual factors therein through giving a presentation 
on their decision-making procedure. This presentation was prepared beforehand, the interviewee 
giving the presentation was asked to provide information on the general coverage decision-making 
process in their country and its institutional bedding. They were also aware that the interview-
ers were interested in necessity argumentations in particular and thus provided information on 
these types of considerations as well. This was followed by a presentation by TKV on what the 
interviewers understood as contextual factors (that is, necessity argumentations) and an extended 
group interview on the role of these types of factors on the decision-making process generally. The 
questions used to guide these interviews may be found in Appendix I. The four semi-structured 
group interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and coded for necessity argumentation use. 
These analyses were enriched by analysis of relevant policy documents and websites as offered by 
the interviewees. This was generally achieved by perusing the general websites of the respective 
institutes and documents pertaining to their working procedures in case of lack of clarity.
The findings gathered during the group interviews (supplemented by the information from 
the web site and document analysis) were presented by TKV at a one-day workshop, held in the 
Netherlands, attended by all authors (13 December 2017). The explicit goal of this workshop was to 
gain deeper insight into the use of contextual factors in the different countries including similarities 
and differences as well as to provide a member check on the collected data. In addition, several 
analytical angles were discussed and the decision to add part 2 of the research was made. Part 2’s 
aim was to examine the final documentation pertaining to four decisions taken across the four 
countries of interest. Three inclusion criteria for the case studies were formulated:
 1.  Necessity argumentations featured prominently in the final documentation of the coverage 
decision in the Netherlands;
 2.  The coverage decision outcome varies in the four countries, with at least one outcome 
deviating from the rest;
 3.  The cases together represent maximum variation in the patterns of use of the argumenta-
tion types (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017).
For part 2, then, policy makers employed at ZIN (JZ and a colleague) aided with choosing eight 
cases that fulfilled the first criterion and that were sufficiently different in type of technology. 
Interview date Description
24 February 2017 Appraisal committee ZIN focus group interview (RvdV, JZ, and a colleague)
17 March 2017 HCKC/NIHDI focus group interview (RM and two colleagues)
6 April 2017 G-BA focus group interview (MP and two colleagues)
23 June 2017 NICE/NHS-England focus group interview (MB and two colleagues)
18 October 2017 Additional interview (RvdV)
13 December 2017 Workshop at ZIN
Table 1 - Overview of interviews and workshops comprising Part 1 of the study
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Inclusion criteria numbers 2 and 3 narrowed the list down to four cases: nivolumab (Opdivo®), 
benzodiazepines, smoking cessation therapy, and walking aids with wheels. Of the sixteen deci-
sions (four countries times four health technologies), only fourteen yielded a document to analyse, 
and three decisions yielded two documents, to a total of seventeen documents. Approximately half 
were obtained through website searches of the relevant institutes, with the other half contributed 
by experts or colleagues working at that country’s Health Care Institute (for an overview of the 
documents analysed, see Table 2).
Decision Country Document
N
iv
ol
um
ab
The Netherlands Package advice nivolumab (Opdivo) including letter to the Minister of Health, Welfare, and 
Sports, dated 8 December 2015 (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015)
Belgium Evaluation report day 90, Dossier 736 and 737, Second request report, dated 6 July 2016 
(R.I.Z.I.V., 2016)
England NICE Technology appraisal guidance: Nivolumab for previously treated squamous non-small-
cell lung cancer (TA483), dated 1 November 2017 (NICE, 2017a)
Germany File for Benefit Assessment in accordance with section 35a of SGB-V, Nivolumab (Opdivo®), 
dated 28 April 2016 (G-BA, 2016)
Be
nz
od
ia
ze
pi
ne
s
The Netherlands Package advice 2009, Publication number 274, dated 3 April 2009 (College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen, 2009a)
Letter to the Minister of Health, Welfare, and Sports, Reimbursement benzodiazepines, dated 
21 April 2008 (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2008b)
Belgium -
England Generalised Anxiety Disorder in adults, the NICE guideline on management in primary, 
secondary and community care (NICE)
Generalised anxiety disorder and panic disorder in adults: management. Clinical guideline 
[CG113], dated January 2011 (NICE, 2011)
Germany -
Sm
ok
in
g 
ce
ss
at
io
n 
th
er
ap
y
The Netherlands Help with smoking cessation: insured care?, dated 30 June 2008 (College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen, 2008a)
Smoking cessation programme: insured care! Publication number 276, dated 21 April 2009 
(College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2009b)
Belgium Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of treatment for smoking cessation, HCKC, dated 2004 
(van den Bruel, 2004)
England Stop smoking interventions and services, NICE guideline (NG92), dated 28 March 2018 
(NICE, 2018)
Germany Regulation exclusion of medicines for heightening quality of life in accordance with Section 
34 (1) Sentence 7 SGB V (Lifestyle Drugs), Annex II to Section F of the Medicine-Directive, 
dated 28 January 2017 (G-BA, 2017)
W
al
ki
ng
 a
id
 w
ith
 w
he
el
s The Netherlands Report Medical aids 2010, Publication number 286, dated 2 April 2010 (College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen, 2010)
Belgium Memorandum main working group number 2003/6.4, Main group 1.4, Walking Aids Adults, 
dated 14 July 2003 (Riziv-Inami, 2003)
England https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/social-care-and-support-guide/care-services-equipment-and-
care-homes/walking-aids-wheelchairs-and-mobility-scooters/, dated 8 August 2018
Germany GKV-Spitzenverband Update of the product group 10 “Walking aids” of the aid directory 
according to Section 139 SGB- VvomAf, dated 27 August 2018 (GKV-Spitzenverband, 2018)
Table 2 - Overview of documents analysed comprising part 2 of the study. Note: for the English Benzodiazepines 
decision, please note that the second document analysed (Clinical guideline 113) is based on the former document.
75
Necessity argumentations across Western Europe
2
TKV was aided by a student in analysing all coverage decision documents for the primary 
arguments separately, again using the list of necessity argumentations (Table 3) as codes, using 
good language skills in Dutch (for the Dutch and Belgian documents) and English and sufficient 
aptitude in reading German, aided by online translation and where needed by professionals who 
were directly involved in the coverage decision processes. The coding was done by TKV by specifi-
cally searching for forms of these twenty necessity argumentations. The outcomes were discussed 
by AdB, BB, and TKV in several iterative meetings, and all other collaborators commented on the 
resulting analysis and agreed upon the final text.
RESuLTS
This section provides an overview of how contextual factors, operationalised as necessity argumen-
tations, generally play a role in each country, followed by a section on the use of contextual factors 
in the four case studies. A short introduction to the decision process in the different countries 
(derived from the website and policy document analysis and the presentation given by the inter-
viewees during the semi-structured interviews) may be found in Appendix II.
Part 1: use of contextual factors in general
From the presentations during the semi-structured group interviews in each of the four countries, 
as well as from the policy document and web site analysis, we conclude the following after introduc-
ing the interviewees to the list of necessity argumentations, sensitising them to the topics.
According to the interviewees, their respective national health care institutes all use necessity ar-
gumentations as contextual factors in their decisions in addition to the formalised criteria (outlined 
below). Members of the research team easily provided examples where, in their eyes, a wide variety 
of these non-formalised, situation-specific contextual factors were employed. These examples 
included but were not limited to: inclusion of smoking cessation (Belgium, see case study below); 
exclusion of homeopathy (England, decided by the National Health Service (NHS), perceived by 
interviewee as a necessity argumentation); exclusion of over-the-counter medicines (England, 
due to low cost per patient); positive “Nikolaus decision” (Germany, due to a small number of 
patients); exclusion of immunisation for travel in free time (Germany, this falling under personal 
responsibility). Notably, the workshop attendees underlined that not all might be identifiable in the 
final decision: sometimes these decisions were, apparently, ‘gut decisions’, with reasons remaining 
implicit.
More generally, reflecting on the list of contextual factors, the Belgian interviewee stated:
[Contextualisation] will remain discursive all the time. (workshop, 13.12.2017)
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This observation highlighted that contextualisation is left open to be established in argumentations 
in a deliberative setting: ‘around the table’. It also accentuated the difference between contextual 
factors, which are situation-specific, and formalised criteria, which are not. This does not mean that 
of all the necessity argumentations, none have been formalised into criteria. In fact, the national 
health care institutes have all formalised the use of these contextual factors but to different extents.
Least formalised is Belgium, where no list of stringent criteria exists: rather, decisions are made 
and contextual factors formulated by different working groups. Some necessity argumentations are 
explicitly reflected in the criteria used in the Unmet Needs Programme, which features therapeutic 
need (discomfort, life expectancy, quality of life) and societal need (budget impact, incidence/
prevalence) but this list is not widely used for decision making (Cleemput et al., 2018).
In England, the situation could be called most intricate. NICE general procedure turns on 
clinical and cost-effectiveness, with thresholds for opportunity costs. Disease severity is formally 
included in the application of the ‘end-of-life’ criteria, which allows additional flexibility only where 
a patient’s life expectancy is less than two years. It is also used in the deliberative decision-making 
process where the independent committee has the flexibility to accept cost-effectiveness estimates 
that are higher than what would otherwise be considered value for money. Moreover, the NICE 
pre-selection procedure employs elements like chronicity and acute death as criteria.
For Germany, ‘necessity’ is one of three formalised criteria described in the German Social Code, 
Book 5 (SGB-V). However, it has not been specified to a great extent; the criteria in Germany 
are considered “generally formulated” (Patera & Wild, 2014). Disease severity does influence the 
level of evidence required in G-BA’s decisions (varying from anecdotal evidence to randomised 
controlled trials).
The country with the highest formalisation is the Netherlands; ZIN operationalises necessity as 
one of four formal package criteria (next to effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and feasibility). This is 
explicated in their formal documentations as disease severity, or individual burden of disease, and 
individual cost considerations (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2013, 2017).
Part 2: use of contextual factors in four case studies
The four decisions to be examined across the four countries, namely nivolumab, benzodiazepines, 
smoking cessation therapies, and walking aids with wheels, were selected per the criteria mentioned 
above, the documents analysed per decision are available in Table 2. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
used contextual factors per decision document per country.
Case study 1: Nivolumab
All four countries decided on reimbursement of nivolumab for treatment of previously-treated 
squamous non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC).
The expectation of a large budget impact necessitated placing nivolumab in the Dutch package 
lock, awaiting an advised decision by ZIN and, potentially, subsequent price negotiations with the 
manufacturer (Schippers, 2015). The Institute did indeed advise the Minister of Health against 
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Contextual 
factor
Description Nivolu-
mab
Benzodi-
azepines
Smoking 
cessation 
therapies
Walking 
aids with 
wheels
Definition of 
Illness
Whether the ailment is considered an illness for which 
treatment is necessary
NL NL; BE; 
EN; DE
Equity/
Fairness/
Justice
Whether coverage would be necessary to counter 
injustice/inequity/lack of fairness in (access to) treatment
NL; EN
Individual 
Cost
Whether lack of coverage would stop patients from buying 
necessary care themselves due to prohibitive cost
NL NL NL NL
Individual 
Responsibility
Whether the individual is considered responsible for 
paying for this treatment
NL NL
Medical 
Necessity
Whether or not a treatment is considered to be “medically 
necessary” or a “medical necessity”
NL
Morbidity/
Severity
Whether the physical and/or psychosocial morbidity 
associated with a certain ailment constitutes such a need 
that coverage is considered necessary
NL; BE; 
EN; DE
NL; EN NL; BE; 
EN
BE; EN; 
DE
Need The extent to which the patient is considered to be in need 
for which treatment is necessary
NL; BE; 
EN; DE
BE
(No) 
Alternative
Whether or not viable alternatives are considered to 
be present which would make coverage more or less 
necessary
NL; BE; 
EN
NL; EN DE
Patient-
Diagnosis
Whether an illness is self-reported rather than diagnosed 
by a doctor
NL; EN
Range of 
Normality
Whether the experience of the patient is considered 
normal or abnormal to such an extent that coverage is 
deemed necessary
NL
Similar 
Treatments
Whether similar treatments are covered or not (meaning 
that this type of treatment is considered necessary)
NL; DE
Societal 
Impact
Whether coverage is considered necessary to allay the 
impact this disease has on people beyond the patient
NL; BE
Societal 
Functioning
Whether coverage would aid a person’s necessary 
functioning in society
BE; EN EN NL; DE BE; EN; 
DE
Vulnerability/
Compassion
Whether a compassionate response to vulnerable groups, 
e.g. children, in the form of coverage is considered to be 
a necessity
NL; BE
Substitution Whether other (e.g., heavier dosage or more expensive 
than necessary) medicines or care would be consumed or 
used by patients as a result of a negative coverage decision
NL
Under-
consumption
Whether less medicines or treatments than necessary 
would be consumed or used by patients as a result of 
a negative coverage decision (the opposite of ‘Moral 
Hazard’)
NL
Table 3 - Overview of contextual factors operationalised as necessity argumentations and their respective de-
scriptions (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017, 2020) combined with information on which factor was used in which 
decision in which country. The argumentation types that were not present in this data set (namely, Dignity, 
Human Right, Moral Hazard, Rule of Rescue, Small Number of Patients, and Societal Responsibility) were 
omitted from this table.
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including nivolumab in the basic benefits package unless a price reduction of at least 40% could 
be achieved: the treatment was considered effective but not cost-effective enough. In their decision 
documentation, the Institute argued that: “the burden of disease is high” as it is considered “a non-
curative disease” with “limited life expectancy”. Interestingly, an alternative treatment (docetaxel) 
is mentioned in the pharmaco-economic report). Moreover, “the costs for the treatment is so high 
patients cannot be expected to pay” (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015). The Minister did negotiate 
and although the final price has not been made public, nivolumab is now available on the Dutch 
benefits package.
For Belgium, the official documentation retrieved is the ‘day 90’ report from the Committee for 
‘advance compensation’ for Pharmaceuticals and specifically the ‘second request’ document, which 
gives the latest insight into motivation concerning reimbursement and the details of the final cover-
age arrangement for nivolumab. The necessity argumentations visible are “weakness and fatigue, 
coughing, shortness of breath, pain” and a median survival number. Moreover, considerations 
around the quality of life feature in the comparison with doxacetel (R.I.Z.I.V., 2016). This resulted 
in a positive decision.
As for ZIN, NICE’s Technology Appraisal Committee considered nivolumab effective but not 
cost-effective enough. Moreover, the uncertainty of the evidence was deemed too great. For these 
reasons, additional characteristics were considered: in the social value judgement several necessity 
argumentations were brought to the fore. The committee noted a high need due to lack of alterna-
tives, with a high morbidity, a low life expectancy, and “symptoms which are difficult to manage” 
(NICE, 2017a). This resulted in a recommendation of funding but only through the Cancer Drugs 
Fund, which happened after a renegotiation on the price of nivolumab with manufacturer Bristol-
Myers Squibb (NICE, 2017b).
In Germany, drugs are covered with market entry, followed by a decision on additional benefit 
by G-BA, which may be used in turn for price negotiations. In the case of nivolumab, the Institute 
for Quality and Science in Health Care (in German: Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit 
im Gesundheidswesen, IQWiG) provided evidence concerning mortality, morbidity, quality of life, 
and several adverse event categories, noting considerable added benefit on all counts for NSCLC 
patients on nivolumab to benefit the decision made by G-BA. In terms of necessity argumentations, 
the report mentions the severity of the disease, the low absolute 10-year survival rate, and the “need 
for drugs”. The Individual Cost is mentioned but not clearly as an argumentation (G-BA, 2016). 
This was sufficient grounds not to exclude nivolumab from coverage.
Case study 2: Benzodiazepines
In the Netherlands, ZIN advised the Minister of Health against continued coverage of benzodiaz-
epines (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2008b, 2009a). The primary reasoning was that although 
the indication was for short-term use, prescriptions for benzodiazepines often ended up to be for 
chronic use. The Institute recommended improving the guidelines, but consultation with field par-
ties revealed difficulties in defining eligibility criteria. Therefore, even despite the disease severity 
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mentioned and the fact that short use of benzodiazepines following the applicable guidelines may 
be medically necessary (but chronic use not), the large amount of chronic users, the possibility 
that denying coverage would lead to patients choosing another, covered, medicine and the fact that 
the cost for one episode of benzodiazepines is approximately €12-16 were decisive in the negative 
coverage decision. The exception was made for three clearly defined indications: epilepsy, anxiety 
disorders, and multiple psychiatric disorders.
For the Belgian case, treatment of benzodiazepines is not covered by the health insurance. NIHDI 
has never appraised benzodiazepines as they have never received a request to do so.
In England, NICE guidelines recommend short-term use of benzodiazepines for several medical 
indications, which have separate appraisal documents. We analysed the case of adult Generalised 
Anxiety Disorders (GADs), which highlights several risks for GPs prescribing benzodiazepines, 
which fall under necessity argumentations. First, emphasis is laid on the high frequency of over-use 
due to tolerance and dependence. The documentation does highlight that use is only recommended 
in case of non-response to other medicines, which can be classed as an argumentation in favour of 
coverage. People with GAD are described to have “long-standing and often uncontrollable worries 
and negative thoughts” which affect their “many areas of their lives, particularly relationships, self-
esteem, daily activities, employment, work life and education” (NICE, 2011).
G-BA has, like NIHDI, never received an appraisal request for benzodiazepines, but in contrast 
to Belgium, benzodiazepines are covered by the German sickness funds. The reason is that in Ger-
many all drugs are covered after market entry except when they are specifically excluded either by 
law in the SGB-V or by G-BA. A systematic assessment of additional benefit (for the sake of price 
negotiations) was only established in 2011 by the Act on the Reform of the Market for Medicinal 
Products. Benzodiazepines were on the German market in 2010 already and are thus part of a 
“historical benefit package.”
Case study 3: Smoking cessation therapies
This analysis is of decisions for both psychotherapeutic and pharmaceutical smoking cessation 
therapies.
In the Netherlands, ZIN dealt with several iterations of the coverage decision for smoking ces-
sation therapies: they were covered, then no longer covered, and then covered again. One reason 
is that it became a political issue with changes in government affecting the reimbursement status. 
The final advice to the Minister has been to cover stop advice, intensive forms of interventions for 
behavioural change, and nortriptyline but not to several other interventions. The final decision 
hinged, at least partially, on the effectiveness: in essence, the health gain even a few extra successful 
stop attempts would yield, also visible in the argumentation that “a smoking cessation programme 
can reduce the damage caused by smoking to others”. In this extensive decision-making process, 
several necessity argumentations played a role (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2008a, 2009b). 
First, the individual is personally responsible for his health, and the costs for the individual were 
low, reducing the perceived necessity of coverage. Even so, there were indications that more people 
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would attempt to quit smoking if it was covered, and especially those with a lower socio-economic 
status. Moreover, smoking was defined as an addiction and bad for health, leading to quality of 
life loss, causing damage to others, including unborn children and infants, treatment for which is 
usually covered by the basic benefits package.
Smoking cessation therapies have never formally been discussed by the committee for Reimburse-
ment of Medicines (Tegemoetkoming Geneesmiddelen) at Belgian NIHDI. Not the mutualities but 
the Belgian National Cancer Initiative covers €20 of the first eight sessions of smoking cessation 
therapies (Kankerplan, 2008-2010) and from 1 January 2017, smoking cessation aid by a tobac-
cologist is reimbursed in Flanders (overheid, 2019). As in the Netherlands though, these therapies 
have not always been covered for everyone. The compulsory health insurance covered smoking 
cessation therapies for all pregnant women, revealing a potential Societal Impact argumentation, 
though this was rarely used. In 2004, HCKC published a report that all smoking cessation therapies 
are cost-effective that informed what is now a primary part of the National Cancer Initiative. This 
report was not a coverage decision, but analysis yielded that smoking was defined as a habit, strong 
descriptions of the morbidity caused by smoking, including the increased risk of having a baby with 
low birth weight (van den Bruel, 2004).
In England, smoking cessation therapies are available to all citizens over 12 years of age, for 
which NICE most recently published guidelines in 2018. These highlighted that “smoking is the 
main cause of preventable illness and premature death” and showed that all smoking cessation 
therapies were cost-effective enough to stay below the QALY threshold. The guidelines underscore 
that there are social inequalities in terms of tobacco use, which “make a significant contribution to 
inequalities in health” (NICE, 2018).
Germany is the only of the four countries analysed in this project that does not cover smoking 
cessation therapies, as they are excluded from the benefits package by law (SGB-V §34). The title of 
the analysed documentation reveals they are considered “lifestyle medicines” aimed at improving 
quality of life, but no additional contextual factors are visible in the documentation.
Case study 4: Walking aids with wheels (rollators)
We analyse walking aids with two, three or four wheels, also called rollators, for adults.
In the Netherlands, the Minister of Health was advised by ZIN to no longer include mobility 
aids in the basic benefits package, and two necessity argumentations were given for this. First, the 
cost for walking aids with wheels, crutches, and many more walking aids was considered too low 
and secondly, “a walker with wheels is for common use”, meaning that it was, in Dutch society, 
considered normal to need one at a certain age (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 2010).
The Belgian NIHDI has published prescription guidelines which cover walking aids with wheels 
for those unable to stand up independently or safely (Riziv-Inami, 2003).
In England, this intervention has not been considered by NICE but the NHS loans walking aids 
with wheels for free, after assessment by a physician. No specific appraisal documents were avail-
able for walkers with wheels, as they are only discussed in guidelines for specific conditions, which 
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only specify that “you or someone you know” needs to have “difficulty walking or getting around 
(mobility)” (NHS, 2018).
Despite the fact that G-BA has not appraised walking aids with wheels specifically, they are 
available to all German citizens from their insurers upon indication: anyone experiencing reduced 
physical mobility or loss of balance is considered eligible, as long as other mobility aids have proved 
insufficient. This list is managed by the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds 
(GKV-Spitzenverband) (GKV-Spitzenverband, 2018).
Comparison of contextual factor use in the four cases
To start, across these cases, similar patterns in contextual factor use lead to similar decision out-
comes. This is visible in five instances. First, there are strong similarities between the decisions for 
nivolumab in Belgium and Germany, which both strongly rely on the severity of the disease and 
patients’ quality of life and need, as well as the low survival rate. The other two decisions for niv-
olumab are highly reminiscent of these argumentations, but the Dutch and English both used them 
as input for price negotiations (which means the initial decision was negative). England and the 
Netherlands also strongly overlapped in their argumentation pattern for benzodiazepines, invoking 
the large amount of chronic users or over-usage as a reason to limit coverage, while acknowledging 
the difficulties experienced by the patient as well as the lack of alternatives. Fourth, there are some 
similarities between the Dutch and English decision for smoking cessation therapies, too, though 
the Dutch decision-making process featured a far greater number of contextual factors. Finally, the 
Belgian, English, and German decisions for walking aids with wheels also show strong overlap: if 
you are unable to stand up safely in these countries, a walking aid with wheels is provided for in 
some way.
Moreover, it would seem that the number of contextual factor types considered valid in one 
or more of the cases varies between the countries: the Belgian decisions feature seven types, the 
English also seven types, the German decisions six types, compared to sixteen types of contextual 
factors present in the Netherlands. This shows that the Dutch decisions generally feature a high 
amount of contextual factors in this data set.
Finally, half the (final) decisions were not taken by the institutes analysed. This pertains to the 
Belgian and German benzodiazepines decisions, the Belgian and German smoking cessation 
therapies decisions, the English and German walking aids with wheels decisions and, to an extent, 
the Dutch nivolumab decision as it differed from the initial ZIN advice, and the English nivolumab 
decision as it was covered through the CDF rather than a positive decision by NICE. Many of these 
did, however, yield a document or web site to analyse (only two benzodiazepines decisions lacked 
such a decision document).
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DISCuSSION
Contextualisation has recently been a raised as an important topic of interest for both policy practice 
and research regarding health care ‘decisions of value’ (Williams et al., 2018). Our cross-country 
research team has defined contextual factors as situation-specific considerations, following Asdal 
(2012). This enabled us to examine the coverage decision processes in four Western-European 
countries: Belgium, England, Germany, and the Netherlands, and specifically, to establish where 
contextual factors are used, both generally (part 1 of the study) and in four decisions taken across 
the four countries specifically (part 2). We have operationalised these situation-specific contextual 
factors using a list of previously-described necessity argumentations that are used across Europe 
and generally vary per decision (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017).
We draw the following conclusions. From part 1 of the study, we conclude that situation-specific 
contextual factors, operationalised as necessity argumentations, are present in decision-making 
processes at the HCKC/NIHDI in Belgium; NICE in England; the German G-BA; and the Dutch 
ZIN in the Netherlands. Some necessity argumentations have been formalised into criteria to be 
used for every decision in theory (individual burden of disease in England, Germany, and the 
Netherlands, and individual cost considerations in the Netherlands) (Commissie-Dunning, 1991; 
Franken et al., 2015; Stolk et al., 2002; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2013). This may raise the question 
whether these would fall outside the definition of contextual factors as situation-specific – however, 
our data show that not every decision analysed uses the formalised contextual factor(s) in practice. 
Specifically, expert interviewees underline that these contextual factors are determined in delibera-
tion, ‘around the table’: a setting present in some form at every institute studied (Patera & Wild, 
2014). They offered many examples of specific decisions in which such factors were considered, 
though underlining that not all of these factors had been explicated in their respective documenta-
tions.
From part 2, we conclude that similar patterns in contextual factor usage lead to similar deci-
sions in the countries studied (Belgium and Germany for nivolumab; England and the Netherlands 
for nivolumab and benzodiazepines; and Belgium, England, and Germany for walking aids with 
wheels). This is an important conclusion, which may serve to encourage exchange between decision 
makers in different countries on more qualitative aspects of coverage decisions in addition to the 
current collaborations on the more quantitative aspects. However, the decisions are still sufficiently 
different (in fact, they were explicitly selected as having different outcomes across the four coun-
tries) to preclude much more than exchange. The use of contextual factors in decisions, we would 
argue, would need to remain at the discretion of local decision makers. In this data set, Dutch 
decisions employ the widest variety of contextual factors, and most often employs an argumenta-
tion type no other country employs. This with the notable absence of the societal functioning of the 
patient, which is a common consideration in Belgium, England, and Germany. This shows that in a 
sense, the argumentations are not 100% situation-specific. Instead, they are part of typifications and 
these types are identifiable across situations but not consistently. It is thus the pattern of contextual 
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factors that is truly situation-specific (D. Martin et al., 2001a; Singer et al., 2000). Future research 
could further address this idea of patterning and how it influences coverage decisions. Finally, for 
all four institutes some decisions in this data set are taken or retaken by another actor, which often 
sometimes means that the documentation for the final decision is not publicly available.
Taking a step further in conceptualising contextual factors, we conclude that they are explicated 
around the table, in deliberation (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2020). This establishing around the table 
is the first element: we also conclude that contextual factors need to be actively integrated in the 
decision documentation, as not all factors established in deliberation seem to be present in the 
document. Many scholars have in fact described, often based on interviews, that many such con-
textual factors remain implicit, either in both the deliberation and the documentation or in the 
documentation only. This is perhaps to be expected, as localised processes of meaning-giving by 
the decision makers themselves are described as implicit (Hughes & Light, 2002; Rooshenas et al., 
2015). We conclude, as Mann puts it, that contextualisation is an intervention (Mann, 2015) and 
as such an active, situated process. As a consequence, this conceptualisation of contextual factors 
attunes us to effect that decision makers have on how decisions are justified and the expertise they 
bring to bear therein (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2020). The fact that these differences in explication of 
factors exist is of particular interest as it provides more insight into the how and why of evidence-
informed deliberative processes (Baltussen et al., 2016; Hall, 2017). Further research should address 
why and how some factors remain implicit, whereas others are not only explicated but actively 
integrated in the final text.
Many of the documentations that should provide a justification/rationale for the final decision 
were, in fact, absent and an alternative document was analysed if present. For some, we analysed 
the pre-final decision (nivolumab for England and the Netherlands, both negative decisions), in 
other cases, the decision was not taken by the national health care institute (walking aids with 
wheels for England and Germany), in others again, no decision was visible at all. This underscores 
that health care coverage decision making is a process that involves many people in many places. 
It is a question of definition (‘does a decision on technology X fall under the remit of our national 
health care institute?’) but also a question of agenda setting (e.g., NIHDI and G-BA had never 
received a request to appraise benzodiazepines). This backdrop to the decision is something that is 
not explicitly integrated into the documentation but is definitely actively shaping the final decision.
This high prevalence of decisions for which the final documentation is not available is a par-
ticularly salient finding, as this highlights that the transparency of some decisions may be limited. 
Because these (final) decisions are made in another setting, the argumentations underlying the de-
cision remain unknown. This is intriguing as many of the institutions studied are seeking to make 
processes more transparent in pursuit of increasing the legitimacy of their decisions (Franken et al., 
2012). A more transparent decision is considered to heighten the legitimacy of this type of public 
decisions in general (Alonso-Coello et al., 2016; Daniels, 2000; Daniels et al., 2016; Daniels & Sabin, 
1997, 1998, 2008; Guyatt, Oxman, Kunz, et al., 2008; Guyatt, Oxman, Vist, et al., 2008). Moreover, 
many authors hold that the coverage decision process should be based on consistently-applied, 
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formalised criteria, visible in the documentation pertaining to the decision and that having highly 
formalised criteria would potentially enable more rational, better-justifiable decisions (Bærøe & 
Baltussen, 2014; Baltussen & Niessen, 2006; Giacomini et al., 2000; Jansen et al., 2017; Kapiriri et al., 
2009). Yet, the Dutch nivolumab decision in particular demonstrates that having highly formalised 
criteria, as is the case in the Netherlands, does not preclude this particular type of decision making. 
Further research will need to carefully consider the ways in which these ‘invisible’ decisions enable 
and restrain deliberative coverage decision-making practice and how this relates to the legitimacy 
of these decisions (de Fine Licht, 2011).
Strengths and limitations
This chapter covers a vital topic as it successfully visualises the contextual factors employed in 
coverage decisions generally and four decisions specifically in four countries. This chapter does 
so without resorting to using the general health care system characteristics as an explanation but 
instead seeks to draw more specific conclusions. Another strength of the chapter lies in the meth-
odology and especially the case-study selection, which was both grounded empirically through 
expert interviews and enriched by theoretical interest through the formulated criteria.
As the Netherlands was taken as the entry point for this study, both in terms of content as in terms 
of the place of work and residence of the majority of the authors, this will have had a major impact. 
In particular, this is visible first, in terms of the case selection (as Dutch interviewees were asked 
for the initial list of potential cases); second, in the level of detail acquired in the case descriptions, 
which is relatively high for the Dutch decisions. It is also likely that it may have affected the research 
question itself. Asking questions concerning formalisation, or operationalisation, of criteria may be 
considered a typically Dutch pursuit, as visualised by the fact that the Netherlands has a rich history 
in terms of seeking to explicate decision criteria in this context (Commissie-Dunning, 1991; Stolk 
et al., 2002; Stolk et al., 2001).
The use of necessity argumentations has narrowed the subject down content-wise to consider-
ations that are likely to be present in decision documents. Future research could investigate how 
what remains implicit impacts decision making. It is also important to note that the decisions 
studied span the last fifteen years, and it is likely that considerations are weighed or valued differ-
ently across that time span. Future research could address how the use of contextual factors may 
change over time.
As Bærøe noted (Bærøe, 2018), there is a difference between approaches aiming to formulate a 
comprehensive list and those that would hold that this is impossible. Although we have chosen a 
limited list as it facilitates this research, we do not necessarily believe that an exhaustive list would 
be possible. Normatively this may well prove problematic; for this study, we are concerned with 
describing what is rather than with what ought to.
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CONCLuSION
This study aims to be part of answering the recent call for research in aid of understanding of prac-
tices of contextualisation. As health care coverage decisions are a particularly fruitful area to study 
these practices in, we have compared the use of contextual factors, defined as situation-specific 
considerations, in documentations that provide a justification or rationale of these decisions as of-
fered by HCKC/NIHDI (Belgium), NICE (England), G-BA (Germany), and ZIN (the Netherlands). 
To study these, we build on group interviews with three national experts per institute, document 
and web site analysis, and a workshop with one to two experts per country (together part 1), and 
the analysis of four different case studies across these four countries, which varied greatly in terms 
of type of technology (part 2). From this data set, we conclude that these four national health 
care institutes all utilise situation-specific contextual factors in their decision documents. These 
contextual factors are employed ‘around the table’, that is, established in deliberation. Though 
some may remain implicit, others are not only explicated but actively integrated in the decision 
documentation, thus strengthening the decision by making it more sensitive to the case at hand. 
Moreover, in this data set, there are strong similarities in terms of how these contextual factors are 
used: similar patterns of contextual factor use lead to similar decisions in different countries. These 
observations do not use context as non-specific explanatory resources, as critiqued by Asdal in 
particular (Asdal, 2012; Asdal & Moser, 2012) but instead focus on the people and their processes 
required to actively integrate these considerations. It also calls for future research on patterning 
of these contextual factors in deliberative settings. Not all decisions are taken ‘around the table’, 
however. Half the decisions were taken or retaken in another setting, with the documentation to 
back up the final decision sometimes completely absent. We note this may impact the legitimacy 
of these decisions and call for future research efforts on how this may affect the daily practice of 
coverage decision making.
Chapter 2
86
aPPENDIx I – INTERVIEW GuIDE fOR SEMI-STRuCTuRED INTERVIEWS
	 •	 	Please	tell	us	about	yourself,	your	institute’s	coverage	decision-making	process,	its	institu-
tional setting, etc. (15 min. presentation by interviewees, prepared beforehand)
	 •	 	What	 is	your	general	 impression	of	how	necessity	and	 its	related	notions	(e.g.	need	and	
situation of the patient and the responsibility of society) are used in your country? Could 
you give one or two examples of a decision where necessity was important and/or decisive?
	 •	 	In	your	opinion,	is	there	anything	that	could	be	improved	in	decision-making	processes	
based on necessity in your country? Could you give an example of a decision for which this 
would have made a difference?
	 •	 	What	are	your	thoughts	on	the	finding	that	these	necessity	argumentations	may	vary	in	us-
age and validity? Is there anything that resonates with your experience particularly? Could 
you give examples?
	 •	 	To	what	degree	are	these	findings	understandable	and	relevant	for	your	work?	How	would	
they impact future decisions?
	 •	 	What	(type	of)	research	outcomes	would	be	most	valuable	for	your	work	in	terms	of	this	
study? How do you think they might be used at your workplace?
	 •	 	What	it	has	been	like	to	participate	in	this	interview,	what	has	been	good,	and	what	could	
be improved upon?
	 •	 	Is	there	anything	else	you	would	like	to	share	with	us	before	we	conclude	the	interview?
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aPPENDIx II - WORkING PROCEDuRES PER COuNTRy
The Netherlands
The Dutch health care system is insurance-based: all Dutch citizens are obliged to take out health 
insurance with a private insurance company. However, the bare minimum for which they are 
ensured, the basic benefits package, is the same for all citizens and is established by the govern-
ment. The Dutch National Health Care Institute (ZIN) advises the Minister of Health in his or her 
decision as to what should, and should not, be covered (Couwenbergh et al., 2013). The mission of 
the Institute is to provide “no less than needed but no more than necessary” health care (as shown 
on their website, accessed 17 January 2019), a mission that is worked out through advice on the 
basic benefits package but also, for example, setting of quality standards.
ZIN employs four a priori established criteria, also called “package principles”: effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of the technology, feasibility of coverage (including budget impact), and 
necessity, which includes individual severity of illness and necessity of coverage. The process at 
the Institute is guided by Institute employees, who also write the final advice document and all 
previous drafts. The process starts with a scoping session with stakeholders, like patient organisa-
tions, health care providers, pharmaceutical companies, and health insurers, who are invited to 
comment on the process. The scoping is followed by an extensive examination of the scientific 
evidence in the Scientific Advisory Council. The third step is the appraisal, or contextualisation, of 
this evidence in the Advisory Committee Package in a setting that is open to the public. Generally, 
some of the stakeholders will be present here as well, and there is an opportunity to contribute to 
the deliberations, which ought to consider wider societal values pertaining to the coverage. The 
final advice is then formulated and approved by the Board of Directors, before it is sent to the 
Minister (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016, 2017).
Belgium
Belgium, similar to the Netherlands, operates on a social health insurance system basis, which 
mandates citizens to take out basic health insurance with an insurer. These insurance organisations, 
called mutualities, operate on a not-for-profit basis. Decisions on what is covered by this compul-
sory health insurance are discussed at the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance 
(NIHDI). NIHDI allocates the national health care budget, sets standard prices for treatments, 
and inspects the mutualities, supervised by the Minister of Public Health and Social Affairs. The 
Health Care Knowledge Centre (HCKC), in contrast, is responsible for research and scientific 
advice concerning the basic health insurance, taking on a consultancy role for policy makers, who 
may commission such research (Centre, 2017). This research generally takes a multi-disciplinary 
approach. HCKC counts over 45 experts with a background in medicine, economy, sociology, 
law, and/or ethics. They formulate recommendations together, aided where necessary by external 
parties and in collaboration with the Board of Directors (Centre, 2019). The coverage decision 
proposals of NIHDI are sent to the Minister who makes the final decision.
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England
The NHS, the National Health System in the United Kingdom, is publicly funded, free at the point 
of delivery, based on clinical need, not the ability to pay, and is aimed at meeting the needs of every-
one (Grosios et al., 2010). The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides 
guidance and advice concerning health care services in England. NICE was established in 1999 in 
an attempt to tackle the so-called postcode lottery in access to new technologies. The Health and 
Social Care Act of 2012 notes that developing its advice or guidance, NICE must have regard to the 
broad balance between the benefits and costs of the provision of health services or of social care 
in England, the degree of need of persons for health services or social care in England, and the 
desirability of promoting innovation in the provision of health services or of social care in England. 
The NICE single technology appraisal is the primary, standardised way NICE evaluates old and 
new forms of care but also multiple technology appraisals and fast track appraisals are available. 
Moreover, NICE’s guideline programme considers the care and services suitable for most people 
with a specific condition or need and people in particular circumstances or settings (NICE, 2016).
The starting point for technology appraisals is the evidence submitted by the company, where 
when it comes to a guideline, NICE uses academic collaborating centres to bring together the 
evidence. In technology appraisals, this evidence is then considered by the ERG and added to it 
evidence from external parties, which may include clinical specialists, commissioning experts and 
patient experts. The appraisal committee subsequently convenes to appraise the available evidence 
in terms of clinical and cost-effectiveness, consider advice given by NICE, board, and drawing 
on social value judgements, including those informed by the Citizens Council, to come to a first 
Appraisal Consultation Document (ACD) containing preliminary recommendations (Dakin et al., 
2015). This Citizens Council, which NICE has had for many years, helps frame the social value 
judgements that the independent committees are asked to consider when formulating NICE guid-
ance. Once it is published, all stakeholders, including the general public, may comment on the 
ACD, which are potentially taken along in NICE’s final recommendation (NICE, 2013).
Germany
The health care system in Germany is social insurance based, like the Netherlands and Belgium, 
with the statutory health funds (SHFs) covering circa 90% of the German population, and private 
insurance covering the rest. The costs for insurance are shared between employers and employees, 
and German citizens are free to choose among the SHFs (ISPOR, 2009). All SHFs are represented 
in the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-Spitzenverband), the SHF 
umbrella organisation. The Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss (G-BA) is the highest, independent or-
ganisation in the German health care system, playing a major role in the decision-making process 
concerning which services are covered by the SHFs and issuing directives concerning the national 
benefits package. It brings together four major organisations representing physicians, dentists, 
hospitals, and insurance funds respectively. The German Social Code, Book 5 (SGB-V) sets out the 
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lawful responsibilities of G-BA, specifying rules for reaching agreement, appointing members and 
involving patients and third parties.
The main decision-making body of G-BA, the plenum, is a deliberative setting in which decisions 
are reached concerning which types of care are in- or excluded. The plenum comprises thirteen 
voting members and five patient representatives. Of these thirteen voting members, three are im-
partial (including the chair), five are representatives from the GKV-Spitzenverband, and the other 
five are care provider representatives. Cases are prepared by one of the nine subcommittees for 
discussion in the plenum, which have their own expertise (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss). Cost-
effectiveness data in particular are prepared by IQWiG, the independent federal organisation set up 
to evaluate medical efficiency, quality and effectiveness of treatments. These data are considered in 
the plenum next to consultations by experts and practitioners.
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INTRODuCTION
Whether a health care technology is made available to patients, for example through a (national) 
formulary, benefits package, or insurance scheme, is decided by means of health care coverage deci-
sions. Making these decisions well is notoriously complex as it leans on a wide variety of heteroge-
neous considerations that are brought together in the decision-making process (Cerri et al., 2014; 
Dakin et al., 2015; Hughes & Doheny, 2011; Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014; Vuorenkoski et al., 2008). 
The most-studied part of this process is the assessment, which examines the available scientific 
evidence such as the (cost-) effectiveness of the technology, often employing Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA) methods (eg. Franken et al., 2012; Kleijnen et al., 2012; Le Polain et al., 2010; 
Makady et al., 2017; Salas-Vega et al., 2016). Notably, such scientific knowledge bases have been 
shown essential but not sufficient for making good coverage decisions (Calnan et al., 2017; Moes 
et al., 2016; Samenleving, 2017; Shirazi et al., 2017). Therefore, many coverage decisions feature a 
second part, sometimes (but not always) a distinct step in time and space: the appraisal. An ap-
praisal entails the formulation of a (recommended) coverage decision based on a contextualisation 
of the given evidence (Jansen et al., 2017; Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2020; Oliver et al., 2004; Patera 
& Wild, 2014; Walley, 2007). Previously, contextualisation has broadly been defined as taking into 
account a variety of values and considerations (Patera & Wild, 2014). Some, such as the English 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), have specified contextualisation to mean 
establishing “what is good for society” or, in other words, providing a societal weighing of the 
evidence (Culyer & Rawlins, 2004; NICE, 2008; Shah et al., 2013).
Little is known about how societal weighing works and how exactly appraisal committees may 
achieve this. Recent work on deliberative coverage decisions more generally does show that ex-
pertise in these decisions may comprise three distinct elements. First, the expertise is substantive; 
committee members are able to understand and work with different types of knowledge. These 
types include not only the scientific input deriving from the assessment but often also knowledge 
provided by patients (‘experts-by-experience’) as well as ‘local’ knowledge regarding the institu-
tional setting where the decision-making process takes place. Second, committee members respond 
appropriately to these different types of input and combine them into one decision, which involves 
being ‘rational’ and being ‘human’. They also deal with any tensions that may arise between knowl-
edge types (Calnan et al., 2017; Gkeredakis et al., 2011; Hughes & Doheny, 2011; Jenkings & Barber, 
2004; Moes et al., 2016; Moreira, 2011; Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014). Third, committee members 
are experts at adhering to not only substantive requirements which are generally in the form of 
formalised decision criteria but also processual requirements (Russell, 2017), often those laid out 
by the widely-used Accountability for Reasonableness framework (Daniels, 2000; Daniels & Sabin, 
1997, 1998, 2008; Hasman & Holm, 2005). These three elements of expertise would appear, however, 
not specific to appraisals so the question remains: what does societal weighing expertise look like?
In this study, we will fill the gap concerning societal weighing expertise by examining the ap-
praisal phase of Dutch health care coverage decisions, which also, like NICE’s decisions described 
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above, explicitly aim for a “societal weighing” of the evidence base provided in the assessment 
(Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016, 2017). Furthermore, Dutch decision-making practice provides an 
excellent case because the appraisal is set up as a separate meeting, a distinct moment in time and 
space, making it easier to distinguish from the assessment phase (Commissie-Dunning, 1991; Stolk 
et al., 2002; Stolk et al., 2001). In the Netherlands, the National Health Care Institute (‘the Institute’, 
in Dutch: Zorginstituut Nederland), an arm’s length body, is responsible for advising the Ministry of 
Health on the contents of the basic benefits basket. This basket outlines the bare-minimum health 
care insurance package that is obligatory for all Dutch citizens. The Dutch coverage decision-mak-
ing process usually starts with a scoping session, in which stakeholders are invited to contribute 
relevant considerations. This is followed by a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee (‘the 
assessment committee’, in Dutch: Wetenschappelijke Adviesraad), in which the scientific knowledge 
base is established based on HTA methodology (Franken et al., 2012; Kleijnen et al., 2012; Makady 
et al., 2017; Salas-Vega et al., 2016). The Package Advisory Committee (‘the appraisal commit-
tee’, in Dutch: Adviescommissie Pakket), convened once-monthly at the Institute, is subsequently 
responsible for the societal weighing of the evidence and the formulation of coverage advice to 
the Minister (Couwenbergh et al., 2013; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016, 2017). The Institute uses 
four formalised criteria in this advice, namely effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, feasibility (including 
budget impact considerations), and necessity. ‘Necessity’ is, as a consequence of being a formalised 
criterion, present in the documents providing input for the appraisal as they outline the avail-
able information per criterion. It has, however, also been considered to be established especially 
in appraisal (Couwenbergh et al., 2013; Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017; Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2020; 
Mastenbroek et al., 2006; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017). Therefore, this chapter will explore how 
the appraisal committee constructs necessity as this may aid in uncovering elements that are specific 
to societal weighing expertise (Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn, 2003; Poley, 2002; Stolk et al., 2002).
aim
This chapter describes the phases of constructing necessity by examining the contents of and the 
proceedings at Dutch appraisal meetings through observations, transcriptions, and subsequent 
analysis of audio recordings of four meetings. These meetings varied greatly in terms of type of 
health care technology appraised. This is supplemented with interviews with appraisal committee 
members and Institute employees (n=13). We answer the question: how does the Dutch appraisal 
committee construct necessity?
METhODOLOGy
approach
In order to explore the Dutch appraisal, we analyse four cases of specific coverage decisions. Argu-
mentations used to construct necessity that could potentially be employed by the appraisal commit-
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tee include but are not limited to, the morbidity and need experienced by the patient, availability 
of alternative treatments, the financial cost per individual patient, and compassion with vulnerable 
groups such as children or small numbers of patients generally. These necessity argumentations are 
part of a list of twenty argumentation types derived from a realist review of argumentations used 
to establish the necessity of coverage of health care technologies worldwide (Kleinhout-Vliek et 
al., 2017). For an overview of these twenty inductively-formulated argumentation types, see Table 
1. The Netherlands is a particularly fruitful setting for studying necessity as the Dutch use two of 
these twenty necessity argumentations, namely individual severity of illness (‘Morbidity/Severity’) 
(Franken et al., 2015; Reckers-Droog et al., 2018, 2019) and the cost that the individual patient will 
incur (‘Individual Cost’), as their explicit, a priori formulated, necessity criterion. As such, these 
ought to be present in every decision document inputting into the appraisal (Couwenbergh et al., 
2013; Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn, 2003; Niëns, 2014; Stolk et al., 2001).
Necessity argumentations are of interest for two reasons. First, these argumentations are employed 
not only by professional decision makers but also by other parties, such as patients, who may also 
be present at the appraisal meeting (further information below). Second, necessity argumentations 
are variable in usage as their perceived validity and allotted weight differs per decision, making 
their patterns especially vivacious (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017; Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2020).
To study necessity argumentations in appraisal we have chosen a case approach (Creswell & 
Poth, 2017; Ragin, 2004) because researching a similar process in a variety of situations is consid-
ered helpful for gaining insight into commonalities across situations, especially when it concerns 
context-dependent social processes (Dussauge et al., 2015; Lamont, 2012). In this, we hold that the 
context is case-specific and thus differs per decision situation (Asdal, 2012; Asdal & Moser, 2012). 
The cases chosen concern four health care technologies, namely eculizumab (Soliris®), front teeth 
replacement, maternity care, and paracetamol-vitamin D tablets. These cases are relatively run-of-
the-mill; three were discussed in the Dutch media but only sparingly (Berkhout, 2017; Unknown, 
2015, 2016; Van der Aa, 2016). They share two characteristics that resulted in their selection. First, 
the cases vary widely, i.a. in terms of type of technology, price, and number of patients affected, with 
necessity argumentations playing a pivotal role in all four, as suggested in informal conversations by 
contacts at the Institute (front teeth replacement therapy, maternity care, and paracetamol-vitamin 
D tablets) or the literature review (eculizumab (Soliris®)) (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017). Second, the 
appraisal meetings took place between 2015 and 2017, meaning that the first author could either be 
present at the appraisal meeting, listen to the audio files, or do both (see Table 2).
Methods
Our dataset comprises four cases and the data on these cases were gathered through observations, 
transcription of audio files, documents, and interviews. The Institute consented to the first author 
accessing the setting of appraisal committee through an explicit invitation to do so by the secretary 
of the committee. This invitation included the ‘closed’ pre-meeting for the eculizumab and the 
paracetamol-vitamin D cases and additional observations at the scoping session for the latter. The 
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secretary also provided audio-recordings s/he herself used to write minutes to be analysed for 
this study. The first author was present at three out of four appraisal committee meetings (for the 
cases eculizumab, front teeth replacement therapy, and paracetamol-vitamin D tablets), where she 
observed and took field notes. These notes were supplemented by audio files of the same appraisal 
committee meetings and one additional case (maternity care). These audio files were transcribed 
verbatim. Moreover, we analysed nine documents pertaining to these cases. For each case, this 
entailed the document that was provided to the appraisal committee (the ‘discussion document’) 
Argumentation type Description
Definition of Illness Whether the ailment is considered an illness for which treatment is necessary
Dignity Whether (lack of) coverage is considered to affect the dignity of the patient to such an extent 
that it needs to be amended
Equity/Fairness/Justice Whether coverage would be necessary to counter injustice/inequity/lack of fairness in (access 
to) treatment
Human Right Whether (lack of) coverage is considered to affect the human rights of the patient to such an 
extent that it needs to be amended
Individual Cost Whether lack of coverage would stop patients from buying necessary care themselves due to 
prohibitive cost
Individual Responsibility Whether the individual is considered responsible for paying for this treatment
Medical Necessity Whether or not a treatment is considered to be “medically necessary” or a “medical necessity”
Morbidity/Severity Whether the physical and/or psychosocial morbidity associated with a certain ailment 
constitutes such a need that coverage is considered necessary
Moral Hazard Whether there is considered to be a possibility of over-usage (i.e., unnecessary increase in 
demand, when people use more than they need as a result of coverage)
Need The extent to which the patient is considered to be in need for which treatment is necessary
(No) Alternative Whether or not viable alternatives are considered to be present which would make coverage 
more or less necessary
Patient-Diagnosis Whether an illness is self-reported rather than diagnosed by a doctor
Range of Normality Whether the experience of the patient is considered normal or abnormal to such an extent that 
coverage is deemed necessary
Rule of Rescue Whether the identifiability of individuals close to death is considered to heighten the necessity 
of coverage
Similar Treatments Whether similar treatments are covered or not (meaning that this type of treatment is 
considered necessary)
Small Number of Patients Whether the small size of the patient population is considered to heighten the necessity of 
coverage (due to, amongst others, the inequality in terms of research expenditure or difficulties 
in obtaining high-quality data)
Societal Impact Whether coverage is considered necessary to allay the impact this disease has on people 
beyond the patient
Societal Functioning Whether coverage would aid a person’s necessary functioning in society
Societal Responsibility Whether society is considered responsible for paying for this treatment
Vulnerability/Compassion Whether a compassionate response to vulnerable groups, e.g. children, in the form of coverage 
is considered to be a necessity
Table 1- Overview of the twenty argumentation types that fall under the necessity criterion and their respective 
descriptions (Kleinhout-Vliek et al., 2017)
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and the final ‘appraisal report’ (see Table 2). For the documents, only the main body of text was 
analysed (i.e., excluding appendices).
For triangulation purposes, the first author interviewed seven policy advisers (‘Institute employ-
ees’) who worked on the cases as well as six appraisal committee members present at the meetings, 
some of whom were interviewed multiple times, to a total of thirteen people over twelve interviews 
(for a precise overview of who was interviewed when, please see Table 2). All approached inter-
viewees consented to being interviewed, except one Institute employee, who declined due to a full 
schedule. Three interviews were group interviews (type: field-formal, meaning that the questions 
were of a semi-structured nature and the interviewer took on a somewhat directive role) (Frey & 
Fontana, 1991). Institute employees 2 & 5 and 1 & 7 were interviewed in pairs at the request of the 
employees themselves, as they considered their answers would supplement one another (in the 
former case, the interviewer did not know two people would be present until the moment of the 
interview). The group interview with Committee members 1, 4, 5 & 6 was done out of convenience, 
as committee members are often only present at the Institute once a month and this presented a 
good opportunity. Again, the interviewees considered their answers to complement one another. 
Oral informed consent was given for use of interview data, written informed consent was given 
for publication, and a formal waiver for ethical approval was obtained [reference number to be 
added]. The interviews were conducted by the first author using a topic list with non-structured, 
open-ended questions, and the interviews were audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed ver-
batim. The topic list included for Institute employees: how this technology arrived at the Institute 
agenda, the scoping session, how they retrieved any additional information, the appraisal meeting, 
how they arrived at the text in the different documents, and more general topics pertaining to the 
Institute. This was done to gain deeper insight into the working processes at the Institute, especially 
concerning different forms of input for the appraisal meeting. For committee members, the topic 
list concerned the appraisal committee’s functioning generally, how different types of information 
Case Observations Document analysis Interview
Eculizumab (Soliris®) file 1
(October 2016)
3.1 discussion document
3.2 appraisal report
3.3 patient contribution
-
Front teeth replacement file 2
(February 2015)
2.1 discussion document
2.2 appraisal report
Institute employee 3
(April 2015)
Institute employee 4
(May 2015)
Maternity care file 3
(January 2015)
Audio file only
1.1 discussion document
1.2 appraisal report
Institute employees 2 & 5
(October 2016)
Paracetamol-vitamin D 
tablets
file 4
(October 2016)
4.1 discussion document
4.2 appraisal report
Institute employees 1 & 7
(October 2016)
Committee member 5
(October 2016)
Table 2 – Overview of data collected pertaining to the case studies
Chapter 3
104
are usually dealt with, and specific experiences they could recall. These questions were formulated 
in order to gain insight into the cases but also to obtain reflections on tentatively formulated phases 
of necessity construction. Lastly, all interviewees were probed about necessity argumentations.
This dataset was analysed as follows. The list of twenty necessity argumentations (Kleinhout-
Vliek et al., 2017) was used as sensitising concepts to guide the first step of the detailed content 
analysis of the documents and transcribed committee meetings, in which the necessity argumenta-
tions were used as a list of codes (Table 1). The explicit mentioning, ‘black on white’ or ‘out loud’, of 
necessity argumentations was tracked across the documents and audio files through coding specific 
utterances as one or more of the argumentation types, using Microsoft Excel to put utterances that 
had received the same code together in the same row. The first tentative patterns were subsequently 
elucidated based on this tracked argumentation use. For the formulation of the phases, we chose 
a chronological and person-dependent (first this person spoke, then that person contributed) 
rather than substantive (these argumentations were used more often than those) patterning. These 
patterns formed the basis for the different phases, formulated and refined in further extensive 
discussions within the authorship team, then supplied and solidified by information retrieved from 
the interviews. These interviews specifically clarified the dynamics around the Institute employees’ 
and the patient and patient representatives’ contributions. Additional observations served to see 
whether data saturation was achieved (Table 3). A member check with the appraisal committee 
and several personal communications (committee meetings of December 2016 and February 
2017, member check through a presentation to the committee on 14 April 2018, personal com-
munications with committee members 5, 6 and 7) to see whether the interpretation made by the 
authors stayed close enough to the interpretation of those observed (Sayer, 2011) (see also Table 
3). Especially the member check and the personal communications have positively impacted the 
reliability of the study in this regard; the personal communications followed the member check to 
clarify the interpretation of our data in a number of places, these are indicated in the text through 
reference to ‘(interviewee X, personal communications)’.
RESuLTS
This section first describes the working procedure of the Institute and the appraisal committee, 
succeeded by an introduction to the case studies and descriptions of the way in which necessity is 
constructed per phase of the appraisal meeting.
Working procedure
The Institute’s working procedure for formulating an advised decision follows the general assess-
ment-appraisal pattern (Patera & Wild, 2014). Agenda setting varies and may happen through 
pharmaceuticals gaining market access or by another party, such as the Minister of Health or a 
professional organisation. Once it is placed on the agenda, one or two Institute employees take 
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responsibility for this dossier; in this study, these were different people for each case. After a scop-
ing session with interested parties, the scientific evidence reports are written by other Institute 
employees with expertise in therapeutic value, cost-effectiveness, and budget impact. These are 
bundled and combined with a short explainer by the one or two Institute employees who hold final 
responsibility for this dossier to benefit the assessment phase. The assessment phase takes place 
at the Scientific Advisory Committee (in Dutch: Wetenschappelijke Adviesraad, WAR), based on 
which an assessment report is composed by the secretary of this committee. This report provides a 
summative conclusion on the valuation, the size, and the probability of the effect of the medicine. 
This assessment report is sent to the stakeholders for consultation and consequently combined with 
input from the scoping session as well as a fresh explainer into a ‘discussion document’ by those re-
sponsible for this dossier. This is aided by the secretary of the assessment committee and approved 
by the secretary and chair of the appraisal committee, to benefit the appraisal phase (Committee 
member 5, personal communications) (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017).
The appraisal subsequently takes place at the meeting of the Package Advisory Committee (in 
this text: the appraisal committee). The committee is comparatively small (Patera & Wild, 2014): 
eight to ten external experts (e.g. in medical ethics, pharmaco-economics, or medicine), who are 
not employed by the Institute, comprise the committee. Like NICE’s Social Value Judgements, the 
Dutch appraisal explicitly aims for a societal weighing of the provided scientific evidence (Couwen-
bergh et al., 2013; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016, 2017).
The committee members read the assessment report in advance of the meetings. All meetings, 
which are in principle open to the public, were preceded by a ‘closed’ meeting, in which patients 
and their representatives were absent but the Institute employee(s) responsible for the dossier 
were present, and the files are already discussed (observations February, November 2015, October, 
December 2016, and February 2017, see also Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016).
Observations and audio file Interview
December 2016
Observations only
February 2017
Observations only
Institute employee 6
(March 2015)
Committee member 5
(March 2015)
Committee member 3
(August 2015)
Committee member 2
(September 2015)
Committee members 1, 4, 5 & 6
(February 2017)
Committee member 1
(February 2017)
Committee member 6
(October 2017)
Table 3 – Overview of additional data collected
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Cases
We studied the appraisal deliberations for four significantly varying cases.
Eculizumab (Soliris®) is an orphan drug currently licensed for Atypical Hemolytic Uremic Syn-
drome (aHUS) and Paroxysmal Nocturnal Hemoglobinuria (PNH). After four years of provisional 
coverage, a temporary coverage arrangement, the final advised decision to the Minister was to be 
drafted by the Institute in 2016. The discussion document (document 3.1) states that there is debate 
on whether the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) for treatment of aHUS with eculizumab 
approximates the reference value at €80,000 per QALY for severe diseases. The calculated cost-ef-
fectiveness ratio was thus considered “highly unfavourable”, but clinicians and patient organisations 
had initiated independent research on shortening the treatment period through improved start-
stop criteria, which was expected to result in a more favourable ICER. A grant was already obtained 
for this research (though not for the medicine itself). After the formal presentation by the Institute 
employee responsible came the contributions of one patient and two patient representatives (in 
this case, the mother of a patient and a clinician). Especially the mother’s emotional contribution 
was followed by an extended silence on the part of the committee, and many committee members 
vocalised their appreciation of these contributions. For the deliberations, the research on the new 
protocol was the primary focal point. The committee thought investing in this a worthy cause; the 
final advised decision stressed that the committee considered the initiative so commendable that it 
needed to remain possible to reimburse eculizumab from public funds within the research protocol 
(Document 3.2). Relief on the part of the patients was palpable; the chair suggested the committee 
take a break, and the patient (representative)s were congratulating each other, also a few committee 
members offered their congratulations (observations/audio file 1).
Front teeth replacement was discussed in the appraisal committee in February 2015 after the 
College of Dentists (in Dutch: College van Adviserend Tandartsen) placed it on the agenda through 
the contacts that Institute employees 3 and 4 had with them. The reason provided was that current 
legislation was perceived as a perverse stimulus with the situation being as follows. All dental care 
is covered by the Dutch basic benefit package until the insured’s 18th birthday but not afterwards. 
This means that when young people lose their front teeth or were born without them, they may 
prefer to have them replaced before their 18th birthday (as the costs are approximately €3,500 for 
front teeth implants), whereas it is often better to do so later as the oral cavity is not fully grown un-
til the age of 22. In the appraisal committee meeting where the coverage of front teeth implants was 
discussed, the topic was not considered of major importance or interest, even a little laughable, for 
its small budget impact (audio file 2 and interview with Institute employee 5). Institute employees 
3 and 4 were especially aware of its political history; one regarded it a mistake that could have been 
prevented that current legislation did not specify the extended coverage until the age of 22. The 
discussions in the appraisal committee seemed relatively straightforward, with everybody largely 
leaning in the direction of extending coverage, until one Committee member apparently “wanted 
to stimulate the discussion by deliberately going against the tide” (interview Institute employee 3). 
This resulted in a longer discussion, with the final decision apparently taken for pragmatic reasons 
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(namely the time it would take to change the legislation; coming back to it in the appraisal meeting 
next month would mean another year’s extension) (observations/audio file 2). The final advised 
decision, then, was that as long as the claim was made before the 18th birthday, coverage would be 
continued until the age of 22 (Document 2.2).
The maternity care case was addressed by the appraisal committee in January 2015 in response to 
an appeal to the general public by the Minister of Health to send in suggestions for parts of the basic 
benefit package that could be removed. The primary argumentation for suggesting that maternity 
care could be removed from the package was that pregnancy is a choice and foreseeable (that is, un-
necessary to be insured for, as the birth is something you know will happen). In line with this, mere 
days before this appraisal committee meeting took place, a newspaper had commented on how 
strange it was that “beschuit met muisjes smeren” (the preparation of a traditional Dutch treat for 
friends and family paying maternity visits) was often done by maternity care workers and therefore 
part of the basic benefit package. The Institute employees, however, concurrently received “signals” 
from the Ministry that it should not be removed from the benefits basket (Institute employees 2 and 
5, interview). Several versions of the advice document had to be discussed at the appraisal commit-
tee, which led to much frustration at coffee machine afterwards. The final document, however, was 
the first where the criteria were used “really well” (interviews with Institute employees 6 and 5). The 
deliberations in the appraisal meeting focused on two elements. First, “the domain question” (audio 
file 3): to what extent is maternity care a type of curative care? The second element concerned the 
idea of whether the need for maternity care is “foreseeable”, meaning that if you know you are going 
to need something someday, you should not be insured for it (as you can save up, you know it is 
coming). The final decision was indeed to continue maternity care coverage (Document 1.2).
The paracetamol-vitamin D tablets file came onto the agenda of the Institute due to some na-
tional policy changes, by which a fairly large number of tablets was left behind on a list of covered 
medications (in Dutch: Geneesmiddelenvergoedingssysteem). In a letter to the Institute, the Minister 
of Health explicitly stressed the need to pay attention to the necessity of coverage of these tablets, 
which included 1000 mg paracetamol, vitamin D, and calcium tablets. The Institute employees 
responsible acknowledged that they, at first, called it an “outflow advice” but were “not allowed” to 
call it that (interview with Institute employees 1 and 7). It was discussed at the appraisal committee 
in October and November 2016. A number of pharmacists had inputted, as patient representatives, 
to the scoping session; the secretary of the committee, brought in the argumentations supplied by 
them. As a consequence, much of the deliberations focused on what constitutes individual afford-
ability for specific vulnerable groups. The second element that was primary in the discussions was 
the comparator medicines; if we compare it to other medicines available at the drug store without a 
prescription, it should not be reimbursed. As a corollary, the question was whether these medicines 
constituted “self-care” medicines or not. The final advised decision was to not cover paracetamol-
vitamin D tablets except for certain medical indications. The rationale was that reimbursing would 
actually be more expensive than not, because of the prescription rule. This rule is an extra charge 
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levied when a reimbursed medicine is bought at the pharmacy on prescription, which was circum-
vented by the negative advised decision (Document 4.2).
General setting
The meetings of the appraisal committee take place in a sizeable meeting room that is relatively 
light, even though the blinds are drawn. There are two entrances: you can enter the room from 
‘within’ the building (behind the security gates) but also from the ‘outside’, provided your name 
is on the list, which is checked at the reception. Ten people are seated around tables set up in 
a large square. There are thermoses with coffee and tea and plates of biscuits. An ‘audience’ of 
eight more people, me included, sit on the rows of chairs set up on one side of the room, where 
we can see the committee and the presentation screen well. I seem unable to shake the feeling 
we are watching a staged performance. It is clearly one of these occasions where you feel careful 
about making noise: I open my water bottle as quietly as possible. Given this fairly formal 
setting, I am struck every time by how warmly the committee members greet one another 
when they come in, how at-home they seem (one even brought her dog!), and even more by the 
apparent light-heartedness of it all, the sheer good humour that characterises the proceedings.
(Condensed field notes 2, 3, 4)
In this setting, the deliberations on the four cases followed approximately the same order. We have 
separated this order out into four phases, namely 1) the contribution of the Institute employee(s); 
2) the contributions of the patient(s) and/or their representative(s); 3) the actual deliberations of 
the committee; and 4) the formulation of the decision. This separation into four phases allows us to 
show how necessity is constructed in each phase.
Phase 1: Institute employee(s)
The contribution of the Institute employee(s) is the first of four phases we distinguish in the Dutch 
appraisal meeting, and we will show the impact of these contributions on the committee delibera-
tions that followed.
The first phase of the ‘open’ meeting that followed, after the meeting was formally opened by the 
chair, comprised the contributions by the Institute employee(s). The individual severity of illness 
(code: Morbidity/Severity) and costs per the individual patient (code: Individual Cost) are for-
mulated as official, explicit elements of the formalised necessity criterion. These were contributed 
by the Institute employee in the form of necessity argumentations, often by means of a formal 
presentation (observations 1, 2 and 4; audio files 1-4). Generally speaking, the appraisal committee 
took the individual severity of illness and costs per individual patient as ‘given’ in their delibera-
tion; they did not explicitly mention them in their deliberations (observations 1, 2, 4/audio files 
1-4). This pattern was broken only in the paracetamol-vitamin D case, in which the low severity 
of illness was indeed actively questioned by a committee member but not discussed any further. 
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The applicability of the individual cost argumentation was also questioned explicitly on behalf of 
the patient representatives by a Committee member, which did prompt a response that served to 
re-establish its applicability in general. Neither argumentations were ‘weighed’ compared to other 
argumentations.
As a committee member explained, the reason for this lack of use of the severity of illness and 
costs for the individual by the committee is that it is not their mandate to weigh these explicitly 
(Committee member 4, personal communication). This does not mean the Institute employee’s in-
put is ineffective. One committee member commented on the introduction by Institute employees, 
that:
CM5 [T]he discussion, at some point, heads into a different direction. 
CM6 Yes, that’s right. (Group interview with Committee members 1, 4, 5 and 6)
They acknowledged the impact on the deliberation: the Institute employee’s argumentations deriv-
ing from formalised criteria are considered authoritative and steering the direction the committee’s 
discussion takes.
In some cases, it could be argued that the appraisal committee did give a different formulation 
to these two explicit necessity criteria, that is, operationalising them differently (resulting in a dif-
ferent argumentation type code). This would involve not calling the individual severity of illness 
as between “0.71 and 1.00” (code: Morbidity/Severity, document 3.1) but instead, highlighting the 
daily consequences for the patient (code: Societal Functioning, observations/audio file 1). A similar 
reframing was observed in the front teeth case:
[Just consider] what that means for someone, right, missing front teeth, in daily communica-
tion. (Observations/audio file 2, code: Societal Functioning)
This clearly shows how the committee may sometimes employ a different operationalisation, result-
ing in a different argumentation type code, of the criteria brought in by the Institute employee.
In sum, necessity is thus constructed in this first phase not by weighing formalised criteria 
explicitly but by rephrasing them and/or allowing them to steer the appraisal process implicitly, 
which committee members consider to positively impact the deliberations.
Phase 2: patient (representative)(s)
For the second phase of the appraisal, which consists of the contribution(s) of the patient (represen-
tative)(s), we will also describe how they affect the deliberations of the committee.
In the second phase, patients and/or patient representatives such as medical doctors, gave a short 
statement (observations/audio file 1). These people differ per case and are not always present. The 
observations/audio file data show that necessity argumentations that a patient (representative) 
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contributed were hardly ever mentioned by the appraisal committee. In the eculizumab case, the 
patient representative mentioned that the decision was:
[A] story (…) that concerns (…) justice. (Document 3.3 and observations/audio file 1, code: 
Equity/Fairness/Justice)
Not only is [coverage] the best option for the doctors and us; it is also for society as a whole.
(Document 3.3 and observations/audio file 1, code: Societal Impact)
Neither of these argumentation types were mentioned as such by the appraisal committee (observa-
tions/audio file 1). The patient representative also brought in two argumentation types that were 
repeated once but not discussed further. First:
As of [29 October 2014], the life of our little daughter Rosa, just 1 year old, forever lost its ease 
and was never again taken for granted. (Document 3.3 and observations/audio file 1, code: 
Vulnerability/Compassion)
This clear call for compassion was repeated by Committee member 7 (observations/audio file 1) but 
not discussed by the committee. The same goes for the functioning of the family generally, which 
the patient representative described as a “roller coaster” due to the high uncertainty of coverage. 
This element of uncertainty was mentioned in turn by the same committee member but also not 
discussed further (observations/audio file 1).
Though patients were only physically present in this dataset in the eculizumab case, their con-
tributions were a primary topic of discussion during the interviews. Several committee members 
commented on what they experience when faced with patients and their representatives during the 
appraisal, and ‘Distance’ was the most important aspect identified:
We need to keep the distance [from the patients]. [With emphasis:] Someone needs to keep the 
distance. And it should be us. (…) It’s like a war, the generals have to decide where the bombs 
will fall, and they should not see the mess it creates. (Committee member 2, interview)
[A good decision] requires a kind of distance from that specific [patient perspective]. (Com-
mittee member 3, interview)
To function well, the committee members feel they require metaphorical distance from the pa-
tients, which explains the lack of explicit discussion of argumentations contributed by patients or 
their representatives. Another committee member reflected:
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The patients challenge the committee to keep their position. (…) You need to stay detached. 
[But the patients’ input] gives handles for substantiating [your position]: you must explain it 
well. It challenges you as a group and as a person. (Committee member 7, personal commu-
nication)
This committee member suggested that the patients’ input increases the quality of the final (ad-
vised) decision as the process is “challenged” by the contributions.
Summarising, necessity is constructed by the committee during the deliberations by not weigh-
ing the patient (representative) contributions explicitly but by allowing them to challenge the 
decision-making process implicitly, which committee members consider heightens the quality of 
the justification or rationale for the decision.
Phase 3: deliberation
The next phase we describe is the deliberative discussion by the committee, where many different 
argumentations are contributed by the committee.
The discussion was usually initiated by the chair, with ample opportunity to speak and to re-
spond to one another for the other committee members. The professed goal of the discussion is to 
ascertain whether there may be reasons to deviate from the reference value for cost-effectiveness 
(Committee member 5, personal communications), which range in three classes from 10 to 80,000 
euro per Quality-adjusted Life Year (QALY). If the cost-effectiveness falls within a certain reference 
value range given a certain individual severity of illness, it is classed as favourable; if it does not, it 
is classed as unfavourable (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017, 2018). The discussions both started and 
ended with a ‘round’ around the meeting table, where committee members were invited to speak 
in turn. In the deliberative phase of the meeting, members may make statements and respond to 
one another before the final decision (observations 1, 2, 4/audio files 1-4). The deliberations were 
subsequently summarised by the chair of the committee, based on which the secretary wrote the 
appraisal report, a summative report of the appraisal committee argumentations. The final advised 
decision was taken based on this combined document by the Institute’s Board of Directors and 
sent to the Minister of Health who took the final decision (Couwenbergh et al., 2013; Zorginstituut 
Nederland, 2016, 2017).
The data on how necessity is constructed during the deliberations can be best characterised as 
bringing new argumentations together. This is visualised for the front teeth case, where the appraisal 
committee wrestled with the tension between not covering cosmetic (that is, as falling within the 
Range of Normality and thus unnecessary) surgery and making sure young people are able to do 
things like eating an apple (audio file 2, code: Societal Functioning).
This tension was resolved by one committee member, who humorously brought the following 
new necessity argumentations together:
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I had a strange association with the contraception debate, where we said, “You should pay for 
that yourself ”, but up to a certain age, we think that it needs to be reimbursed because of the 
situation that, just for example, a 14, 15-year-old with parents who think otherwise would not 
be able to – that it could result in unwanted pregnancies, and we would like 18-year-old girls to 
enter adulthood without an unwanted pregnancy. [Laughter] They must both have good teeth 
and not have an unwanted pregnancy! [Laughter]. (Committee member 9, observations/audio 
file 2, codes: Similar Treatments and Vulnerability/Compassion)
Bringing in new necessity argumentations and combining them was also visible in the maternity 
care case. The public regarded the preparation of beschuit met muisjes or beschuitjes (a traditional 
Dutch treat for friends and family paying maternity visits) by maternity care workers as unneces-
sary. The appraisal committee, however, did not consider this a decisive reason for denying cover-
age. These different viewpoints were expertly brought in and combined in the following way:
If you look at that article in Trouw [Dutch newspaper] of this week, following the draft advice 
that was released, you’ll see that maternity care is associated straightaway with prepping be-
schuitjes. [Laughter] And if at that point someone would say, “Wait a minute, er, should I pay 
for that?” I would have some sympathy with that. (...) [But] I think it’s important to indicate 
something like: “Yes, but wait a minute, maternity care is about other matters, er, breastfeeding, 
detecting risky situations, etc., etc., for which it is completely just to be calling for solidarity”.
(Committee member 8, audio file 3, codes: Societal Responsibility and Vulnerability/Compas-
sion)
Committee members and Institute employees describe the appraisal as an “open, moral” place 
“with permeable borders” where many “things” interact “organically” to form an advised decision 
(Committee members 2, 6, 4, Institute employee 4, (group) interviews). Specifically, the appraisal 
committee “brings in” new necessity argumentations “from the outside” to be “woven together” 
(Committee member 1, interview). In fact, this bringing in from the outside is part of their official 
task (art. 14, Zorginstituut Nederland, 2016).
In sum, necessity is constructed in this phase by bringing in new argumentations derived from 
the outside, from society, with sources including newspapers and previously-taken decisions, and 
weaving these considerations together.
Phase 4: decision
In the final phase of the appraisal, the committee formulates its positive or negative coverage deci-
sion advice.
The committee regularly gave additional recommendations, generally phrasing advice as: “yes, 
provided that…” or “no, unless…” (observations 1, 2, 4/audio files 1-4). For the eculizumab case 
and maternity care case, the advised decision was positive, provided that the work on the indication 
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protocols would continue (documents 1.2 and 3.2). Similarly, the paracetamol-vitamin D tablets 
are not covered except for certain medical indications; one of the committee members even sum-
marised their deliberations as if directly giving the Minister advice. The primary rationale was that 
reimbursing these medicines would actually make them more expensive, due to the prescription 
rule:
You may make many more [medicines] available outside the pharmacy. Given the situation, 
this is our answer: if it has to be bought at the pharmacy, it has to be reimbursed. But we advise 
you to think carefully about the prescription rule, because that creates a completely unequal 
ratio between those cheap medicines that are and those that are not available on prescription. 
(Committee member 6, audio file 4, code: Similar Treatments)
The committee thus gives recommendations to a broad set of actors including the manufacturer, the 
professional organisations involved in indication protocols, and the Minister of Health. We analyse 
this dynamic as a way of completing the construction of necessity: with these recommendations, 
the decision is placed back into society as it is linked directly not just to patients and the Minister of 
Health but to other stakeholders who will impact what care entails in practice.
DISCuSSION
In order to describe how necessity is constructed in Dutch health care coverage decisions, we fol-
lowed the use of necessity argumentations across documents and the meetings of the appraisal 
committee at the Dutch Health Care Institute. Necessity is constructed by first, allowing explicit 
criteria contributed by the Institute employee to steer the process. Second, by allowing patient 
(representative) contributions to challenge the process: the decision should be sensitive to but not 
captured by particular interests. Notably, both the knowledge that is contributed by the Institute 
employee and the patients and/or their representatives implicitly shape the deliberations that fol-
low. The third element we identify is bringing in new argumentations from the outside and weaving 
them together carefully. Fourthly and finally, necessity is constructed through formulating recom-
mendations, making the decision more societally embedded than a tersely formulated ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
In the introduction, we outlined our interest in societal weighing expertise and concluded that 
expertise in health care coverage decisions generally comprises 1) understanding different types 
of knowledge and 2) combining them into one decision, whilst 3) adhering not only to substan-
tive requirements but also processual ones (Calnan et al., 2017; Gkeredakis et al., 2011; Hughes & 
Doheny, 2011; Jenkings & Barber, 2004; Russell, 2017; Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014). In terms of 
expertise pertaining to societal weighing specifically, we see that all three elements are confirmed 
by our dataset on constructing necessity to a certain extent. The committee indeed deals expertly 
with different types of knowledge. In this dataset these contain on the one hand argumentations 
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representing scientific knowledge contributed by the Institute employee (individual cost and se-
verity of illness) but on the other hand also the patient (representative)’s experiential knowledge. 
We show that although these considerations are often not mentioned explicitly by the committee, 
they sometimes get rephrased, and they always steer the discussions implicitly, and are therefore 
considered crucial to the final decision. The committee also combines many argumentations and 
does so expertly. The overlap with coverage decision expertise, we argue, indicates that these parts 
of constructing necessity may indeed be classified as elements of societal weighing expertise and 
highlight the precise way that processual requirements, such as the presence of stakeholders, may 
impact appraisal deliberations. This relationship between necessity construction and expertise in 
societal weighing specifically is even stronger for the latter two phases of constructing necessity, 
as they show how argumentations are brought in from society (in our dataset, sources included 
newspapers and stakeholders), and the (advised) decision is embedded in society in turn. These 
two elements give a distinct flavour to societal weighing expertise that other studies of health care 
coverage decision-making expertise appear not to have hit upon.
The reluctance in terms of explicitly weighing the experiences of individual patients has pre-
viously been described for a variety of settings (Carlsen & Norheim, 2005; Hashem et al., 2018; 
Rooshenas et al., 2015). One potential underlying reason may be what Moreira describes as ‘the 
politics of singularities’. Personal stories, according to Moreira, have a strong allegorical character 
by which they may spark the imagination through being relatable, and are thus able to destabilise 
other argumentations (Moreira, 2012). This fact that the committee listens to but does not explicitly 
mention these argumentations may be a manifestation of a refusal to be drawn into such politics. 
Regardless of the underlying reason, this finding is fascinating in light of recent widespread at-
tempts to draw patients and citizens into such decision-making processes (Mitton et al., 2009; 
Wait & Nolte, 2006), also termed a ‘multi-stakeholder appraisal’ (Abrishami et al., 2017). Our data 
underline that this will not be easily achieved, which is in line with earlier work on the practices 
of dealing with different types of knowledge in health care coverage settings (Hashem et al., 2018; 
Moes et al., 2016).
On the recommendations specifically, the brunt of the available literature covers the process 
of coming to these decisions and the rationales behind them, rather than looking at what the ad-
ditional recommendations might be (cf., Bukachi et al., 2014; Byskov et al., 2014; Giacomini et al., 
2000; Madden et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2001; Rooshenas et al., 2015; Singer et al., 2000). Follow-up 
research may address questions on whether other appraisal committees also give recommenda-
tions, on the underlying dynamic these recommendations may point to, and implications for the 
process of health care coverage decisions generally.
Strengths and limitations
This chapter describes how a coverage appraisal is performed by expert decision makers and the 
dynamics of using argumentations therein. To our knowledge, this study adds to existing research 
on coverage decisions both methodologically, through showcasing how insight can be generated by 
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tracing argumentation types across documents and deliberative settings, as well as content-wise, 
noting what societal weighing expertise entails specifically. It makes a contribution to the literature 
of elegant muddling through by showing the emergent shared systematics behind it (Calnan et al., 
2017; Russell, 2017). Moreover, it shows how pragmatic rationality is accomplished collectively; it 
is not just the committee but also the Institute employees and the patients that crucially shape the 
deliberations.
The methodology chosen will have impacted the data; the data set comprises a mixture of nine 
individual and three group interviews. Though both types of interviews were held primarily for 
purposes of data triangulation, the data gathered in these settings will have differed. In group 
interviews, the members of the group may stimulate each other (rather than the researcher being 
the only one to take this role) in terms of encouraging recall, opinion elaboration, and variation 
in response. However, group members may also correct each other, and even sway each other’s 
opinions. Influential herein are group size, familiarity, and power dynamics (Frey & Fontana, 
1991; King et al., 2018). In this data set, two of the three group interviews were with two direct 
Institute employee colleagues, who seemed high on familiarity and relatively low on power dynam-
ics, positively impacting the data gathered. Interviewees did indeed often supplement each other; 
both double interviews were in fact suggested by the interviewees themselves for that reason. The 
third group interview, with four appraisal committee members, also concerned peers who were 
comfortable expressing their opinions together. Moreover, in this case, the quieter respondents 
were interviewed separately as well.
A major limitation of this study is the focus on four cases. It is relatively common to only focus on 
one case for characterising these types of decision making (Moes et al., 2016; Moreira, 2011). The 
case approach has granted us increased reliability but may necessarily lack some in-depth acquain-
tance with each case. Another limitation is the narrow focus on the deliberations in the appraisal 
committee meeting only. Other studies focus on the ‘back stage’, thereby uncovering more work 
that is done ‘behind the scenes’ to accomplish these types of deliberations (e.g., Escobar, 2015). 
Future research could attempt to visualise both, especially elucidating how the two intermingle in 
practice (cf. Hajer, 2005).
CONCLuSION
Using heterogeneous argumentations to make well-justified decisions is a task that many public 
institutions work hard to complete astutely. This chapter gives insight into the processes of tackling 
this task in a particularly vibrant field: health care coverage. It does so through examining the 
construction of necessity in the deliberative appraisal of four Dutch coverage decisions by following 
the necessity argumentations as mentioned by the different parties involved, supplemented by in-
terviews with both appraisal committee members and Institute employees. Necessity is constructed 
differently in the four phases of the appraisal meeting, which, we show, correspond to four ele-
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ments of expertise in societal weighing specifically. These elements comprise first, allowing explicit 
criteria to steer the process. Second, being shaped by the input of patient (representative)s; these are 
considered to challenge the process and heighten the quality of the justification or rationale. Third, 
bringing in new argumentations from society and weaving them together, and fourth, formulating 
recommendations to place the decision ‘back’ into society. These elements of societal weighing 
expertise explicate how the committee reaches a decision that is well-embedded in society.
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Text comes from the Latin texere, meaning to weave, and context derives from contexere, mean-
ing to weave together or to weave with. (Janssen, 1985, cited in Asdal, 2012)
[Y]ou should not see that [appraisal process] as too fabricated, I think, because those are actu-
ally quite organic, er, organic elements, that discussion, right? (Institute employee 4, interview)
We have thought too much in recent years about the science of thinking and not enough about 
the art. (Jacobs, 2017, p. 16)
hOW TO ESTaBLISh NECESSITy COLLECTIVELy?
This dissertation was tasked with the quest for a new, more apt, and more usable operationalisa-
tion of the necessity criterion in Dutch health care coverage decisions as the process of refining 
and tightening the establishment of necessity on a collective level was considered to have lagged 
compared to other criteria. Though not every country employs a formalised necessity criterion, 
many do utilise qualitative considerations that concern the necessity questionin their deliberations. 
This question asks: do we think providing this health care technology is necessary on a collective 
level; or as phrased more specifically in Dutch policy documents and reports, do we think a claim 
on the collective solidarity is justified?
In the Netherlands, decisions concerning the contents of the basic benefits basket are taken by 
the Minister of Health based on advice formulated by the Dutch National Health Care Institute 
(in Dutch: Zorginstituut Nederland, ZIN, here: the Institute). Many people input into such advice: 
professionals accumulating and arranging scientific data on effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and 
individual severity of illness, building on the work done by many others who have gathered these 
data; stakeholders who attend and contribute to different meetings that are part of the decision-
making process; committees who deliberate and weigh; professionals who write extensive and 
summative reports. During this multi-cogged process, four criteria are employed so that the final 
decision may meet all four. Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the health care technology in 
question are first and second, feasibility third, and necessity is the fourth criterion. Using necessity 
as a criterion has never been as straightforward as the others, and this lack of perceived clarity led 
to this dissertation.
Over the course of this project (2015-2020), the Institute appears to have moved its position on 
the necessity criterion and the use of criteria generally. A presentation by an appraisal committee 
member on an away day (December 2016, field notes #161202) suggested that necessity should be 
considered an outcome of the whole process rather than input in the form of a criterion. This was 
followed, a year later, by the publication of the report Package advice in Practice (in Dutch: Pakket-
advies in de Praktijk – Wikken en Wegen voor een Rechtvaardig Pakket) (Zorginstituut Nederland, 
2017). Here, the word ‘necessity criterion’ has largely disappeared in favour of a combination of 
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severity of illness and own risk considerations. The emphasis of this report lies on argumentations 
now specifically serving as input for wikken en wegen (a Dutch idiom perhaps best translated as a 
mixture between “deliberation”, “weighing”, and “hemming and hawing” – the report is now usually 
referred to at the Institute as the Wikken en Wegen report). The report argues that for the accep-
tance of package advice, it is important that all relevant arguments are visible, that it is clear how 
they are weighed together, and it is shown which arguments were decisive in the advice and why. 
“After all,” the report states, “new argumentations may always present themselves” (Zorginstituut 
Nederland, 2017, p. 5). Without concluding that this process of wikken en wegen offers a one-to-one 
replacement for the necessity criterion as previously operationalised, it is important to note the 
difference in emphasis with the previous Package management in Practice reports (College voor 
Zorgverzekeringen, 2006, 2009; Zorginstituut Nederland, 2013).
My approach to operationalising necessity was influenced by a discrepancy I encountered rela-
tively early on in my research. This discrepancy existed between, on the one hand, the difficulties 
and critiques displayed by the many scholarly and policy reports that had considered necessity 
previously and, on the other hand, the relative ease with which Institute employees pinpointed de-
cisions in which necessity was of particular influence. During the early days of my field work, these 
employees provided a nearly continuous stream of examples: cosmetic surgery, health care aids 
like walking aids with wheels, maternity care, paracetamol, and vitamin D tablets, physiotherapy, 
smoking cessation therapies, Viagra, etc., etc. They even often classified these as ‘typical necessity 
questions’. This sensitised me to the difference between argumentations (as present in decision-
making practice) and criteria, which seemed mostly visible as such in the decision documents 
but were stipulated by policy reports to be used in practice. One of the first main questions this 
project raised in me was: what is a criterion exactly? Moreover, I wondered about the fact that many 
operationalisations had been substantive in terms of descriptions or even checklists (Commissie-
Dunning, 1991; Niëns, 2014), even though the process and place of using these argumentations 
seemed so important in the policy reports (as outlined in the Introduction to this thesis).
From the very beginning – but encouraged by the notable developments in the Wikken en Wegen 
report – I chose to look at the practices of using necessity as a criterion in the form of argumenta-
tions, rather than relying on a primarily theoretical approach. The reason was that there seemed to 
be most clarity in daily practice. The main research question of this dissertation thus became: how 
is the necessity criterion used in practice? The first step entailed the identification of argumentations 
pertaining to necessity. I purposely widened this first step, the identification of potential argumen-
tations, to scholarly literatures rather than policy reports only. Doing so, I aimed to retrieve a wider 
variety of argumentations, not only those considered valid enough to become part of a decision 
justification or rationale. The following steps entailed observing how these argumentations are 
used in decision-making practice. I did this through a cross-country comparison of practices and 
decision documents, hoping to gain insight through mirroring ‘our’ Dutch practices to others’, and 
observations at the appraisal committee meetings enriched by interviews with appraisal committee 
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members and Institute employees. For the latter two elements, I chose a case approach to gain 
insight into patterns of social behaviour specifically (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Ragin, 2004).
This discussion starts with the answer to the main research question: how is the necessity criterion 
used in practice? I will subsequently highlight how using the necessity criterion achieves a societal 
weighing, conceptualising this societal weighing as contextualisation practices while positioning it 
in relevant Health Services Research (HSR) and Science and Technology Studies (STS) literatures. I 
will then provide policy recommendations and a reflection on them before ending with the general 
limitations of this research and a reflection on my research position and role.
ON uSING ThE NECESSITy CRITERION IN PRaCTICE
The unit or form the necessity criterion takes in practice is argumentations in favour of, or against, 
coverage of a health care technology. Argumentations are the explicated reasons pertaining to cov-
erage, generally given on paper or in discussion by anyone reasoning about the potential coverage 
status of a technology. These necessity argumentations are first and foremost diverse: they may 
range from scientific calculations on individual severity of illness to more practical considerations 
such as whether similar treatments are covered or not; from definitions of (non-)illness and what 
may, or may not, be considered the normal experience to the wider societal impact of coverage (see 
Chapter 1). Some necessity argumentations are relatively idiosyncratic (as in, specific to the health 
care technology under consideration) and others more permanent. An example of the first would 
be the argument that young people should be enabled to step into adulthood with a full set of teeth 
as this is important for eating apples and daily communication. A (to insiders highly familiar) 
example of the latter, more permanent type is that as an insurance-based system, to reimburse 
relatively cheap medicines through health care insurance is considered more expensive than not to 
do so, meaning that the rule of thumb of ‘cheaper than €100 means no coverage’ may be applied. In 
this variability, necessity differs from criteria such as effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, as these 
generally work with calculations. These may also be, and generally are, under discussion, but the 
diversity of argumentations and their largely qualitative nature are the first characteristics that 
make necessity stand out.
The selection of necessity argumentations differs per health care technology under consideration 
and is crucial to the use of the necessity criterion in practice. As Chapter 1 shows, the reason is that 
not all necessity argumentations are considered equally valid for the decision on every health care 
technology. This makes earlier efforts to operationalise necessity in the form of a checklist (Niëns, 
2014) relatively difficult to use, as it indeed turned out to be (interviews appraisal committee 
member 5, Institute employee 6, March 2015). It also sets necessity again in stark contrast to more 
classic coverage decision criteria such as effectiveness and cost-effectiveness (cf. Stolk & Poley, 
2005). Others have noted, over fifteen years ago, that the use of what they termed considerations 
pertaining to necessity was inconsistent, which made it a “problematic notion” (Hoedemaekers 
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& Oortwijn, 2003). This dissertation fully supports the conclusion of inconsistency in terms of 
necessity argumentation use, though expressly not the valuation thereof.
When comparing the use of necessity argumentations across countries, it becomes clear that 
not every country has formalised necessity in a criterion to the same degree. This does not mean, 
however, that necessity argumentations are absent elsewhere. In fact, the use of necessity argumen-
tations is widespread, at least in the Western world but also not absent from other middle- and 
high-income countries such as Argentina, Israel, Japan, and Korea (Chapter 1). The reason it may 
perhaps appear a quintessentially Dutch notion is, at least in part, the strong tradition of explicating 
and operationalising these argumentations, as evidenced by the policy reports described in the 
Introduction but also by scholarly work in this area (Hoedemaekers & Oortwijn, 2003; Stolk et 
al., 2002). Chapter 2 delves in further to show how in Belgium, England, and Germany, necessity 
argumentations are both recognised and used by decision makers. The Netherlands has both a 
comparatively high level of formalisation of necessity and a broad set of necessity argumentation 
usage. This holds generally across the decisions on the four health care technologies studied but is 
especially visible in the individual cost consideration. This consideration indicates a lower neces-
sity of coverage of health care technologies with a low price and is unique to the Netherlands in 
this dataset. The high level of explicated and formalised necessity argumentations confirms Dutch 
coverage practice as an especially fruitful research site.
From the cross-country comparison, it also becomes clear that the combination or pattern of 
argumentation use is of high importance, as similar patterns of argumentation use lead to similar 
health care coverage decisions in the countries studied. In Chapter 2, I highlight similarities be-
tween argumentation patterns in specific decisions, such as the English and Dutch decisions on 
nivolumab, benzodiazepines, and smoking cessation therapies. Chapter 1 resonates this conclusion 
as it not only demonstrates that some argumentations are used primarily in favour of, and others 
primarily against, coverage but also indicates similarities between the argumentation patterns for 
cancer drugs and orphan drugs, which are very different from the argumentation patterns for cos-
metic surgery, Viagra, infertility treatments, obesity treatments, and smoking cessation therapies. 
This research thus underlines the previously-noted but not well-studied importance of clustering or 
patterning of argumentations (Lehoux et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2001; Singer et al., 2000). Notably, 
these argumentation patterns could well coincide with potential different decision networks with 
varying robustness (Chapter 4). This indicates that exchange between countries on more qualitative 
aspects of health care coverage decisions, in addition to ongoing efforts on quantitative aspects, 
may well be a fruitful endeavour.
Necessity argumentations are used ‘around the table’, that is, in a deliberative setting, in all four 
countries studied in Chapter 2. In the Netherlands, this primarily takes the shape of the appraisal 
phase of coverage decisions. The appraisal phase generally follows the assessment phase, in which 
the relevant scientific input is determined, but it may or may not be a distinct moment in time and 
space (Oliver et al., 2004; Patera & Wild, 2014; Walley, 2007). The goal of the Dutch appraisal, which 
is indeed separated from the assessment, is to provide a societal weighing of this input, similar to the 
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former social value judgements in England (Culyer & Rawlins, 2004; NICE, 2008; Shah et al., 2013; 
Zorginstituut Nederland, 2017). This appraisal is achieved by the appraisal committee (in Dutch: 
Adviescommissie Pakket, ACP), a committee of eight to ten experts with professional backgrounds 
such as pharmaco-economics, health care ethics, and patient sciences (art. 14, Zorginstituut Ned-
erland, 2016).
To describe how necessity is constructed and what constitutes societal weighing expertise 
therein, I the appraisal committee meeting in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. From this, I conclude that 
societal weighing expertise has two primary facets in this dataset. First, it takes the form of receiv-
ing input and allowing this input (in the form of explicit criteria presented by Institute employees 
and contributions by patient (representative)s) to steer and challenge the process  to increase the 
quality of the decision. This dynamic of perceived increased quality of decisions due to the presence 
and contribution of patient (representative)s, I would suggest, has two primary explanations. First, 
unlike other criteria noted above, necessity is the type of consideration that may more easily also 
be contributed by laypersons and those with experiential expertise (Chapter 1). In this way, the 
variety and number of argumentation types may be increased and the resulting decision potentially 
strengthened (Chapter 4). The committee members themselves expressed the second explanation, 
namely how, primarily for expensive medicines with a relatively unfavourable cost-effectiveness 
ratio, the committee was forced to consider matters extra carefully and formulate their negative 
coverage decision advice especially diligently, when faced with patients and/or their representatives 
(Chapter 3).
The second facet of societal weighing expertise is the deliberation and the formulation of the ad-
vised decision and recommendations. This deliberation is where the pattern of necessity argumen-
tations that is to become part of the final coverage decision is established. The appraisal committee 
does so by bringing in new argumentations, derived from many sources ranging from scientific 
reports to newspapers and beyond, and weaving the argumentations together. This weaving serves as 
a metaphor for the verbal combining of different case-specific and actively-integrated argumenta-
tions considered pertinent to the case at hand (Chapter 2). Different argumentations may be woven 
together in different ways, of which I conceptualise three in Chapter 4. First is the articulation 
of links between argumentations, whereby different argumentations are brought together as both 
relevant to a positive or negative decision. Examples include linking the coverage of maternity care 
not to preparing beschuit met muisjes but to detecting risky situations. Using black-boxed links is 
the second. Black-boxed links are previously-formulated connections, of which the negative deci-
sion based on an unfavourable cost-effectiveness ratio appears the most common, described by 
some as “simply stamping the file” (appraisal committee member 6, personal communications). 
The third and final way of combining argumentations is broadening the scope of networks, i.e., 
including previously unconnected matters to a decision under construction. This includes compar-
ing it to a previous decision, in the sense that ‘entering adulthood with good front teeth’ should be 
covered just as ‘entering adulthood without an unwanted pregnancy’ is. Broadening the scope of 
networks also comprises the formulation of specific recommendations. These recommendations 
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may be aimed at actors as diverse as the Minister of Health and treatment expertise centres abroad. 
The intended end-product, an advised decision plus recommendations, I conceptualise as a robust 
decision, meaning able to withstand pressure ‘out there’.
In sum, Chapters 1 and 2 describe how the necessity question – is a claim on the collective 
solidarity justified? – is answered in practice by using argumentations. These argumentations are 
numerous and diverse, and their perceived validity differs per decision. In some countries, like 
the Netherlands, these argumentations are formalised to a high degree into a criterion, whereas in 
other countries these argumentations are used without such a high level of formalisation. In the 
Netherlands, a high level of formalisation does coincide with a high diversity of argumentation 
types. Moreover, necessity argumentations are used in patterns, with similar patterns leading to 
similar decisions across countries. Finally, which argumentation types to use is determined in de-
liberation, ‘around the table’, which generally occurs in the Netherlands in the appraisal phase with 
the explicit purpose of achieving a societal weighing. Zooming in on the Dutch appraisal, Chapters 
3 and 4 describe what such a societal weighing comprises: allowing explicit criteria and patient 
(representative)s’ contributions to steer and challenge the process, and subsequently, bringing in 
new argumentations, combining them in different ways, (namely through linking argumenta-
tions, using black-boxed links, and broadening the scope of decisions), making the decision and 
formulating recommendations. This shows how argumentations and other decision elements are 
combined into a robust decision.
SOCIETaL WEIGhING aS CONTExTuaLISaTION PRaCTICES
The societal weighing that happens in appraisal, identified under the previous heading as the 
primary place of use of necessity argumentations, serves to set the decision-making process and 
outcome in context, to contextualise it. I will show in this section that societal weighing entails first, 
‘bringing the outside in’, and second, placing the decision ‘back into society’. I will then set these 
findings in the wider Health Services Research and Science and Technology Studies literatures 
relevant to coverage decision-making practice, explicating my contribution by describing societal 
weighing as contextualisation practices.
Bringing the outside in
In the process of societal weighing, ‘the outside’ is actively brought in. This happens in two primary 
ways, first, through the patients, patient representatives, and/or other stakeholders that are present 
in the room (or have been present in the scoping session), and second, through argumentations 
brought in by the appraisal committee members. I will discuss these in turn.
First, the patient, patient representatives, and/or other stakeholders strongly impact the processes 
of societal weighing as they represent the outside. They arrive in the scoping or appraisal committee 
meeting literally from the outside: they use the visitors’ entrance, sit in the audience section (see 
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Chapter 3), and are here for this decision only. In this dataset on appraisals, these groups were 
almost exclusively visible in the eculizumab case, where a mother described the roller coaster their 
family had experienced since their daughter’s diagnosis with aHUS. However, the effect of patient 
(representative)s on the deliberations were a primary topic in the interviews with the committee 
members. Their contributions are considered to steer or guide the deliberative process in terms 
of challenging the committee to substantiate their decision well. Moreover, other stakeholders 
contributed in several cases at other moments, such as pharmacists in the paracetamol-vitamin D 
case drawing attention to vulnerable groups, and the association of dentists who set the front teeth 
replacement therapy decision on the agenda and inputted later on as well.
The second way in which the outside is brought in is through the committee members them-
selves, who derive argumentations from a wide variety of ‘outside sources’. These sources include 
but are not limited to newspapers (as in the case of maternity care, where reference was made to 
beschuit met muisjes smeren) and previous decisions (as in the cases of front teeth replacement 
therapy, where it was linked to the coverage status of contraceptives for under-18s, and eculizumab, 
with the earlier decision for PNH patients). Naturally, argumentations may also come from the 
contributions noted above, as the pharmacists who contributed during the scoping session for 
paracetamol-vitamin D tablets, whose argumentations were repeated by an appraisal committee 
member.vv The committee, then, may add an argumentation from the outside to a (collective) 
decision network and in this way ascertain and, if successful, ensure its validity in this case.
In societal weighing, the outside is actively brought in through the presence and contributions 
of patients, their representatives, and/or other stakeholders, which steer or guide the delibera-
tions, and through the committee members themselves as they bring in new argumentations from 
outside sources and add them to decisions.
Placing the decision back outside
Placing the decision back outside is likewise achieved through two interlinked ways. The first ele-
ment is that the committee seeks to make a robust decision, conceptualised by Rip as being able 
to withstand pressure in particular outside settings, achieved through careful bringing together of 
argumentations into a solid justification or rationale. The second element is the addition of recom-
mendations.
The first element, making a robust decision, entails for the committee to bring argumentations 
and other decision elements together with the societal context in mind, which means here to make 
reasonings explicit. Specifically, the explication of argumentation types for reasons of providing a 
justification or rationale is important here. Such explication into networks of argumentation types 
cannot be performed randomly, seen first in the fact that many argumentation types appear to be 
used for either positive or negative coverage decisions. They tend to come in patterns, as shown by 
the similarities between several argumentation patterns in the cross-country comparison, such as 
the English and Dutch decisions on nivolumab and smoking cessation therapies. It is also shown 
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by the ways alternative decision networks are explicated, such as the appraisal committee member 
who professed to be able understand that beschuit met muisjes smeren should not fall under the 
collective solidarity, as well as the committee member who posited that safeguarding the disposable 
income of vulnerable groups is not the prime responsibility of the basic benefits basket. Both were 
done to benefit the reason-giving: to provide a justification or rationale displaying that these mat-
ters had been thought about, though dismissed.
The second way in which the committee places the decision back outside is through recom-
mendations to other stakeholders. These recommendations comprise, in this dataset, continued 
work on indication criteria (e.g., the maternity care case, but also the English and Dutch decisions 
on benzodiazepines and the German decision on walking aids with wheels), price negotiations 
(nivolumab case), but also cooperation with other research centres (eculizumab case) and for the 
Minister to “to think carefully about the prescription rule” (paracetamol-vitamin D case). Impor-
tantly, giving recommendations is not part of the formal remit of this committee; they actively 
branch out when they give such recommendations. These practices also serve to make the decision 
more robust, even specifying the outside settings in which the decision is to have an effect.
Societal weighing thus secondly entails placing the decision back outside through making careful 
justifications or rationales for decisions and making them explicit to benefit those outside, and 
through formulating recommendations for specific outside settings.
Contextualisation practices
In this section, I would like to concretise how conceptualising societal weighing as contextualisa-
tion practices builds on, and contributes to, the HSR and STS literatures.
First, as outlined in the Introduction, scholars in HSR have described committees like the Dutch 
appraisal committee as taking decisions flexibly, humanely, with sensitivity towards emotions 
and preferences of the recipient(s) of the health technology under consideration as well as those 
making the decision (Hughes & Light, 2002; Mechanic, 1997; Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014). This 
is combined with adhering to decision criteria and procedures. These committees are especially 
good at doing both (Hughes & Doheny, 2011; Jenkings & Barber, 2004; Russell, 2017). Russell has 
designated this combination as experts displaying pragmatic rationality (Russell, 2017, following 
a.o. Aristotle; Russell & Greenhalgh, 2014).
HSR’s conceptualisation of pragmatic rationality as human (responsive to patients and others) 
and rational (responsive to criteria and procedures), this dissertation shows, has a distinct outwork-
ing when it comes to societal weighing. In societal weighing, these patients, their representatives, 
and/or stakeholders are representing the societal context in the deliberative setting. During the 
deliberations, the appraisal committee feels they need to keep their distance (cf. Moreira, 2012)
but that the presence of patient (representative)s does give them “handles” for substantiating their 
position. In this sense, this outside that is brought in by patient (representative)s being present, 
this context, follows STS scholar Asdal as it “conditions or enables a specific utterance to happen” 
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(Asdal, 2012, p. 388). As such, it is primarily the people that are present that have this type of impact 
(cf. Wallenburg et al., 2019), and this is perceived to increase the quality of the decision outcome. 
Notably, this links the presence of the patients, their representatives, and/or other stakeholders, 
who represent the outside, directly to the quality of the decision justification or rationale, which is 
for the benefit of the outside. It is a double form of contextualisation. Deliberations, decisions, and 
justifications or rationales being shaped by these actors in this way I thus denote as contextualisa-
tion practices.
Second, STS has classically described pragmatic rationality as taking into account circumstances 
relevant to that unique situation in order to achieve robust outcomes in particular settings (Rip, 
1985, 1992). Rip specifies that pragmatic rationality is crucial in the absence of scientific and socio-
political consensus, in line with more recent studies that highlight such rationality in situations of 
high uncertainty (Calnan et al., 2017; Moreira, 2011). Within STS, one-off controversy has been 
deemed an important area of study. The reasoning is that many implicit argumentations become 
explicated in confrontational settings especially (Callon et al., 2009; Moreira, 2011, 2013).
As noted in Chapter 4, this study shows that such explication also happens, at least in part, in less 
controversial decisions. Moreover, it is not just explication of argumentations; the committee care-
fully brings them together by bringing the outside in (deriving from newspapers and the like) and 
adding recommendations to stakeholders, who are in daily life positioned outside. Argumentations 
to be factored into the decision are fragile during the process and needs to be solidified or linked 
in some way, which happens in the decision-making situation (Callon et al., 2009; Nowotny, 2003; 
Rip, 1992). Part of the contextualisation of the decision thus involves deciding which argumentation 
types are, and which are not, taken along in the final decision: around the table is where the active 
integration of the outside argumentations happens. Moreover, it is where the recommendations are 
formulated, which is a specification of actively making a decision robust in certain outside contexts. 
Recommendations specify who should do what to ‘make this work’, to heighten the quality of care. 
As indicated earlier, previous work has not engaged much with giving recommendations, and this 
is therefore an important nuance: recommendations make a decision robust in certain contexts. 
Here we thus also see a double contextualisation movement: active integration of outside argumen-
tations, combined with active formulation of recommendations to benefit outside contexts.
Concluding, conceptualising societal weighing as contextualisation practices focuses our gaze 
on two elements. First, it highlights the impact of patients, their representatives, and/or other 
stakeholders as representing the outside in terms of the quality of the decision justification, which 
is for the benefit of those outside; second, it shows the expertise of the committee in terms of 
choosing the right outside argumentations, combining them, and formulating recommendations, 
all deriving from or aimed at this same outside, i.e. the societal contexts as conceived of for that 
specific health care technology and coverage decision.
Societal weighing is achieved through contextualisation practices, which specifically conceive of 
patients, their representatives, and/or other stakeholders as representing outside contexts which 
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condition or enable utterances to happen and thereby increasing the quality of the decision jus-
tification or rationale for the benefit of those outside. Second, they comprise actively integrating 
argumentations deriving from outside contexts, showing that explication also happens in less 
controversial decisions, and adding recommendations to stakeholders which are positioned in 
certain outside contexts.
ExPERTS aS GuaRaNTORS Of DECISION quaLITy
In this section, I will briefly explore the role of the committee in terms of experts as guarantors 
of decision quality in view of the different ‘types’ of societal weighing that this dissertation has 
described, and how this differs from the traditional types of guarantors described in the Introduc-
tion, namely through adherence to procedural or substantive criteria.
Though all societal weighing processes, characterised by contextualisation practices, display 
elements of bringing the outside in and placing the decision back outside, the way they do so 
varies significantly. Societal weighing expressly does not look the same for every decision. The 
societal weighing takes a different shape every time and this is most obvious in how the com-
mittee assumes different roles and by extension in how the collective solidarity through the basic 
benefits basket assumes different shapes. Examples that stand in stark contrast include: “we want 
to make something possible here” (eculizumab case) or “simply stamping the file”, meaning that 
the committee functions as an enabler of price negotiations (Dutch and English nivolumab deci-
sions). Another apparently contradictory set would be ‘not responsible for the disposable income of 
certain groups’ (paracetamol-vitamin D case, as there are other responsible organisations, but also 
the Dutch walking aids with wheels decision) contrasted with ‘responsible for children and young 
people’ (maternity care and front teeth replacement therapy cases). Many may conceive of these 
differences as problematic. I will proceed to argue the opposite, namely that choosing the right role 
and thus demarcating the extent of the collective solidarity is exactly what the appraisal committee 
is supposed to do.
The robustness of a decision is dependent on the setting(s) in which the decision is to play a role, 
and the particulars of these settings are different every time. The societal context in this dissertation 
is expressly not used as a non-specific explanatory resource (Asdal, 2012; Asdal & Moser, 2012): the 
societal context varies per decision as it is differently conceived of for that specific health care technol-
ogy and coverage decision. Let me demonstrate this. The examples above showcase different patients 
of differing ages, differing clinical pictures, but also differing ways in which the care is provided, 
different stakeholders and divisions of responsibilities, different initiatives and possibilities in terms 
of research but also in terms of price negotiations. Naturally, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
of a health care technology differ every time as well but the role these criteria may play and their 
perceived validity do, in principle, not vary to the same extent across decisions. The committee, 
then, does well to be aware of the particulars of a decision’s specific societal contexts and to take 
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them along actively in the decision-making process. In this active taking-along, this integration, 
it is important to note that the people present in the appraisal committee meeting, the patient 
(representative)s, other stakeholders, Institute employees, and the committee members themselves, 
all contribute to the fact that not anything goes. Instead, delineating the collective solidarity in the 
right way for a particular health care technology requires expertise in terms of societal weighing, 
evidenced by this specific set of contextualisation practices: bringing the outside in and placing the 
decision back outside in a careful, appropriate, and well-legitimated manner.
Not all societal weighing processes look the same: in fact, they vary significantly. This is shown by 
the fact that the committee takes different roles in the deliberations, and that correspondingly, the 
extent of the collective solidarity is demarcated differently. This, I argue, is not a problem – rather, 
it is exactly how it should be. Not only varies the health care technology per decision but also the 
contexts that are perceived as relevant are significantly different each time. This means that in 
expert contextualisation practices, through which a high-quality societal weighing is achieved, 
these different contexts are taken into account well. This results in carefully made, appropriate, 
well-legitimated, robust decisions.
WEaVING NECESSITy
Above, I have described contextualisation practices as the processes of using argumentations to 
achieve an expert societal weighing. I have chosen the metaphor of weaving to denote these con-
textualisation practices and I will spend some words on this metaphor here. The contextualisation 
practices described are evidently more than muddling through, even elegantly; they require exper-
tise to achieve well. They achieve more than rationality, even pragmatic rationality; they achieve a 
decision that is considered well-rounded and well-grounded. The metaphor of weaving, evoking 
notions of a structured, organised craft, with differing substrates in terms of colours and thickness 
but clear boundaries in terms of what may be achieved, I trust, helps bring out the art of making 
health care coverage decisions. Previous operationalisations of the necessity criterion, whether in 
the form of checklists or broadly-defined considerations, seem to have missed this aspect. I would 
argue they have thought more about the ‘science’ of decision making, and less about the art (Jacobs, 
2017).
The use of the necessity criterion in practice, I would like to characterise as ‘weaving necessity’. 
Necessity argumentations, which are many, case-specific, actively integrated during deliberations 
around the table, and varied in level of formalisation but used in patterns, ensure that decisions 
are not made without reference to relevant societal contexts. Weaving necessity, then, entails using 
these carefully-selected argumentations in a way that achieves a societal weighing (in terms of both 
bringing the outside in and placing the decision back outside), delineating the collective solidarity 
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in a way that is well-legitimated and sensitive to the case at hand, in a way that yields a decision that 
is robust in contexts that are considered relevant.
Weaving necessity is a metaphor I use to evoke the art of decision making, showcasing that neces-
sity argumentations, which are many, case-specific, and patterned, are actively integrated into 
decisions through these contextualisation practices. Using necessity argumentations thus aids 
achieving a high-quality societal weighing through delineating the collective solidarity in an ap-
propriate, robust manner.
POLICy RECOMMENDaTIONS
I would like to provide three specific policy recommendations and a brief reflection on all three. Be-
fore I begin, it is clear that policy practice is also on the move while research happens (Zorginstituut 
Nederland, 2017), and it may well also point to how the two worlds intertwine. This may happen 
through informal conversations and more formal presentations; the recent Wikken en Wegen report 
is written by my primary point of contact at the Institute, who also co-authored Chapter 2. Three 
specific elements of this report as describe above resonate strongly with this dissertation. First, the 
renewed interest for reference to the societal context. Second, the non-exhaustiveness of a list of 
criteria: additional relevant argumentations are always possible. Three, the importance of a strong 
justification or rationale to back up the advised decision. In line with the above, I would advise the 
Institute to continue on this path by following three recommendations.
Contextualisation practices entail first, bringing the outside in, in which patients, their repre-
sentatives, and/or other stakeholders play a vital role. Consequently, my first recommendation is 
to take steps to invite more different perspectives into the deliberative process in the appraisal. This 
tallies with Moes’ reasoning that this values especially patients in their capacity as knower (Moes, 
2019) and the scoping sessions currently being institutionalised at the Institute (Zorginstituut 
Nederland, 2017). In my words, this entails bringing more different and more different types of 
argumentations into the decision-making process. To this end, I would encourage reflection on 
how to achieve that and whom to involve, as well as exchanges between HTA agencies on more 
qualitative aspects of health care coverage decisions. I would add that having more actors present 
in the decision-making setting might also contribute to the realisation of the rest of the decision 
through linking argumentations together into decision networks. This would also thus potentially 
facilitate a more rigorous testing step, as the appraisal committee currently tests these decision 
networks alone. This would enable research on how different forms of expertise and experiential 
knowledge work differently in terms of ‘opening up the decision network (a suggestion which I 
owe to Professor Tiago Moreira). As a corollary, I suggest institutionalising an improved appeals 
procedure, as it will open opportunities to contribute to not only ongoing decisions but also to 
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those taken in the past, perhaps redressing at least part of the power differential inherent to these 
decisions.
Second, contextualisation practices comprise setting the decision back outside. That includes, as 
stated above, the involvement of others not only in the scoping phase but also in the testing during 
the appraisal phase. Moreover, as the justification or rationale is essential herein, I would suggest 
that the final advised coverage decision would benefit from including alternative decisions that were 
considered but not chosen. I would suggest that if for example both a positive and a negative decision 
were considered, or two variations on a positive decision, both potential decisions are displayed 
in the final advised decision including the argumentations that were considered to back up these 
alternatives. The reason is that this inclusion of alternative decisions would helpfully show that 
the concluding decision was not consensual, spelling out rather than obscuring differing points of 
view (Mouffe, 1999, 2011; Rip, 1986). Although a potential controversy may, of course, still follow, 
a relatively robust decision outcome will benefit from the transparency gained by the inclusion of 
alternative decisions that were also considered.
Third, I would advocate for the Institute to consider ways to actively find controversy and invite 
it in (again not just in the appraisal phase but more generally), as an additional way to bring the 
outside in. Callon et al. suggest:
[Controversies] should be encouraged, stimulated, and organized. There are overflows every-
where. They produce the fabric of our individual and collective lives. (Callon et al., 2009, p. 257)
They see overflows, that is, places of controversy, everywhere. This yields another recommendation 
for the Institute: actively finding controversy that may be brewing ‘in society’, and drawing it in. 
This is another, more proactive form of contextualisation, and would perhaps take the form of ho-
rizon scanning not just for expensive medicines but for controversy in the making. Examples might 
include organising a conversation on the inclusion of menstrual cups in the basic benefits basket as 
suggested by a recent petition (https://petities.nl/petitions/menstruatiecup-in-de-basisverzekering, 
accessed 19 November 2019). This actively inviting in controversy in the making also yields a task 
for researchers: designing and experimenting with methods to identify (hidden) controversy, in 
addition to existing methods to map them (e.g., Marres, 2015; Munk et al., 2016).
All three recommendations may appear to rely on a somewhat idealistic and rationalistic de-
scription of deliberation, and as such, clash with the largely organic process that I describe in terms 
of coming to a decision through weaving. Regarding the second recommendation for example, in 
the contextualisation process, one potential outcome takes precedence over another, the committee 
considers it more worth investing ‘weaving time’ into, and as such, the decision that is not taken 
will never be as carefully woven as the decision that is. On the first and third recommendation, this 
weaving process does by no means guarantee all elements to be taken along by those who weave – 
and thus far, the experts at contextualisation have been the appraisal committee, which has given 
the deliberative situation another dimension to the already notable power differential in the room. 
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Finally, it does not explicitly acknowledge the antagonism that is and will be present, in part due 
to the inherent tension between the individual and the collective (Moreira, 2011), an antagonism 
that is not to be obscured by consensus (Mouffe, 1999, 2011). Thus far, the weaving process and 
robust outcomes of decisions have resonated with and strengthened one another, but here these 
conceptualisations do clash. I would argue that robustness takes precedence here. This means that 
even though this alternative decision is less carefully woven, which will probably take the form of 
being less precise, less extensive, and less well-formulated, it is worth including it in the decision 
outcome nevertheless, for reasons of transparency. These recommendations, then, ultimately hope 
to provide concrete steps to lessening the power differential somewhat, risking antagonism for the 
relatively robust and transparent outcomes it may produce.
STRENGThS aND LIMITaTIONS
This study is the first to produce an overview of argumentations pertaining to necessity. It is strong 
in terms of showing how these argumentations are used, as it does so through analysing observa-
tions/audio recordings, documents, and interviews in the Netherlands but also abroad. It interprets 
a relatively large number of cases (four Dutch appraisals and sixteen further decision outcomes) 
and finds commonalities in argumentation use across those. Naturally, because of time constraints, 
some in-depth familiarisation may have been lacking.
Moreover, my efforts have largely been focused on the appraisal phase and the documentation 
surrounding it, but contextualisation may be conceived of as much more than just the appraisal. This 
is visible, for example, in the scoping session and the Institute employees who write up the discus-
sion documents. Many argumentations that were prepared were, however, verbalised, explicated, in 
the appraisal meeting, making it a prime locus for this study. Within the appraisal meetings, I have 
focused on explicit rather than implicit meaning-giving. This was, as reflected on below, formed by 
both my personal research interests as well as the practicalities of using explicated argumentations 
as sensitising concepts. It does remain likely that in this way, I have put less emphasis on more 
implicit forms of contextualisation. Similarly, I have had a relatively narrow focus on necessity. How 
these different contextualisation practices intertwine and what more implicit forms look like would 
benefit from further research.
REfLECTION ON PERSONaL RESEaRCh POSITION aND ROLE
In answering the research questions, it is important to be aware of the epistemological angle I have 
approached them from and how this may have impacted the data collection and interpretation.
My reflections are on epistemology and specifically on how it impacts doing research in terms 
of methodology, conceptualisations, and conclusions. With my background in the natural sciences 
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(biomedical research to be precise), I am used to showing care towards my research subject(s). 
Counterintuitive as this may sound to some, cultured cells require diligent care (cleaning, feeding, 
and the like), and stem cells, in particular, are fussy research subjects, necessitating the researcher 
to give up Saturday afternoons to care-giving tasks. Naturally, this imperative of taking care holds 
even more for those with human research subjects and, according to Latour, especially of those 
who adopt a constructivist stance, as I have done in this research (Latour, 2004). To specify, by 
a constructivist stance, I understand that ‘facts’, scientific or otherwise, are made, knowledge is 
generated, in the sense that knowledge is mediated in some way.
This means first and foremost that my academic work has been mediated: I have been as involved 
in and as responsible for data generation as the people and practices I studied, and likely even more 
so. This is visible in the construction of the twenty necessity argumentation types, which are mine 
alone (but checked with a co-reader). It is no less true for the conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3, 
even though these were member-checked rigorously. Law and Singleton state that research means 
selecting, and that by writing up data into chapters, I betray part of the data that were available to 
me (Law & Singleton, 2013). I would have to agree that other conclusions, or at least other nuances, 
would indeed have been possible. I have two examples of how my personal preferences have shaped 
my research. First, as a researcher, I am interested in investigating what I consider tangible: I find 
it difficult to convincingly show how external factors may implicitly affect decisions (Asdal, 2012; 
Asdal & Moser, 2012). This has impacted the way I have opted to follow the argumentation types 
across the different observed meetings and documents (Chapters 2-4), rather than follow inter-
viewees’ ideas of how certain contexts, such as the presence of innovative pharmaceutical industry 
or David Cameron’s desire to be re-elected, both of which were mentioned by interviewees, may 
have had an indirect impact on certain coverage decisions. Second, I have been shaped by a book 
called ‘How People Think’ (Jacobs, 2017), where Alan Jacobs convincingly argues (following Daniel 
Kahneman and Jonathan Haidt, amongst others) that people make decisions intuition-first. This is 
followed by a rationalisation of this intuition by providing reasons for why this intuition is right. I 
also believe, however, that this process of providing reasons is important for the legitimacy of public 
decisions especially. I think that decisions that are made by a direct appeal to a Minister of Health, 
who does not have to account for his or her decisions in the same way, are less valid – as visible in 
Chapter 4 especially. Overall, during its coming together and when it is finished, academic work is 
performative, it does something. I am therefore not surprised to see ongoing parallels between my 
work and the policy developments at the Institute (Law & Singleton, 2013).
On taking care as a constructivist, Latour specifies that:
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who 
lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naive believers, but the one who offers the participants 
arenas in which to gather (…) one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is 
fragile and thus in great need of care and caution. (Latour, 2004, p. 246)
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From this, I gather that to believe that the research subject is constructed and to show how it is con-
structed, how it is made, is to expose its vulnerabilities. For me personally, this only truly acquired 
meaning after a particularly vivid member check, in which I appeared to have misinterpreted the 
deliberations at the appraisal committee I studied. Sayer gives hands and feet to this idea of taking 
care when he says in his book ‘Why Things Matter to People’ that it is possible for social scientists to 
over-theorise to such an extent that the people studied do not recognise themselves (Sayer, 2011). He 
argues that social scientists should aim to remain close to the interpretation of those studied. These 
two ideas, of showing care and of remaining close to the interpretation of the research subjects, 
have helped me find direction for my dissertation. These ideas have impacted the methodology, 
some of which was chosen in collaboration with the research subjects (Chapter 2). These ideas 
may also have, perhaps, impacted the theoretical concepts employed to give meaning to the data 
gathered. After the deconstruction phase of studying the appraisal committee meetings and the 
advised decisions, I have chosen to conceptualise the robustness of health care coverage decisions. 
I believe this does justice to the everyday work at the Institute, and I believe it may potentially 
contribute constructively to future efforts.
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When exactly is a health care technology necessary and how do we determine this on a collective 
level? Just how far should the collective solidarity stretch? These questions are answered every 
time a health care coverage decision is made. The Dutch National Health Care Institute (in Dutch: 
Zorginstituut Nederland, in this text: the Institute) is an arm’s length body tasked with advising the 
Minister of Health on these decisions, which specify the contents of the basic benefits basket. The 
basic benefits basket contains all health care technologies covered by the collective health insur-
ance Dutch citizens are obliged to take out. The Institute uses four specific formalised criteria to 
formulate their health care coverage advice, namely effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, feasibility, and 
necessity. This final criterion has been defined or operationalised in different ways over the years 
since the influential Dunning Committee report on Choices in Health Care first suggested it, nearly 
30 years ago. It has, however, also long been considered “non-uniform” and “problematic” by schol-
ars. This dissertation provides a fresh operationalisation of the necessity criterion by answering the 
question: how is the necessity criterion used in practice?
In this dissertation, I argue that the necessity criterion has, in the past, been operationalised too 
narrowly, primarily following a well-established tendency at the Institute (and further afield) to 
guarantee the rationality of decisions through strong adherence to well-explicated decision criteria. 
This tendency has obscured what this notion of necessity is there to achieve: that an advised deci-
sion is not made without explicit reference to the societal context. This reference to the societal 
context, then, happens in Dutch coverage decision-making practice by using necessity argumenta-
tions, which are the form the necessity criterion takes in practice. These argumentations, I show, 
are far broader than the formalised tenets of the necessity criterion as visible in the most recent 
instalments of relevant policy documentation.
The Introduction gives an overview of three cornerstones of this study: first, the most important 
policy reports, starting with the Dunning Committee report; second, the primarily inductive Health 
Services Research (HSR) literatures on coverage decision making; and third, the relevant Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) literatures on expert advice. The policy reports that have dealt with 
the necessity criterion highlight two things: first, the necessity criterion has been operationalised in 
many ways, but over the years it seems to have moved from a broad definition to a highly specific 
one, with elements of severity of illness and reference to the context, whether societal or insti-
tutional in terms of insurance, relatively permanent. Second, the location of using the necessity 
criterion has almost always been in deliberation, and specifically, in the appraisal phase (which 
is generally defined as a setting for contextualisation or societal weighing and as following the 
assessment phase, where the scientific input regarding, e.g., effectiveness and cost-effectiveness is 
established).
The section on HSR zooms in on how health care coverage decisions are made in practice, gener-
ally focusing on the deliberative setting. It describes how the field first exhibited an appreciation 
of making these decisions not according to general rules or criteria, as they were seen as too rigid. 
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Instead, decision makers’ personal preferences were described as vital for good decisions. This has 
evolved to showing expertise in such decisions as doing both-and; the application of criteria, which 
often comprised using scientific knowledge, and following procedures is combined with local or 
contextual knowledge, displaying human-ness. Combining these elements well is described as 
displaying pragmatic rationality, whereby the expertise needed to do so guarantees the quality of 
the decision.
The STS literatures referenced do not focus on the deliberations only but showcase the role such 
deliberations and decisions may play in a wider political decision-making process. Here, also, 
pragmatic rationalism is referenced, but in this case, it is defined as being able to produce a robust 
outcome in certain contexts. Robustness is described in terms of the ability to withstand pres-
sure ‘out there’, but also as deriving from substantive input wider and more varied than technical 
expertise. This focus on what happens to a decision afterwards highlights the importance of a good 
decision justification or rationale.
Chapter 1 starts with providing an overview of twenty necessity argumentation types derived 
from scholarly literatures through a realist review. Such a review aims to provide insight into what 
works, for whom, and in what context. We use it to identify these twenty argumentation types 
(which include but are not limited to, the morbidity and need as experienced by the patient, avail-
ability of alternative treatments, the financial cost per individual patient, and compassion with 
vulnerable groups such as children or small numbers of patients generally) and examine in what 
context and by whom they are used to argue in favour of, or against, coverage of the health care 
technology in question. We conclude that the context wherein a necessity argumentation is used 
affects its use and outcome in several ways. The use of necessity argumentations thus depends on 
the outcome of the decision (different argumentation types are used to argue in favour of or against 
coverage); the person who is arguing in favour of or against coverage (patients, authors, members 
of the public, and the media use a wider variety of argumentation types than policy makers and 
insurance companies, and when a member of the public or a patient sets the decision on the agenda 
the outcome is more likely to be positive); and sometimes on the country where it is used (some 
countries appear to have very specific argumentation type preferences).
In Chapter 2, my co-authors and I report on a cross-country comparison on the use of contextual 
factors (i.e., necessity argumentations) between Belgium, England, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
We follow Asdal and Moser in defining contextual factors as situation-specific and compare the 
countries’ use of contextual factors generally based on interviews, and the documentation reporting 
the justification/rationale of four decisions taken in all four countries. Most interestingly, all four 
countries do use contextual factors thus operationalised, and the relevant factors are established 
in deliberation, around the table. The Netherlands employs a relatively wide variety of factors and 
has a high level of formalisation of the necessity criterion compared to Belgium, England, and 
Germany. Notably, similar contextual factor patterns led to similar decisions across the countries, 
suggesting patterning of argumentations as an interesting avenue for further research. A significant 
number of decisions lacked a public justification, raising questions on legitimacy.
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Chapter 3 homes in on what happens around the table in the Netherlands, specifically the 
appraisal phase of four distinct health care coverage decisions, namely eculizumab, front teeth 
replacement therapy, maternity care, and paracetamol-vitamin D tablets. The appraisal committee 
(in Dutch: Adviescommissie Pakket, ACP) is tasked with the ‘societal weighing’ of these decisions 
and regarded as a primary place for establishing, or ‘constructing’, necessity. Through analysis of 
observations and audio-recordings of appraisal meetings, enriched by interviews with commit-
tee members and Institute employees, we show how necessity is constructed in the four phases 
of appraisal. These four phases are first, the contributions of the Institute employee; second, the 
contributions of patients and/or their representatives; third, deliberations of the committee; and 
fourth, taking the final decision. These phases highlight four ways of constructing necessity: 1) 
allowing explicit criteria to steer the process; 2) allowing patient (representative) contributions to 
challenge the process; 3) bringing in new argumentations and weaving them together; 4) formulat-
ing recommendations. These correspond to four elements of societal weighing expertise, of which 
the latter two are most distinct, as they show how argumentations from society are actively used 
and how the decision outcome is embedded in society by the committee.
Chapter 4 derives a three-step model for making robust coverage decisions from Science and 
Technology Studies literatures on controversy and re-examines some of the data from the previous 
chapter to illustrate this model. The model conceptualises (advised) decisions as networks as ele-
ments and comprises three steps: 1) identifying elements, which include findings, arguments, and 
values; 2) designing networks of elements, which entails articulating links, broadening the scope of 
networks, and sometimes black-boxing links; and 3) testing these networks and choosing one. This 
yields a clear additional rationale for engaging patients and members of the public (as they might 
contribute different and different types of elements, positively affecting decision network strength) 
as well as an appreciation of the tacit expertise brought to bear by the committee.
The Discussion showcases the contribution of this study by first, summarising how the neces-
sity criterion is used in practice, thus answering the research question, and second, by specifying 
how societal weighing is achieved through contextualisation practices and delineating how this 
contributes to HSR and STS literatures.
The necessity criterion takes the form of argumentations in favour of, or against, coverage of the 
health care technology under consideration, and their perceived validity, and hence their selec-
tion differs per case. Many countries use necessity argumentations in coverage decisions, but they 
generally have formalised these argumentations to differing degrees, with the Netherlands serving 
as a country with a relatively high level of formalisation. Necessity argumentations are generally 
established in patterns in a deliberative setting. The Dutch appraisal thus serves as an interesting 
site for further study, and this is where the societal weighing is achieved.
Societal weighing entails first, ‘bringing the outside in’, and second, ‘placing the decision back 
outside’. The outside is actively brought in through the presence of patients, their representatives, 
and/or other stakeholders, who are here for this decision only but steer and guide the deliberations 
in vital ways and through committee members referencing outside sources such as newspapers 
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and adding these considerations to decisions. The decision is placed back outside through the 
way the committee carefully brings lots of argumentations together with producing a robust, that 
is, able to withstand pressure in outside settings, decision in mind, and through the addition of 
recommendations relevant for specific outside settings. This adds to HSR and STS literatures as it 
showcases what makes societal weighing distinct, namely the contextualisation practices, through 
which the outside, that is, the relevant contexts, affects the processes, contents, and outcomes of 
the deliberations. This results in different ‘types’ of societal weighing that may happen around the 
table, which is not problematic but in fact guarantees the quality of the decision. The delibera-
tions, decisions, and justifications or rationales are of high quality as they display this specific set 
of contextualisation practices: bringing the outside in and placing the decision back outside in a 
careful, appropriate, and well-legitimated manner, sensitive to the specific outside contexts that are 
considered relevant.
I use the metaphor of weaving necessity to evoke the art of the decision-making process, wherein 
the many, case-specific, and patterned necessity argumentations are brought together to help delin-
eate the extent of our collective solidarity appropriately and robustly.
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Wanneer is een zorgtechnologie precies noodzakelijk en hoe bepalen we dit op collectief niveau? 
Hoe ver moet de collectieve solidariteit precies gaan? Deze vragen worden beantwoord op het 
moment dat er een beslissing wordt genomen over de vergoeding van gezondheidszorg. Zorgin-
stituut Nederland (in deze tekst: het Instituut) is een overheidsinstantie belast met het adviseren 
van de Minister van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport over deze beslissingen, waarmee de inhoud 
van het basispakket van de zorgverzekering wordt gespecificeerd. Het basispakket bevat alle 
zorgtechnologieën die worden gedekt door de collectieve basisverzekering, die alle Nederlandse 
burgers verplicht zijn af te sluiten. Het Instituut gebruikt vier specifieke, geformaliseerde criteria 
om zulk vergoedingsadvies te formuleren, namelijk effectiviteit, kosteneffectiviteit, uitvoerbaar-
heid en noodzakelijkheid. Sinds het bijna 30 jaar geleden voor het eerst werd voorgesteld in het 
invloedrijke rapport van de commissie-Dunning, ‘Kiezen En Delen, Rapport van de Commissie 
Keuzen in de Zorg’, is het laatste criterium, noodzakelijkheid, op verschillende manieren gedefi-
nieerd en geoperationaliseerd. Het noodzakelijkheidscriterium wordt echter ook al lang door 
wetenschappers als “niet-uniform” en “problematisch” beschouwd. In dit proefschrift bied ik een 
nieuwe operationalisering van dit criterium door de volgende vraag te beantwoorden: hoe wordt 
het noodzakelijkheidscriterium in de praktijk gebruikt?
In dit proefschrift beargumenteer ik dat het noodzakelijkheidscriterium in het verleden te krap is 
geoperationaliseerd. De voornaamste reden hiervoor is de sterke neiging bij het Instituut (en daar-
buiten) om de rationaliteit van beslissingen te garanderen door middel van rechtlijnig gebruik van 
duidelijk omschreven beslissingscriteria. Deze neiging verbloemde wat deze noodzakelijkheidsno-
tie in staat is te bewerkstelligen, namelijk dat een geadviseerde beslissing niet wordt genomen 
zonder te verwijzen naar de maatschappelijke context. Het noodzakelijkheidscriterium neemt in 
de praktijk de vorm aan van argumentenen deze argumenten worden gebruikt in de Nederlandse 
beslissingspraktijk voor deze verwijzing naar de maatschappelijke context. Ik laat zien dat deze 
argumenten veel breder zijn dan de geformaliseerde principes van het noodzakelijkheidscriterium 
zoals beschreven in de meest recente relevante beleidsdocumentatie.
De Inleiding geeft een overzicht van de drie pijlers van deze studie: ten eerste, de belangrijkste 
beleidsdocumentatie sinds het rapport van de commissie-Dunning; ten tweede, elevante literatuur 
over Gezondheidswetenschappen (Health Services Research, HSR) over vergoedingsbesluitvorming; 
en ten derde de relevante Wetenschaps- en Technologiestudies (Science and Technology Studies, 
STS) over advies van deskundigen. De beleidsdocumentatie waarin het noodzakelijkheidscriterium 
is behandeld benadrukt twee dingen: ten eerste is het noodzakelijkheidscriterium op vele manieren 
geoperationaliseerd, maar door de jaren heen lijkt de overgang te zijn gemaakt van een relatief 
brede definitie naar een specifiekere Hierin lijken elementen van ziektelast en verwijzing naar de 
context, de maatschappelijke context dan wel de geïnstitutionaliseerde context in termen van ver-
zekering, relatief permanent. Ten tweede is het gebruik van het noodzakelijkheidscriterium bijna 
altijd gelokaliseerd in deliberatie. in de appraisal fase om precies te zijn, die over het algemeen 
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wordt gedefinieerd als de setting voor contextualisering of maatschappelijke weging en als volgend 
op de assessment fase, waar de wetenschappelijke input, onder andere de effectiviteit en kostenef-
fectiviteit, wordt vastgesteld.
Het gedeelte over HSR zoomt in op hoe beslissingen over de vergoeding van de gezondheidszorg 
in de praktijk worden genomen, waarbij de nadruk meestal ligt op de setting waarin de deliberatie 
plaatsvindt. Ik beschrijf daarin hoe het veld startte vanuit een waardering voor het nemen van 
zulke beslissingen zonder algemene regels of criteria te volgen, omdat deze als te rigide werden 
beschouwd. In plaats daarvan werden de persoonlijke voorkeuren van besluitvormers beschreven 
als essentieel voor goede beslissingen. Dit is geëvolueerd naar het beschrijven van expertise in 
beslissingen die beide dingen doen, namelijk zowel het toepassen van criteria, wat vaak het gebruik 
van wetenschappelijke kennis en het volgen van procedures omvat, als het in acht nemen van lokale 
of contextuele kennis, waarin de menselijkheid van de commissie wordt getoond. Het goed combi-
neren van deze elementen wordt omschreven als het demonstreren van pragmatische rationaliteit, 
waarbij de benodigde expertise de kwaliteit van de beslissing garandeert.
De STS-literatuur die ik behandel richt zich niet alleen op de deliberatie, maar onderstreept 
vooral de rol die dergelijke beraadslagingen en beslissingen kunnen spelen in een breder politiek 
besluitvormingsproces. Ook hier wordt de term pragmatisch rationalisme gebruikt, maar in dit 
geval wordt het gedefinieerd als het in staat zijn om een  robuust resultaat te produceren in bepaalde 
contexten. Robuustheid wordt beschreven in termen van het vermogen om druk van ‘buiten’ te 
weerstaan, maar wordt ook afgeleid uit inhoudelijke input, die breder en gevarieerder is dan alleen 
technische expertise. Deze focus op wat er met een beslissing gebeurt als deze eenmaal is genomen 
onderstreept het belang van een goede motivering van een beslissing.
hoofdstuk 1 begint met een overzicht van twintig noodzakelijkheidsargumentatietypen afgeleid 
van wetenschappelijke literatuur door middel van een realist review. Dit type review is bedoeld 
om inzicht te geven in wat werkt, voor wie en in welke context. We hebben deze methode gebruikt 
om deze twintig argumentatietypes (waaronder de morbiditeit en behoeftes van de patiënt, de 
beschikbaarheid van alternatieve behandelingen, de financiële kosten per individuele patiënt en 
compassie met kwetsbare groepen zoals kinderen of kleine aantallen patiënten) te identificeren. 
We onderzoeken vervolgens in welke context en door wie ze worden gebruikt om te pleiten voor, 
of tegen, vergoeding van de technologie in kwestie. We concluderen dat de context waarin een 
noodzakelijkheidargumentatie wordt gebruikt op verschillende manieren invloed heeft op het 
gebruik en de uitkomst van de beslissing. Het gebruik van noodzakelijkheidsargumenten hangt dus 
af van de uitkomst van de beslissing (verschillende argumentatietypes worden gebruikt om voor 
of tegen vergoeding te pleiten); van de persoon (patiënten, auteurs, burgers en de media gebruiken 
een breder scala aan argumentatietypes dan beleidsmakers en verzekeringsmaatschappijen, en 
wanneer een burger of patiënt het besluit op de agenda plaatst, is het resultaat eerder positief); en 
soms van het land waar het wordt gebruikt (sommige landen lijken zeer specifieke voorkeuren voor 
argumentatietypes te hebben).
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In hoofdstuk 2 rapporteren mijn coauteurs en ik over het gebruik van contextuele factoren 
(d.w.z. noodzakelijkheidargumenten) in een vergelijking tussen België, Duitsland, Engeland en 
Nederland. We volgen Asdal en Moser in het definiëren van contextuele factoren als situatie-
specifiek. We vergelijken het gebruik van contextuele factoren in het algemeen in deze landen op 
basis van interviews, en specifiek op basis van documentatie die de motivering van vier specifieke 
beslissingen in alle vier de landen rapporteert. Het meest interessante is dat alle landen derge-
lijke contextuele factoren gebruiken, en de relevante factoren worden in overleg, rond de tafel, 
vastgesteld. Nederland hanteert een relatief grote verscheidenheid aan factoren en kent een hoge 
mate van formalisering van het noodzakelijkheidscriterium in vergelijking met België, Duitsland, 
en Engeland. Vergelijkbare contextuele factorpatronen leiden tot vergelijkbare beslissingen in de 
verschillende landen, wat suggereert dat argumentatie in patronen wordt gevormd, wat interessant 
zou kunnen zijn voor verder onderzoek. Een aanzienlijk aantal beslissingen bevatte geen openbare 
motivering, wat vragen oproept over de legitimiteit van deze beslissingen.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ingegaan op wat er in Nederland om de tafel gebeurt, met name in de ap-
praisal fase, in vier verschillende vergoedingsbesluiten, namelijk eculizumab, fronttandvervanging, 
kraamzorg en paracetamol-vitamine D-tabletten. De Adviescommissie Pakket (ACP, in deze tekst: 
appraisal commissie) is belast met de ‘maatschappelijke weging’ van deze beslissingen en wordt 
beschouwd als de primaire plaats voor het vaststellen of ‘construeren’ van noodzakelijkheid. Door 
analyse van observaties en audio-opnames van commissievergaderingen, verrijkt met behulp van 
interviews met commissieleden en medewerkers van het Instituut, laten we zien hoe noodzakelijk-
heid wordt geconstrueerd in vier fasen van de appraisal vergadering. Deze vier fasen zijn: ten eerste, 
de bijdragen van de medewerker van het Instituut; ten tweede, de bijdragen van patiënten en/of hun 
vertegenwoordigers; ten derde, de beraadslagingen van de commissie; en ten vierde, het nemen van 
de definitieve beslissing. Deze fasen belichten vier manieren om noodzakelijkheid te construeren: 
1) toelaten dat expliciete criteria het proces sturen; 2) toelaten dat bijdragen van patiënten of hun 
vertegenwoordigers het proces uitdagen; 3) nieuwe argumentaties inbrengen en deze combineren; 
en 4) formuleren van aanbevelingen. Deze vier manieren komen overeen met vier elementen van 
deskundigheid op het gebied van maatschappelijke weging, waarvan de laatste twee het meest 
specifiek zijn omdat ze laten zien hoe argumentaties uit de samenleving actief worden gebruikt en 
laten zien hoe het besluit door de commissie in de samenleving wordt ingebed.
In hoofdstuk 4 beschrijven we een driestappenmodel voor het nemen van robuuste vergoe-
dingsbesluiten op basis van STS-literatuur over controverse, geïllustreerd met behulp van data uit 
het vorige hoofdstuk. Wij conceptualiseren (geadviseerde) beslissingen als netwerken van elemen-
ten en het model om deze te bereiken bestaat uit de volgende drie stappen: 1) het identificeren 
van elementen, waaronder bevindingen, argumenten en waarden; 2) het ontwerpen van netwerken 
van elementen, waaronder verbindingen tussen elementen leggen, het verbreden van de reikwijdte 
van netwerken, en soms het ‘black-boxen’ van verbindingen; en 3) deze netwerken testen en er 
een kiezen. Dit levert een duidelijke (aanvullende) reden op om patiënten en burgers te betrekken 
(omdat ze verschillende en verschillende soorten elementen kunnen bijdragen, die de sterkte van 
174
Samenvatting
het beslissingsnetwerk positief beïnvloeden), alsook een waardering van de expertise van de com-
missie.
In de Discussie expliciteer ik de bijdrage van deze studie door eerst samen te vatten hoe het 
noodzakelijkheidscriterium in de praktijk wordt gebruikt en daarmee de onderzoeksvraag te 
beantwoorden, en ten tweede door te specificeren hoe een maatschappelijke weging wordt bereikt 
door middel van ‘contextualiseringspraktijken’, en duidelijk te maken hoe dit bijdraagt  aan HSR- en 
STS-literatuur.
Het noodzakelijkheidscriterium neemt de vorm aan van argumenten voor of tegen vergoeding 
van een bepaalde medische technologie. De geldigheid van deze argumenten, en dus hun selectie, 
verschilt per geval. Veel landen gebruiken noodzakelijkheidsargumentaties in vergoedingsbesluiten, 
maar ze hebben deze argumentaties in verschillende mate geformaliseerd. Nederland is duidelijk 
een land met een relatief hoog formaliseringsniveau. In de setting van de deliberatie worden nood-
zakelijkheidargumenten meestal in patronen gebruikt. De Nederlandse appraisal dient dus als een 
interessante plek voor verder onderzoek omdat juist hier de maatschappelijke weging plaatsvindt.
Maatschappelijk wegen omvat ten eerste, ‘het buiten binnen brengen’, en ten tweede ‘de beslis-
sing terug naar buiten brengen’. Het buiten wordt actief binnengebracht door de aanwezigheid 
van patiënten, hun vertegenwoordigers en/of andere stakeholders, die alleen voor deze beslissing 
aanwezig zijn en de beraadslagingen op cruciale manieren sturen en begeleiden, en door de com-
missieleden die gebruik maken van externe bronnen zoals kranten en deze overwegingen aan 
beslissingen toevoegen. De beslissing wordt terug naar buiten gebracht door de manier waarop de 
commissie zorgvuldig een veelheid aan argumentaties combineert met als doel het produceren van 
een robuuste beslissing, dat wil zeggen, een beslissing die bestand tegen druk van situaties buiten. 
Hetzelfde gebeurt door de toevoeging van aanbevelingen die relevant zijn voor specifieke externe 
instellingen. Dit draagt  bij aan HSR- en STS-literatuur omdat het laat zien wat maatschappelijk 
wegen onderscheidt, namelijk de contextualiseringspraktijken, waardoor het buiten, dat wil zeggen 
de relevante contexten, de processen, inhoud en resultaten van de beraadslagingen beïnvloedt. Dit 
resulteert in verschillende ‘soorten’ maatschappelijk wegen die rond de tafel kunnen plaatsvin-
den. Dit is echter niet problematisch, maar garandeert in feite de kwaliteit van de beslissing. De 
beraadslagingen, beslissingen en motivaties zijn van hoge kwaliteit omdat ze deze specifieke set 
van contextualiseringspraktijken laten zien: het buiten binnenbrengen en de beslissing terug naar 
buiten brengen op een zorgvuldige, passende en goed onderbouwde manier die gevoelig is voor de 
specifieke contexten die als relevant worden beschouwd.
Ik gebruik de metafoor van het weven van noodzakelijkheid om de kunst van het besluitvor-
mingsproces op te roepen, waarbij de vele, casus-specifieke noodzakelijkheidargumenten in een 
patroon worden samengebracht om onze collectieve solidariteit op een passende en robuuste 
manier te helpen afbakenen.
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All health care technologies covered through the basic benefits basket of 
the Dutch collective health insurance should be effective, provide value for 
money, and be necessary. This last criterion determines the extent of the 
collective solidarity. But how to establish whether a health care technology 
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Through examining qualitative cases from the Netherlands and further afield, 
Tineke Kleinhout-Vliek describes how necessity is established in health care 
coverage decision-making practice. Manifold argumentations pertaining to 
necessity exist and are used by the Dutch National Health Care Institute 
and its appraisal committee (and their equivalents in several Western 
European countries) when deliberating on and formulating advised health 
care coverage decisions. Kleinhout-Vliek details the varied but patterned use 
of these necessity argumentations in cases ranging from highly expensive 
medicines to paracetamol tablets and maternity care.
Such varied use of necessity argumentations may seem problematic, as 
variation would indicate inconsistency and potential inequity between 
decisions. Instead, Kleinhout-Vliek shows that these variable necessity 
argumentations are used for setting health care coverage decisions in 
context, that is, for contextualising them. As the relevant contexts differ 
per health care technology appraised, the relevant necessity argumentations 
vary likewise. Well-contextualised health care coverage decisions contain 
necessity argumentations that are carefully woven together. Weaving 
necessity makes these decisions robust: able to withstand pressure outside 
the decision-making setting.
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